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ASSURING THE RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATELY PREPARED DEFENSE
Criminal defendants frequently claim that they
did not have the benefit of adequate legal assistance
in their defense. This claim is, as an unsympathetic
court said a few years ago, "one of the most com-
monly raised and least successful grounds [for re-
versal] employed by convicted defendants." I The
reason for these claims and the resulting denials,
according to an equally unsympathetic court, is
that "[i]n the mind of the dissatisfied defendant,
the line between unsuccessful defense counsel and
incompetent counsel is readily confused." 2 This
attitude is epitomized by a recent commentator
who contends that the likely denial is "not neces-
sarily bad for it can be safely assumed that most
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are friv-
olous." 3 However, these sentiments cannot be in-
terpreted to mean that criminal defendants do not
have a constitutional right to adequate legal assist-
ance, that the right is never lost, or that the courts
never give a new trial for this reason.4
I Pennsylvania ex rel. Alexander v. Banmiller, 184
Pa. Super. 554, 136 A.2d 489 (1957). See also United
States v. Edwards, 152 F. Supp. 179, 185 (D.C.), aff'd,
256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847
(1958).
2 United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d
608, 614 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964).
Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945) is another example of
judicial skepticism:
The opportunity to try his former lawyer has its
undoubted attraction to a disappointed prisoner.
... He may realize that his allegations may not
be believed but the relief from monotony offered by
a hearing in court is well worth the trouble of writ-
ing them down.
3 Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Af-
fecting Due Process, 54 MImN. L. Rxv. 1175, 1243 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Grano].
4 The leading article on the right to adequate repre-
sentation is Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Repre-
sentation as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Crimi-
nat Cases, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Waltz]. See also Bines, Remedying Ineffective
Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from
Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927 (1973); Craig, The
Right to Adequate Representation in the Criminal Process:
Some Observations, 22 Sw. L.J. 260 (1968); Finer,
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CoRNELL L. REv.
This comment will examine one area of the gen-
eral right to adequate assistance of counsel: the
issue of the defendant's right to a continuance. It
will focus on those elements of inadequate prepara-
tion for trial that lead courts to reverse and vacate
convictions. Specifically, it will discuss situations
where late appointment of defense counsel pre-
cludes adequate preparation and also situations
where adequate time was available but unused. It
will also discuss both situations where the trial
court denied defense requests for continuances and
situations where the defense failed to request more
time.
The purpose of this comment is not to explore
new avenues to reversals of convictions. Rather its
purpose is to identify those situations in which
additional time for preparation may be needed and
therefore should be given in order that the accused
receive a fundamentally fair trial that comports
with the demands of the sixth amendment while at
the same time leaving no legitimate complaint
which could be used by the defendant to open the
case to a full evidentiary hearing.
I. Historical and Definitional Background
Although the complaint of inadequate assistance
of counsel was not unknown before 1932,5 its utility
1077 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Finer]; Grano, supra
note 3; Comment, The Right to Counsel and the Neophyte
Attorney, 24 Ruroxas L. REv. 378 (1970); Note, Crimi-
nal Codefendants and the Sixth Amendment: The Case for
Separate Counsel, 58 GEO. L.J. 369 (1969); Note, Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78
HAtv. L. REv. 1134 (1965); Comment, Effective Repre-
sentation-an Evasive Substantive Notion Masquerading
as Procedure, 39 WAsH. L. REv. 819 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Effective Representation]; Note,
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. REv. 1531
(1963).
5 See, e.g., People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 143 N.E. 448
(1924) (complaint successfully raised); People v.
Blevins, 251 11. 381, 96 N.E. 214 (1911) (complaint
successfully raised); Sayre v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky.
338, 238 S.W. 737 (1922) (complaint unsuccessfully
raised). See generally Comment, Effective Representation,
supra note 4, at 819-21.
RIGHT TO A PREPARED DEFENSE
to criminal defendants became apparent when the
Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama' gave the issue
a constitutional dimension by reversing the convic-
tions in the Scotsboro case. The Court stated that
the defendants were as much entitled to legal as-
sistance during the pre-trial period as at the trial
itself. The general appointment of the entire county
bar to represent the defendants was not an effective
appointment of counsel because none of the ap-
pointed lawyers prepared for the trial. Because of
this situation, "the defendants did not have the aid
of counsel in any real sense.. .. " In short, there
was a "denial of effective and substantial aid." 8
After considering the speed with which the de-
fendants were pushed through the judicial process,
the Court held that "the failure of the trial court to
make an effective appointment of counsel was ... a
denial of due process within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 9
Lower courts have generally interpreted Powell
as meaning that at least some minimum level of
assistance and performance is required at all critical
periods of the proceedings.' ° Powell emphasized
that perhaps the time between arraignment and
trial was the most criticalperiod of the proceedings:
a time "when consultation, thorough-going investi-
gation and preparation were vitally important.
.. ." n However, the Court has given little guidance
to lawyers and lower courts as to what constitutes
adequate preparation. In Avery v. Alabama
i" it
unanimously rejected an appeal from a condemned
defendant who claimed that a denial of a continu-
ance for more time to prepare deprived him of the
customary opportunity to consult, investigate and
prepare a defense. The Court held that no certain
minimum time is constitutionally required for prep-
6 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
7 Id. at 57.8Id. at 53.
9 Id. at 71.
10 The most abrupt disagreement with the view that
the sixth amendment gives a right to counsel that does
in fact give assistance is found in Mitchell v. United
States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
850 (1958). The court held that Powell mandated a
procedural requirement of effective appointment so that
it is possible for the lawyer to provide an adequate
defense. "We think the term 'effective assistance'...
does not relate to the quality of the service rendered by
a trial lawyer... ." Id. at 793. This interpretation ig-
nores the statement in Powell that the defective ap-
pointment caused a "denial of effective and substantial
aid." 287 U.S. at 53. Mitchell was criticized in Waltz,
supra note 3, at 293 and Comment, Effective Represen-
tation, supra note 3, at 822-23.
"287 U.S. at 57.
"308 U.S. 444 (1940).
aration by trial counsel. Looking at the facts, 3 it
appeared to the Court that counsel had been
zealous in their defense of Avery. The Supreme
Court affirmed since there was no showing at a
hearing for a new trial (held immediately after the
conviction) that counsel would have done better
with more time.
Although the Court in Avery cited Powell with
approval, it is difficult to reconcile the result with
this statement from the earlier case: "Neither [de-
fense counsel] nor the court could say what a
prompt and thorough-going investigation might
disclose as to the facts." 14 If no one can say what
proper investigation will reveal, then the defendant
has a heavy burden indeed to show what counsel
could do with the benefit of additional time to
avoid the prejudice to the defendant. The inference
from Avery that even the most minimal amount of
time may be constitutionally adequate to investi-
gate and prepare thus creates tension with the
Powell rule that a person may be denied due process
of law when forced to trial with inadequately
prepared counsel.
While the Court has periodically reiterated its
concern for well prepared trial counsel, 5 it has not
resolved the underlying tension. Most recently it
reasserted the Avery principle in Chambers v.
Maroney 6 by declining "to fashion a per se rule
requiring reversal of every conviction following
tardy appointment of counsel. ... "1 It also de-
dined to order an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the right to counsel was denied whenever
a habeas corpus petition alleges a belated appoint-
ment.is
State and lower federal court dispositions of
claims that defense counsel was not adequately
prepared at the time of trial have not been con-
sistent.8 The variety of standards defining and
UTwo lawyers were appointed three days before the
one day trial. The Court felt that the trial judge had
not abused his discretion in denying the motion for a
continuance and emphasized that the crime had oc-
curred and the trial was held in a small community
where it was not difficult to contact necessary witnesses
and make the required investigation.
14 287 U.S. at 58.
1" Note the epigramatic dicta in Hawk v. Olson, 326
U.S. 271, 278 (1945) ("The defendant needs counsel
and counsel needs time...") and White v. Ragan, 324
U.S. 760, 764 (1945) ("[lit is a denial of the accused's
constitutional right to a fair trial to force him to trial
with such expedition as to deprive him of the effective
aid and assistance of counsel.").
16 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
17 Id. at 54.
IId.
"9 See Section II infra.
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describing inadequate representation illustrate the
inconsistent holdings on claims of poor legal as-
sistance. 0
By far the most common definition has been the
"farce or mockery" standard. The following formu-
lation of the farce or mockery standard was stated
by the Fifth Circuit in Williams v. Beto:2 1
relief from a final conviction on the ground of
incompetent or ineffective counsel will be granted
only when the trial was a farce, or a mockery of
justice, or was shocking to the conscience of the
reviewing court, or the purported representation
was only perfunctory, in bad faith, a sham, a
pretense, or without adequate opportunity for
conference and preparation.2
The apparent philosophy behind this standard is
that something is better than nothing; the de-
fendant has no ground for complaint where the rep-
resentation was not a "nullity." 2 1 It leaves de-
fenseless the accused person whose lawyer was of
some small help but who made serious and preju-
dicial errors. This standard is also vague since it is
stated in the negative and does not specify the
elements of good representation. Nevertheless, un-
20 Nor has there been a shortage of terms designating
the problem. Most courts and commentators refer to
the right to "effective counsel." See, e.g., Bonaparte v.
Smith, 362 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D. Ga. 1973) and note 4
supra. This probably stems from the use of that term
by the Court in Powell. A few have used the term "in-
competent." See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 45 Ill. 2d 501,
259 N.E.2d 796 (1970); Comment, Incompetency of
Counsel as a Ground for Attacking Criminal Convictions,
4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 400 (1957). Others term the issue to
be "adequate assistance" of counsel. See, e.g., Moore v.
United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970) and note 4
supra. The confusion is increased by using the terms
simultaneously. See, e.g., West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d
1026, 1032 (5th Cir. 1973) (all three terms); Comment,
The Right to Competent and Effective Counsel under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 46 Tu.. L. REv. 293
(1971).
"Adequate assistance" will be used throughout this
Comment. "Incompetency" implies an inherent in-
ability to do the job which is only one aspect of the
problem. "Ineffective" implies that ability is somehow
judged by counsel's degree of success in defending
clients. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (McKinnon, J., dissenting); Williams
v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 705 (5th Cir. 1965).
21354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965).
12 Id. at 704. See also Johns v. Perini, 462 F.2d 1308
(6th Cir. 1972); Scalf v. Bennett, 408 F.2d 325 (8th
Cir. 1969); Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.
1965); Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir.
1957); Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945); Bonaparte v. Smith, 362
F. Supp. 1315 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
2 Andrews v. Robertson, 145 F.2d 101, 102 (5th
Cir. 1944) cert. denied, 324 U.S. 874 (1945).
til recently at least, most courts applied this
standard.
24
Several courts have employed positive definitions
of adequate representation. In MacKenna v. Ellis,
2
1
the Fifth Circuit held that effective counsel was
"not errorless counsel, ... but counsel reasonably
likely to render and rendering reasonably effective
assistance." 2 While this definition is more neutral
in tone, the use of "effective" in the definition
means that "effective assistance" is self-defining
and redundant. The Sixth Circuit recently adopted
the MacKenna standard for testing sixth amend-
ment claims of inadequate assistance.n
Professor Waltz concluded that "[u]nsatisfactory
as it may seem to those desirous of objective
prospectively usable standards, all of these judicial
admonitions can only be translated as the familiar
command that persons accused of crimes be ac-
corded a 'fair trial.' "28 But in the decade following
Waltz's article, a number of cases have subse-
quently developed a negligence-customary skill
definition. In Moore v. United States9 the Third
Circuit held that "the standard of adequacy of
legal services as in other professions is the exercise
of the customary skill and knowledge which nor-
mally prevail at the time and place." a0 Given the
24 Three federal courts of appeals recently specifically
rejected the "farce or mockery" standard. In Beasley v.
United States, 491 F.2d 687, 693 (6th Cir. 1974), the
court stated that "the 'farce and mockery' test should
be abandoned as a meaningful standard for testing sixth
amendment claims." In West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d
1026, 1033 (5th Cir. 1973), the court rejected the Wil-
liams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965), definition
quoted in the text at note 22. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court concluded in Scott v. United States, 427
F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the "farce and mockery"
standard is "no longer valid as such but exists in the
law only as a metaphor that the defendant has a heavy
burden to show requisite unfairness."
25 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), modified, 289 F.2d
928, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).26 Id. at 599. (Emphasis by the court.) The Fifth
Circuit recently reasserted the MacKenna standard in
West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973).
27 Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th
Cir. 1974).
28 Waltz, supra note 4, at 305.
29 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970).
10 Id. at 736. See also United States v. Hines, 470
F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968 (1973);
Chambers v. Brierley, 459 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1972);
Kott v. Green, 303 F. Supp. 821, 822 (N.D. Ohio 1968)
(Criminal defendants are entitled to expect their
lawyers "to perform at least as well as any attorney
with ordinary training in the legal profession, and to
exercise the usual amount of skill and judgment ex-
hibited by an attorney conscientiously seeking to pro-
tect his client's interests."); State v. Anderson, 117
N.J. Super. 507, 519, 285 A.2d 234, 240 (App. Div.,
1971) (normal and customary skill).
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Supreme Court's recent test in McMann v. Richard-
son3' for "reasonably competent advice" 32 to a
client ("whether that advice was within the range
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases")," the standard of skill for purposes of the
comparison is that of a lawyer actively practicing
criminal law.
The negligence-customary skill test finds support
in recent opinions and should be adopted as a gen-
eral standard for measuring claims of inadequate
assistance." However, a caveat is in order. When
the defendant makes no allegations of conflict of
interest"9 or inadequate preparation, 6 the review-
ing court is being asked to review the tactics and
trial judgments of counsel. Except for extreme
situations," courts hesitate to second guess the
lawyer.n Since there is a presumption that any at-
torney appearing before the court is competent, 9
31397 U.S. 759 (1970).
" Id. at 770.
Id. at 771. One commentator fashioned a "malprac-
tice standard" based on, and similar to, some of the
above cases:
[Wlhether counsel exhibited the normal and cus-
tomary degree of skill possessed by attorneys
who are fairly skilled in the criminal law and who
have a fair amount of expertise at the criminal
bar.... [T]he relevant question should be whether
counsel's behavior was such that reasonably com-
petent and fairly experienced criminal defense
lawyers might debate its propriety. If such a debate
may exist, assistance should not be found ineffec-
tive.
(Emphasis in original)
Finer, supra note 4, at 1080.
14 See notes 30 and 31 and accompanying text supra.35 Where a lawyer is unable to give his full devotion
to two or more clients whose interests may conflict, the
courts have not been hesitant to reverse. See, e.g.,
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (amount
of prejudice to defendant due to joint representation
need not be shown); United States v. Wisniewski, 478
F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1973) (reversible if possibility of con-
flict); Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1973)
(reversible if substantial possibility of conflict of in-
terest)- United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1972) 4rial judge must comment on risks of joint repre-
sentation); Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) (automatic reversal if record does not indi-
cate an informed decision to accept joint counsel). But
see United States v. Rubin, 433 F.2d 442 (5th Cir.
1971) (trial judge has no affirmative duty to inquire
regarding the impropriety of joint representation). See
generally Note, Criminal Codefendants and the Sixth
Amendment: the Case for Separate Counsel, 58 Gxo. L.J.
369 (1969).
36 See Section III infra.37 E.g., Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir.
1957); Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579 (N.D.
Tex. 1967); Abraham v. State, 228 ind. 179, 91 N.E.2d
358 (1950).
nE.g., Odom v. United States, 377 F.2d 853 (5th
Cir. 1967); People v. Dudley, 46 Ill. 2d 305,263 N.E.2d
1 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 910 (1971).
11 United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d
the trial courts may feel that nearly any choice of
trial tactics is debatable, especially by experienced
criminal defense lawyers.
H. Adequate Assistance of Counsel and the
Need for a Continuance
Trial courts may continue a case when it appears
necessary to achieve a fair trial. The rule is well es-
tablished that the exercise of this power is within
the discretion of the judge. 0 As a natural result of
this policy, the appellate courts vacate convictions
only when the denial of a continuance means the
loss of a fundamental right. Even then the claims
are critically examined.4 This policy has the tacit
approval of the Supreme Court. In Ungar v. Sara-
fiteu it stated that "[tihere are no mechanical tests
for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so
arbitrary as to violate due process." 4 3 The Court
concluded that the answer must be found in the
circumstances of each case, especially in the rea-
sons presented to the trial judge.
Relying upon Avery v. Alabama,4 the Court up-
held the denial of a continuance requested by a
defendant, a lawyer, who claimed that he needed
more time to engage counsel for his contempt hear-
mag. The Court concluded that the facts and issues
were clear in the case, that the witnesses and
evidence were readily available and that the motion
was not made until the day of the hearing. Even
though the defendant conceded that he needed only
a small period of time, he gave no reason for his
situation. The Court did not explicitly hold that
this conduct amounted to a waiver of the right to
adequate assistance of counsel, but it seems clear
that the Court agreed with the trial judge's as-
sumption that the defendant waived this privilege
by his conduct.
While the granting of continuances is discretion-
ary, trial courts can abuse their discretion so that
the denial of a continuance constitutes a denial of
due process. Given the Supreme Court's emphatic
statements on the right to adequate assistance of
976 (7th Cir. 1948); Crowe v. State, 356 F. Supp. 777
(D.S.D.), ajf'd, 484 F.2d 1359 (8th Cir. 1973).
40 See, e.g., United States v. Pigford, 461 F.2d 648,
649 (4th Cir. 1972) (the denial of "a continuance is a
matter which lies within the sound discretion of the
court and is not to be overturned in the absence of a
showing of abuse of that discretion.")4 1 E.g., United States v. Sanchez, 483 F.2d 1052 (2d
Cir. 1973); United States v. Earley, 482 F.2d 53 (10th
Cir. 1973).
4376 U.S. 575, reh. denied, 377 U.S. 925 (1964).43 Id. at 589.
4 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
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counsel, it is clear that a denial of a continuance
necessary to prepare for trial is a reversible abuse
of discretion. This conclusion thus poses the harder
question: under what circumstances should the de-
fendant and his attorney be allowed more time for
conference, investigation of the facts and research
of the applicable law?
The most obvious occasion in which the trial
court need not grant more time is where the de-
fense fails to request it. Without reasons in support
of the motion, the judge cannot learn what addi-
tional investigation and research is contemplated
and whether it may possibly help the defendant.
The failure to request a continuance generally pre-
cludes appellate relief based on a claim of inade-
quate time for preparation because requesting a
continuance is the only way the defendant can di-
rectly indicate a need for more time.
It should be noted that the unavailability of ap-
pellate relief in cases where counsel made no re-
quest for more time does not mean that relief is
never given on direct appeal. Convictions, espe-
cially convictions of defendants with new lawyers
for the appeal, can be reversed where no additional
time was requested.45 These cases require trial per-
formance so inadequate as to result in an unfair
trial. It is counsel's trial performance rather than
preparation which is reviewable because a signifi-
cant part of the record consists of counsel's per-
formance, the adequacy of which can be argued on
appeal. Chances of success on this approach, how-
ever, are lower because appellate courts are loath
to judge the courtroom conduct of defense counsel
as opposed to the preparation.
When counsel fails to alert the court of insuffi-
cient consultation, research or investigation, the
defendant must assert the claim in a collateral at-
tack. The defendant is no longer bound by the
record; new evidence can be presented at a hearing
on the petition for relief. The underlying legal basis
for such a collateral attack is the duty of the lawyer
to prepare. The Fourth Circuit has characterized
the duty as "an affirmative obligation to make
suitable inquiry to determine whether valid [de-
fenses] exist." 48
This well recognized duty will not support gen-
eral claims of unpreparedness. The defendant must
specifically allege facts reasonably susceptible to
45 E.g., State v. Anderson, 117 N.J. Super. 507, 285
A.2d 234 (App. Div. 1971), aff'd. per curiam, nmodified
on other grounds, 60 N.J. 437, 290 A.2d 447 (1972).
41 Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347,353 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 832 (1963).
proof at a habeas corpus hearing which tend to
show that counsel's handling prejudiced the de-
fendant's case. The allegations can consist of ex-
trinsic factors such as a lack of time for preparation
or intrinsic factors such as the unexplained failure
to investigate indications of an alibi, self-defense,
insanity or diminished capacity.
Implicit in the general duty to be prepared is the
obligation to move for a continuance if unpre-
pared.7 Requesting additional time where it is
needed accomplishes two things. Presumably the
trial court will grant the necessary time. If the re-
quest is denied, counsel has perfected the record for
possible appeal or collateral attack by stating why
the defense was inadequately prepared and what
specifically could be accomplished with more time.
Some courts refuse to vacate convictions in cases
where defense counsel failed to request time for
additional preparation.4 These cases hold that
counsel should have brought the problems to the
attention of the trial judge who has the duty to
grant or refuse the motion.
More often, however, courts grant relief- when
the defendant shows specific reasons why counsel
should have requested more time. In re SaundersO
is a good example of this situation. The defendant,
with a new attorney, claimed his original attorney
failed to request additional time to investigate
facts suggestive of a diminished capacity defense.
Specifically, he alleged that his lawyer did not re-
quest the defendant's medical records reflecting
hospitalization for two head injuries which resulted
in organic brain damage, personality change and
epilepsy even though the lawyer knew of the gen-
eral nature and existence of the records. Nor did
the lawyer order a psychiatric examination even
though the defendant's mother volunteered to pay
the costs for a private defense psychiatrist. Shortly
after the guilty verdict, but before the penalty
phase of the trial, the lawyer received a letter and
several reports from a clinical psychologist con-
firming the defendant's and defendant's mother's
claims about his mental-medical history. The law-
yer did not use the information either to reopen the
guilt phase or as evidence in mitigation during the
47See, e.g., Stokes v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 131 (4th Cir.
1970); Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.
1931). Cf. State v. Anderson, 117 N.J. Super. 507, 285
A.2d 234 (App. Div. 1971), aff'd. per curiam, modified on
other grounds, 60 N.J. 437, 290 A.2d 447 (1972).
48See Ex parte Gammon, 255 Ala. 502, 52 So. 2d 369
(1951); Swanson v. Jones, 151 Neb. 767, 39 N.W.2d
557 (1949).
49 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 472 P.2d 921, 88 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1970) (en banc).
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penalty phase of California's bifurcated criminal
trial system.
The court granted the habeas corpus petition
based on the failure of the attorney to consider the
indicated defense. The purpose of factual and legal
investigations, the court noted, is to make possible
informed decisions on the client's behalf. While
tactical reasons may have existed supporting the
decision to withhold the defense for possible use in
a plea for clemency, the failure to learn of the de-
fendant's mental condition in the three and one-
half months available removed rational support
from that decision. An informed tactical decision
that appears questionable in retrospect would
probably not be grounds for reversal. But here, as
the Ninth Circuit held in quite similar circum-
stances,
the possible defense of diminished capacity was
withheld not through deliberate though faulty
judgment, but in default of knowledge that reason-
able inquiry would have produced, and hence in
default of any judgment at all.5'
Defendants must also point to specific failures of
counsel's pre-trial effort from which arises the
possibility of prejudice. The failure to investigate
the facts usually follows from the inadequate con-
sultation with the defendant. In some instances
counsel is guilty of a total failure to learn the un-
derlying fact pattern of the case;51 however, even
this failure is not certain to cause reversal. 2 Courts
vacate convictions for a variety of more specific
allegations of what counsel failed to do. Convic-
tions have been reversed for failure to investigate
the physical circumstances of the crime,53 to in-
vestigate the prosecutrix and medical examination
results in a rape case,u to develop an insanity de-
fense when the facts strongly suggested it," to
consider moving to suppress evidence seized under
questionable circumstances,5" to investigate an
alibi which the evidence strongly indicate7 and to
50 Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 39 (9th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963) (quoted in
Saunders).
5 E.g., Walker v. Caldwell, 476 F.2d 213 (5th Cir.
1973) (perfunctory appointment).52 See, e.g., United States v. Trigg, 392 F.2d 860 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968); Swanson v.
Jones, 151 Neb. 767, 39 N.W.2d 557 (1949).
Kott v. Green, 303 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).55 McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297 (E.D.
Va. 1972).
11 United States ex rel. Williams v. Brierley, 291
F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
57Johns v. Perini, 462 F.2d 1308 (6th Cir. 1972).
interview a prosecution witness and learn that the
witness would not testify.u In each of these cases
the convicted person was able to show that some-
thing more could have been done with more time
that would have precluded the possibility of preju-
dice to the defendant.
Courts also vacate convictions where counsel
failed to research applicable law. For example, a
court held that when incorrect advice caused the
defendant to change his plea to guilty, there was
an abuse amounting to inadequate representation,59
as is advising a guilty plea without knowing what
sentence is possible,60 advising a guilty plea to a
felony charge without knowing that the crime is a
misdemeanor," ignorance of criminal procedure by
an out of state lawyer,2 failure to learn the ele-
ments of the crime,6 and failure to file a written
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity when that
failure meant the defendant was conclusively pre-
sumed to have been sane at the time of the offense."
The more common claim of insufficient prepara-
tion is found in those cases where defense counsel
requests additional time which the trial court
denies. The courts are nearly unanimous in holding
that a continuance must be given when the de-
fendant was not given enough time to plan his case
properly. 65 Indigent defendants often face trial with
a tardily appointed lawyer. In the extreme case
this means appointment immediately preceding
trial. The courts will not hesitate to reverse con-
victions in these instances. In the words of one
judge, "no time is never enough." 66 In United
States v. Vasilick,I for example, the attorney was
not even present when appointed. Thirty minutes
later, absent any investigation or prior contact with
the defendant, the attorney proceeded to trial.
Eighteen years later, the district court concluded
58Viscarra-Delgadillo v. United States, 395 F.2d 70
(9th Cir. 1968). Cf. Pennington v. Beto, 437 F.2d 1281
(5th Cir. 1971).
59 Kienlen v. United States, 379 F.2d 20 (10th Cir.
1967).
10 Wilson v. Rose, 366 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1966).
11 Walker v. Caldwell, 476 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1973).
2 Lunce v. Overlade, 244 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1957).
6 Roberts v. Dutton, 368 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1966).
r Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1965).
, But see United States v. Trigg, 392 F.2d 860 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968) (appointment
just before trial); Daugherty v. Beto, 388 F.2d 810
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 986 (1968) (ap-
pointment just before trial).
66Joseph v. United States, 321 F.2d 710, 712 (9th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 977 (1964). See also
United States v. Yodock, 224 F. Supp. 877 (M.D. Pa.
1963); United States v. Vasilick, 206 F. Supp. 195
(M.D. Pa. 1962).
6 206 F. Supp. 195 (M.D. Pa. 1962).
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that the defendant was presumptively prejudiced
and ordered a new trial.
One court recently carved an exception from the
rule against late appointments. The district court
in United States ex rel. Navarro v. Johnsons denied
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claim of in-
adequate preparation and inadequate performance.
The lawyer met with the defendant only five min-
utes on the morning of the trial. But the court em-
phasized that the Public Defender Association had
been appointed some time earlier at the preliminary
hearing. An earlier case from the Third Circuit
held that the timeliness of appointment of counsel
must be measured by the time a defender organiza-
tion is appointed by the court and not the time the
particular trial lawyer is assigned to the case.69 In
Navarro the court found that the public defender
had carefully studied the file which contained the
results of an interview of the defendant done earlier
by an Association staff member. The defendant
charged his lawyer with failing to produce two wit-
nesses for the defendant, but it was shown that the
Association tried unsuccessfully to locate them and
the defendant's own testimony at the habeas corpus
hearing showed that they could not possibly have
seen the occurrence. The attorney also spoke with
an arresting officer but characterized his testimony
as "disastrous" to the defendant ° In light of these
attendant circumstances the court held that the
preparation was adequate.
The court in Navarro concluded that the de-
fendant had not shown evidence of poor prepara-
tion. Alternatively, it could be argued that the five
minute conference established a presumption of
inadequate preparation but that the presumption
was rebutted by the prosecution's evidence that the
Association had done considerable work on the case
which the attorney studied and by the defendant's
inability to show how additional preparation time
would have helped.
Nevertheless, Navarro is a disturbing case. The
Court repeats the controlling standard of adequacy
for the Third Circuit, i.e., "the exercise of the cus-
tomary skill and knowledge which normally prevail
at the time and place." 71 However, the lawyer
whose preparation was questioned had only very
recently graduated from law school. During his
Is 365 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
69 Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir.
1970).70 United States ex rel. Navarro v. Johnson, 365 F.
Supp. 676, 688 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
71 Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d
Cir. 1970).
first week with the Association he tried thirty-eight
cases; Navarro was number thirty-nine. If such a
trial case load is considered "normal" or "cus-
tomary," then the quality of "adequate" repre-
sentation for a given defendant will be determined
by the representation given to criminal defendants
as a group.
Most courts also reverse in cases where the de-
fendant was given some time to investigate and
confer, but only in an amount insufficient for the
particular case 2 Reviewing courts have found the
time given to defendants too short where counsel
was appointed shortly before or on the day of
trial7 the day before trial 4 and a week before
trial.75 Like the cases where no time was available,
some of these cases are extreme examples of in-
justice. Walder v. CaldwelP6 is illustrative. The de-
defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
following his guilty plea and conviction. The at-
torney failed to investigate the facts, the possibility
of a motion to suppress or of plea bargaining. He
testified at the district court hearing that he fol-
lowed a substantially different practice when rep-
resenting fee clients rather than appointed clients.
That the defendant was a victim of injustice is
evident considering that he pleaded guilty to, and
was sentenced for, felonies when the crimes charged
were misdemeanors and that his sentence was
greater than the statute allowed.
The Fourth Circuit holds that a tardy appoint-
ment [the day of or the day before trial] of defense
counsel is prima facie evidence of prejudice to the
defendant and that the burden then shifts to the
prosecution to show that the defendant was not in
fact prejudiced. 7 This policy avoids the problem of
7 But see Frates v. Bohlinger, 472 F.2d 149 (1st Cir.
1973) (appointed day of trial when defendant appeared
without counsel)- Turner v. Maryland, 318 F.2d 852
(4th Cir. 1963) (defendant admitted he had no infor-
mation to give counsel); Goforth v. United States, 314
F.2d 868 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 812 (1963)
(same as Frates); United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376
(2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950) (15
minutes enough time).
7' Walker v. Caldwell, 476 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1973)
(shortly before trial); Rastrom v. Robbins, 440 F.2d
1251 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971) (four
hours); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir.
1970).74 Twiford v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1967);
Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 832 (1963).
75 Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Tex.
1967).
76 476 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1973).
7 ' Garland v. Cox, 472 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1973);
Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 849 (1968); Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 6247
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judging the actual trial performance of the lawyer.
As a panel from that circuit recently stated, "In a
situation where the ultimate fact [counsel's ade-
quacy] is difficult to prove, but the intermediate
fact [late appointment] is established, we hold that
it is appropriate to presume ineffective assist-
ance." 78
This presumption, however, is not irrebuttable as
illustrated by Turner v. Maryland 9 The attorney
did not consult with the defendant until one half
hour before the trial and did not read statements
taken from the defendant until five minutes before
trial. He failed to argue in behalf of the defendant
during the trial and neglected to advise the de-
fendant of the right to appeal. But the conviction
was affirmed when the defendant stated at his
habeas corpus hearing that he was unable to give
any information on which to build a defense80
Although no facts were developed at the hearing
showing what more could have been done, Turner
remains a problem case. The defendant accepted
assistance because he recognized that he needed
someone to prepare his defense. Thus the case im-
plies that in those cases that appear hopeless, the
defendant can get a "fair trial" even when the rep-
resentation is almost no representation at all. The
result leaves the significance of the presumption
open to question. In United States v. Fisher" the
Fourth Circuit recently held that "conviction with-
out effective legal representation is a misplaced
sanction for the shortcomings of a defendant's at-
torney."I In the light of this position, it is not
likely that the presumption of prejudice could be
overcome so easily today.P
There is, however, support for the proposition
that a late appointment is not necessarily reversible
error. In Avery v. Alabama4 the Supreme Court
held that three and one-half days were sufficient
even though the crime had been committed several
(4th Cir. 1967); Twiford v. Peyton, 372 F.2d 670 (4th
Cir. 1967); Jones v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 347 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 832 (1963).
78Garland v. Cox, 472 F.2d 875, 879 (4th Cir. 1973).
Cf. United States v. Knight, 443 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.
1971).
79318 F.2d 852 (4th Cir. 1963).80 The Third Circuit also found that the presumption
of prejudice could be overcome. See United States ex
rel. Mathis v. Rundle, 394 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1968).
8 477 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1973).
121d. at 304.
8 Bus see Garland v. Cox, 472 F.2d 875, 879 (4th
Cir. 1973) ("The moment that contravening evidence
is presented from any source, the presumption vanishes
completely-as if it had never existed.").
1 308 U.S. 444 (1940). See also Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970) and note 72 supra.
years before the trial date and despite the fact that
the defense attorneys wanted more time because
they had had no opportunity to confer with doctors
who might have given testimony favorable to a de-
fense of insanity. The Court emphasized that coun-
sel had not shown any specific testimony or evi-
dence indicating that they could have done better
with more time.
In Chambers v. Maroney 5 the Supreme Court did
not deal directly with the presumption of prejudice.
However, the Court indirectly referred to a less
stringent approach in dealing with the presumption
of prejudice. In Chambers the legal aid attorney
first met the defendant shortly before trial. Noting
that he was from the same legal aid society as
another attorney who represented the defendant
at a prior trial on the same charge, the Court
stressed that the court of appeals made a careful
examination of the record and had "ample grounds
for holding that the appearance of a different at-
torney at the second trial had not resulted in prej-
udice to the petitioner." "6 Chambers was more a
decision not to rule than a ruling, and its effect is
uncertain. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has suggested, however, that it "seemingly viti-
ated" the presumption of prejudice rule of the
Fourth Circuit 1
Two jurisdictions have specifically rejected the
rule. The Third Circuit briefly held that a later
appointment constituted a prima facie case of
denial of effective assistance of counsel, thus shift-
ing the burden of proving lack of prejudice to the
state,"' but, following Chambers, rejected this posi-
tion in favor of a "strong inference of prejudice
from the failure to appoint counsel until the day of
trial or very shortly prior thereto." 8 9 The First
Circuit has agreed that there is no presumption of
inadequacy due to a late appointment. In reversing
a conviction, the court in Rastrom v. Robbins" held
that the minimum acceptable time can vary widely.
The court adopted a "totality of the circum-
85 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
86 Id. at 53.
7 Commonwealth v. Woody, 440 Pa. 569, 572, 271
A.2d 477, 480 (1970).
1 United States ex rel. Mathis v. Rundle, 394 F.2d
748 (3d Cir. 1968).
89Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 735 (3d
Cir. 1970). Ironically the conviction in Moore was
vacated even though the per se rule requiring reversal
was abandoned, while the court applying a presumption
of prejudice standard, in Mathis, held that the pre-
sumption was rebutted when counsel testified that he
was unable to say that he was unprepared.




stances" rule followed by most other jurisdic-
tions. 91
The circumstances to which the courts in non-
presumption jurisdictions look for the possibility of
prejudice focus on the ability of the lawyer to pre-
pare and on the actual amount of time and effort
invested in pre-trial stages. In Rastrom the court
concluded that it was error to deny a continuance
requested by an inexperienced attorney who had
only four hours to prepare since the trial judge
could have either granted the continuance or could
have appointed more experienced counsel. The
holding is based on the logical assumption that the
neophyte lawyer needs comparatively more time
on a case before he or she can advise the defendant
and conduct the trial.Y
Other courts have specifically mentioned and
stressed the overburdening case load of public de-
fenders. In Coles v. Peyton9 the court held that ap-
pointing two public defenders to represent fifty-
eight defendants over a three-month period was
solid evidence of prejudice to the defendants.9
These cases usually contain other examples of
poorly prepared counsel so the importance of a
heavy case load should not be overestimated.95
Several other criteria exist for testing the suffi-
ciency of representation between the time of ap-
pointment of counsel and the time of trial. Accord-
ing to one court "the question [of late appointment
of counsel] necessarily involves a comparison of the
appointment with all the attendant circum-
stances .... ,, 9 One factor would be the gravity of
the charge. Generally, counsel devotes more time
in preparation for a trial involving a more serious
crime which probably carries a more severe pen-
alty.9 A closely related factor is the type of defense
1 See, e.g., Callahan v. Russell, 423 F.2d 450 (6th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Knohl, 379 F.2d 427 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 973 (1967); Mosley v. Dut-
ton, 367 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
942 (1967).
912 440 F.2d 1251 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863
(1971). See also Smotherman v. Beto, 276 F. Supp. 579
(N.D. Tex. 1967).
389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849
(1968). See also United States ex rel. Adams v. Rundle,
294 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
'4 But see United States ex rel. Navarro v. Johnson,
365 F. Supp. 676, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (thirty-eight
cases in first week of work of recent law school graduate
is acceptable case load).
95 Thomas v. State, 251 Ind. 2d 546, 242 N.E.2d 919
(1969) (case load should not determine rights of de-
fedants).
96 Moore v. United States 432 F.2d 730, 735 (3d
Cir. 1970).
'7See, e.g., the discussion on seriousness of offense
and severity of punishment in United States v. Fisher,
477 F.2d 300, 302-303 (4th Cir. 1973).
anticipated. Some defenses, such as insanity,
require considerable preparation time. The extent
of counsel's participation in similar cases is another
factor.s Courts also consider what counsel learned
from the defendant which reduced the area of
necessary preparation. The courts especially notice
whether the defendant is able to assist counsel. 9
Several courts take note of work done by prior
counsel before the lawyer in question was assigned
for trial. In United States v. Abshire"' a former
counsel had been on a case for six months and was
well prepared. The conviction was affirmed because
newly appointed co-counsel had the benefit of this
preparation.'0'
Criminal defendants in some cases come to trial
defended by counsel who had adequate time for
preparation and should have been prepared but
who nevertheless request a continuance. The court
in those cases is being asked to grant additional
time because of the conduct of the defendant or
the lawyer when the trial should be held imme-
diately.
Trial judges who deny these continuances tradi-
tionally are upheld on appeal regardless of where
the fault lay. When the trial judge has reason to
believe that the requested delay has more to do
with the defendant's desire to avoid trial than with
the time required to prepare, the resulting convic-
tions are affirmed. The only exception to this gen-
eral rule is in favor of those defendants who, for
mental or emotional reasons, are unable to assist
or cooperate with their lawyers. °'
The crucial aspect of cases involving denials of
requests for continuances is the effort made by the
trial judge to determine whether a delay is needed.
Continuances have been rejected where, for ex-
ample, defendants claimed unprepared counsel be-
cause more time was needed to interview witnesses.
8Id. See also United States v. Tyler, 459 F.2d 647
(10th Cir. 1972).
9D Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir.
1970) (Defendant unable to effectively assist attorney).
See also Frates v. Bohlinger, 472 F.2d 149 (1st Cir.
1973) (conviction affirmed where defendant was able to
assist counsel); Rastrom v. Robbins, 440 F.2d 1251
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971) (defendant
unable to communicate with counsel); McLaughlin v.
Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297 (E.D. Va. 1972) (defendant
institutionalized and unable to cooperate due to terror
of death penalty).
100 471 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1972).
"'1 See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970);
United States ex rd. Navarro v. Johnson, 365 F. Supp.
676 (E.D. Pa. 1973). But see United States v. Fisher,
477 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1973).
102 See text accompanying note 99 supra.
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In one case,' the trial judge's colloquy with counsel
showed that there was a possibility that a witness
could not have fully exonerated the defendants or
offered relevant testimony and the willingness to
testify was unascertainable; in another case4 the
conviction was affirmed where the defendant made
no effort to employ discovery and where there was
no reason to believe that an additional witness
would have added to previously received testi-
mony.
On other occasions, defendants, perhaps sensing
the possible outcome of their prospective trial, be-
come disenchanted with their legal representation
and request more time to hire a new attorney.
While the courts are obligated to hear the de-
fendant's reasons for wanting new counsel, 05 they
are not required to grant a continuance to allow
time to find a replacement.V 06 The denial causes the
defendant either to proceed without assistance l" or
with the original lawyer.'l' The appellate opinions
often mention that defendants precipitate this
problem by failing to cooperate with the attorney
they seek to replace." 9
The refusal to continue the case often is based on
the inaccuracy of the reasons asserted for the delay.
In United Stales v. Harrelsonn ° the defendant urged
what probably would have been sufficient to obtain
a continuance: that lead counsel was hospitalized,
that the prosecution was obstructing discovery, and
that his other counsel was unprepared. The motion
was denied because the trial judge's lengthy hearing
showed these charges were untrue.
These cases often involve trials which the trial
court has previously continued." In Marxuac v.
103 United States v. Cawley, 481 F.2d 702 (5th Cir.
1973).
104 United States v. Harris, 436 F.2d 775 (9th Cir.
1970). See also United States v. Villella, 459 F.2d 1028
(9th Cir. 1972).
105 People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 2d 118, 465 P.2d 44,
84 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970).
101 Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, reh. denied, 377
U.S. 925 (1964); United States v. Casey, 480 F.2d 151
(5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Morrissey, 461 F.2d
666 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Pigford, 461 F.2d
648 (4th Cir. 1972); People v. Washington, 41 Ill. 2d
16, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968).
107 E.g., United States v. Casey, 480 F.2d 151 (5th
Cir. 1973) (counsel gave notice of 20 days that he would
not represent the defendant).
10s E.g. United States v. Pigford, 461 F.2d 648 (4th
Cir. 19725.
109 See, e.g., United States v. Pigford, 461 F.2d 648
(4th Cir. 1972) (defendant refused to return to state in
which trial was held to assist counsel); People v. Wash-
ington, 41 Ill. 2d 16, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968) (defendant
caused two month delay in start of trial).
10 477 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1973).
n See, e.g., Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, reh.
United States"2 the defendants got two ten-day con-
tinuances, but were denied a third. They asked
again because one defendant was allegedly hos-
pitalized and were again denied. Another motion
was denied when one attorney was hospitalized and
the defendants did not want another attorney.
Finally the defendant refused to attend the trial
and was found in a hospital though he was not in
need of hospitalization. The court of appeals af-
firmed the conviction noting that a defendant has
a right to counsel of his choice, "[h]owever, this
subsumes good faith on the part of the defendant,
something the court had abundant reason for ques-
tioning." "I Such conduct is received as an attempt
to frustrate the prosecution and is sometimes
viewed as "at least a waiver of a right to anything
beyond the most minimal postponement .... 11 4*
Whether there is a' "waiver" or not, the courts
unanimously rely on the discretionary power of the
trial judge to affirm these convictions.
The courts face a more difficult question when
the attorney and his client had sufficient time for
preparation but due to the poor effort by the lawyer
they need and request additional time. Unlike the
cases discussed above, the problem is not the prod-
uct of the defendant's effort to avoid trial. The
judge must weigh the advantages of a speedy trial
and disposition of the case against trying a person
who would arguably have better representation but
for the laxity of his lawyer.
The traditional response of reviewing courts was
negative and the courts rejected most claims that
the denial of a continuance deprived the defendant
of the adequate assistance of counsel for several
reasons. First, most claims of this nature involved
defendants with retained counsel. These de-
fendants got less sympathy than defendants for
whom counsel was appointed. The courts used
principles of agency"5 and state action"6 to carve
denied, 377 U.S. 925 (1964) (two short continuances);
United States v. Sanchez, 483 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1973)
(three continuances); United States v. Earley, 482 F.2d
53 (10th Cir. 1973) (long series of postponements);
United States v. Rosenthal, 470 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1972)
(two continuances); United States v. Pigford, 461 F.2d
648 (4th Cir. 1972) (one continuance); Marxuach v.
United States, 398 F.2d 548 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 982 (1968) (two continuances).
m 398 F.2d 548 (1st Cir.), cerl. denied, 393 U.S. 982
(1968).
" Id. at 551.
"4 Frates v. Bohlinger, 472 F.2d 149, 151 (1973).
Cf. People v. Washington, 41 Ill. 2d 16, 241 N.E.2d
425 (1968).
"1 See, e.g., Sayre v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 338,
238 S.W. 737 (1922), where the court agreed that the
appellant would have been as well served had he had
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an exception for retained attorneys from the consti-
tutional requirements of adequate assistance of
counsel. Most jurisdictions have now rejected this
distinction." 7 Courts also relied on the discretionary
power of the trial judge, a power reinforced by the
Supreme Court,"' to avoid re-examining the merits
of the refusal to continue the proceedings. Finally
these cases were decided before the extensive de-
velopments in constitutional criminal procedural
law that occurred during the last twenty years.
As a result there is now a discernible trend to-
ward appellate examination of the reasons offered
in support of continuance motions and the reasons
given for refusal. The corollary of this trend is an
increased tendency to reverse and remand those
cases in which counsel indicate with specificity the
possibility that additional time will substantially
benefit the defendant and in those cases in which
the court denies a continuance and counsel follows
with a defense that indicates the lawyer was in fact
unprepared.
It follows that a mere assertion that the de-
fendant needs more time unsupported by specific
reasons or supported by erroneous reasons will not
no attorney at all. Nevertheless the court concluded
that
... negligence, unskillfulness, or incompetency
of counsel is imputed to the client.., when a
defendant selects an attorney to represent him, the
counsel ... becomes] the mouthpiece and other
self of his client, by which the client is forever
bound ....
Id. at 342-43, 238 S.W. at 739.
116 See, e.g., the classic exposition of the state action
doctrine in United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203
F.2d 407, 426 (3d Cir.) (per curiam)(Maris, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953):
The [fourteenth] amendment... is directed only
to action by a state and its command... is that
the state through its officers shall not deny to a
defendant in a criminal case the effective assistance
of counsel for his defense. This may well impose a
definite obligation upon the state through its courts
to appoint competent counsel for indigent defend-
ants in criminal cases. There is, however,... "a
vast difference between lacking the effective as-
sistance of competent counsel and being denied
the right to have the effective assistance of compe-
tent counsel." It is only the latter for which the
state is responsible, the former being normally the
sole responsibility of the defendant who selected
his counsel. (footnotes omitted)
117 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport,
478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973) (citing Shelley v. Kramer);
United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Ci. 1972);
Stokes v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1970); Blan-
chard v. Brewer, 429 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1002 (1971); United States ex rel.
Maselli v. Reincke, 383 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1967); Wilson
v. Rose, 366 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1966); Shipman v.
Gladden, 253 Ore. 192, 453 P.2d 921 (1969); Abraham v.
Indiana, 228 Ind. 179, 91 N.E.2d 358 (1950).
118 Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
suffice for appellate relief. In United States v.
Sanchez"' the defendants were granted three con-
tinuances but were denied a fourth when both
attorneys sought to withdraw from the case. One
requested permission to withdraw because the de-
fendants had another attorney, and the other at-
torney sought to withdraw because of a broken
ankle suffered ten months previously and emo-
tional problems. The court rejected the requests
and proceeded to trial. The defendants' appeal was
rejected based on the apparent bad faith of the
defendant and on the fact that during the trial the
attorneys gave an active defense. The trial judge
also concluded that adequate time was available
and that the failure to call two witnesses did not
cause the absence of important testimony
0
Another court affirmed conviction of a defendant
whose counsel requested additional time to inspect
the analysis of drugs taken from the defendant.'
1 '
The court observed that counsel had possession of
a sample four days before trial and concluded that
forty-five minutes was sufficient for examination.
Two recent federal courts of appeals cases illus-
trate the increased tendency to reverse convictions
in trials where the trial judge denied a motion for a
continuance. In United States v. Fisherln the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the con-
viction of Ronald Fisher who failed to report for
induction into the armed forces and keep his local
selective service board advised of his address.
Fisher retained an attorney and paid him $250, but
the relationship ended when he could not afford the
trial fee. Fisher then retained another attorney who
assured him that if a trial proved necessary, they
could get a continuance since the attorney had an-
other trial scheduled the same day. However, the
trial judge, prior to the trial, refused to continue
the case. The judge also ordered the first attorney
to appear for the defendant since he had not re-
quested permission of the court for withdrawal.
The first attorney appeared on one day's notice and
requested a continuance which the court denied.
The judge censured the attorney for his lack of
preparation and failure to consult with the de-
fendant. One hour later the trial began and Fisher
was convicted on both counts.
Fisher is instructive because it focuses on the
criteria which reviewing courts look to in assessing
-9 483 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1973).
1
2 0 See also United States v. Villella, 459 F.2d 1028
(9th Cir. 1972) (conviction affirmed when counsel gave
no reason why witnesses were not located).
IlUnited States v. Schrenzel, 462 F.2d 765 (8th
Cir. 1972).
"' 477 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1973).
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a claim of inadequate preparation. First, the court
noted that the case was appropriate for appeal be-
cause the colloquy between the judge and the two
attorneys was part of the record. The court also
noted that it was presented with a "claim based
on an established insufficiency of preparation, not
on his counsel's subjective assertion that he was not
prepared for trial." "2 Writing for the court, Judge
Butzner emphasized that contrary to the govern-
ment's contention, selective service litigation is
complex and the offenses are serious with the possi-
bility of substantial incarceration. That the lawyer
gave an active defense at the trial was discounted:
"Swershy's defense of Fisher during the trial,
though aggressive, did not nullify the inevitable
prejudice resulting from the lack of advance prep-
aration." "I
The court also looked to what counsel could have
done to better the defense. Specifically counsel
might have bolstered the defendant's credibility by
offering character testimony or testimony about
attempts to reduce an unrelated felony charge to a
misdemeanor thus enabling him to enlist. To the
contention that Fisher waived a continuance by
stating that he knew of no witnesses and was willing
to proceed with the trial, the court answered that
the defendant's remarks did not constitute an in-
tentional waiver of a known right in light of the
district judge's remarks about showing specific
need and the possibility of assessing costs to counsel
for the delay. The court even observed that "the
lack of preparation impaired trial counsel's effec-
tiveness in explaining the need for a continu-
ance." ' 25 The court noted that its holding would
be the same whether it applied a presumption of
ineffectiveness or a "totality of the circumstances"
approach.'
26
Judge Butzner recognized the need to expedite
criminal cases and the power of judges to censure
attorneys who delay cases by failure to pre-
pare, but he concluded, "conviction without ef-
fective legal representation is a misplaced sanction
for the shortcomings of a defendant's attorneys." 127
Significantly, the court did not raise the problem
of retained versus appointed counsel.12
The second case, West v. Louisiana,12 comes
2 Id. at 302.
"4 Id. at 303.
12 Id. at 304.
12 Id. at 302 n.3. See notes 77-83 and 88-91 and ac-
companying text supra.
= 477 F.2d at 304. Cf. United States v. Davis, 442
F.2d 72 (10th Cir. 1971).2 See note 117 and accompanying text supra.
-9 478 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973).
from the Fifth Circuit. Unlike Fisher, West in-
volved a state criminal proceeding that reached the
federal courts in the form of a petition for habeas
corpus. The district court granted the petition and
the court of appeals, judge Wisdom writing the
majority opinion, affirmed. The defendant, Limmie
West, was convicted of armed robbery and sen-
tenced to forty-nine years, six months at hard labor.
Before the trial started his attorney, whom he had
also retained on previous occasions, spoke with him
for at most one hour and perhaps for as little as
five minutes."' ° The attorney moved for a continu-
ance contending that he had no opportunity to
confer with defendant and was not prepared for
trial."' The trial court concluded that the de-
fendant was attempting to avoid trial and that the
statement that other counsel had been retained was
a ploy to evade trial since the defendant had previ-
ously used the attorney who now requested a delay.
The record made at an unsuccessful state habeas
corpus hearing showed that the lawyer made no
investigation, called no witnesses and moved for a
directed verdict when the prosecution completed its
case. When the court denied the motion, the lawyer
immediately rested the case, and the jury voted to
convict. The court of appeals held that effective
counsel is "counsel reasonably likely to render and
rendering reasonably effective assistance" " and
concluded that West's lawyer failed to meet this
test.
The state contended that whether the repre-
sentation was adequate was irrelevant. Because
West had privately retained his attorney, the state
argued that it was not responsible for any failures
of counsel because the actions of privately retained
counsel cannot constitute state action. Judge
Roney agreed on this point in his dissent. He con-
tended that the cases on point held that misfeas-
ance by privately retained counsel is not state ac-
tion and therefore cannot constitute a denial of due
process or equal protection. The majority was un-
convinced. It directly considered the state action
issue and rejected it as a basis of precluding relief
to defendants who employ their own attorneys."
nG Id. at 1033-34.
I Id. at 1035 (Roney, J., dissenting). The motion
for continuance and reasons for the denial are men-
tioned only by Judge Roney.
m 478 F.2d at 1033. This standard was originally
announced in MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599
(5th Cir. 1960).
m The court stated that "to 'administer justice with-
out respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor
and to the rich' [28 U.S.C. § 453] we must apply the
same standard, whether counsel be court appointed or
privately retained." Id. at 1033 (footnote omitted).
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Judge Roney also disagreed with the majority on
another issue. As he stated it, "in the federal state
context, how tightly does the Constitution control
the state trial judge's decision as to whether a trial
should be postponed at the request of defendant
and his retained counsel?" 114 At the heart of his
dissent lies judge Roney's displeasure with the dis-
trict court for granting the petition after reviewing
the thirty-three page state habeas corpus hearing
without conducting its own hearing. Only a more
detailed hearing, he stated, could have developed
the fact that the defendant sought delay for
delay's sake. 'If this delay can be accomplished
by lack of preparation, then lack of preparation is
exactly what the defendant wants." "I
judge Roney also seemed impressed by the
weight of the evidence against West. He asked in
effect, what good would more preparation have
done. ' If Judge Roney is interpreted to mean that
before collateral relief is granted the court should
require that the defendant make at least some
minimal showing that counsel failed to prepare and
that he, the defendant, was possibly prejudiced by
the failure, then his remarks are well taken. In this
case the district judge and a majority on the court
of appeals felt that this showing had been made.
But if his remarks are to be interpreted as meaning
that because the evidence of guilt is overwhelming,
the failure of counsel to prepare should be ignored,
then his conclusion should be rejected. For ex-
ample, with adequate preparation the defense
lawyer might successfully challenge the admissi-
bility of evidence or testimony. Proof that the
defendant committed the act is not proof of guilt
for the element of intent may be impossible to
establish due to diminished capacity, or the de-
fendant may be legally insane. The defendant
deserves counsel who will also engage in plea bar-
gaining if indicated and desired by the defendant.
West's forty-nine year, six month sentence is
strong evidence that this approach was not fol-
lowed.
Conclusion
The problem for trial judges faced with requests
for additional time by counsel who assert they can-
1 Id. at 1036 (Roney, J., dissenting).
N5 Id.
138Id. at 1037.
not give adequate representation is the result of
the tension between the Powell v. Alabanan right
to adequate assistance of counsel and the Avery v.
Alabama;" holding that the courts may deny re-
quests for additional time if the court in the reason-
able exercise of its discretion concludes that counsel
had sufficient time. For Judge Roney in his dissent-
ing opinion in West v. Louisiana,'9 the Avery prin-
ciple should prevail: "There seems little point in
following a broad rule as to the discretion of trial
judges if we are to follow a narrow rule in the ef-
fective counsel-trial preparation dichtomy." 140
The Supreme Court in Avery restricted the right
to adequately prepared defense counsel, but certain
recent federal court cases show that the Avery
principle has withered since its announcement in
1940. If a trial judge, faced with a motion to con-
tinue, affirmatively seeks information from counsel
regarding how the additional time will be used and
what will be accomplished and learns that there is
the possibility that additional time will substan-
tially benefit the defendant, then the judge should
continue the trial for a reasonable period of time
with the admonition that counsel use the time and
prepare in the manner indicated. When the trial
judge fails to make specific inquiry of counsel or
orders the case to trial despite learning that counsel
is not prepared, the reviewing court should reverse
or vacate the conviction. The point emphasized is
that the trial judge must diligently inquire into the
problem and make the inquiry part of the record in
order to entertain the motion on an informed basis
and to generate a record that facilitates direct re-
view of the issue.' 41 To do otherwise is to lose sight
of the broad scope of the right to counsel implied
in the due process and equal protection clauses, ex-
pressly commanded by the sixth amendment and
confirmed by Supreme Court decisions for more
than forty years.
- 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
308 U.S. 444 (1940).
n9 478 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973).
140 Id. at 1036 (Roney, J., dissenting).
14 One commentator has suggested that counsel be
required to file a confidential worksheet with the court
before trial specifying time spent in consultation and
investigation, witnesses interviewed and other work
done on the case. This would become part of the record
on collateral attack. Presumably it could be part of the
record on direct appeal. See Grano, supra note 3, at
1248-49.
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THE CHALLENGE OF OBSOLETE PENAL STATUTES
Obsolete criminal statutes are a source of diffi-
culty to litigants and the judiciary. To remove the
threat of enforcement of these statutes requires
either repeal by the legislature or abrogation by the
judiciary. The problems of inducing a legislature
to repeal an unwanted, or perhaps forgotten statute
are discussed elsewhere.2 The courts are seldom con-
fronted with the challenge of obsolete criminal stat-
utes because their existence is often unknown or ig-
nored both by citizens, legislators, and law-enforce-
ment officials. After non-enforcement for a sub-
stantial period of time, coupled with blatant
violation by the citizenry, their once-perceived
threat may pass from the consciousness of potential
victims of their enforcement.8 These statutes cease
to carry any weight as prohibitions, and, as a result,
their chances of being repealed by the legislature
are sharply diminished.4 Similarly, they are not
1For the purpose of this comment, an obsolete crimi-
nal statute is one that is not only seldom, if ever en-
forced, but one which is out of keeping with present
mores. Extreme examples would be a statute against
blasphemy, or one forbidding the exhibition of movies
depicting violent felonies. For examples of such obsolete
statutes, see Baker, Legislative Crimes, 23 Mime. L. Rxv.
135 (1939); Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes
by Nonenforcement, 49 IowA L. REv. 389, 391-92 (1964)
(hereinafter cited as Bonfield). Non-enforcement alone
is not determinative of obsolescence; other motives
such as difficulty of proof of the elements of a crime, or
the relative infrequency of the crime may lead to non-
enforcement of a statute. Conversely, a statute need not
go unenforced to be obsolete.2 A. BicEEL, THE LEAST DANOERous Bs cH 146
(1962); J. C. GRAY, Tm NATURE AND SoURCEs OF TnE
LAw 192 (2d ed. 1921) (hereinafter cited as GRAY);
JOHNSON, LAW ENFORCEmENT 340 (1930); Bonfield,
supra note 1, at 391; Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to
Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in
the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960);
Rodgers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 IOWA L. Rav. 1,
13-17 (1966) (hereinafter cited as Rodgers); Comment,
Dead Laws, or Only Dying?, 94 JusT. P. 358 (1930).
3 Many statutes which are actively enforced are
virtually unknown to most citizens. Merely that these
statutes are unknown does not deprive them of vitality
or fairness. Some of this validity and fairness disap-
pears, however, when a law is intentionally or inad-
vertently neglected. Enforcement of a penal statute has
as one of its primary purposes the effect of deterrence.
If a statute is not enforced it cannot deter those who
do not know of its existence, and much of its validity is
thereby lost. Furthermore, in the absence of enforce-
ment (which is by constitutional dictate a public proc-
ess) citizens not otherwise aware of the statute will have
no warning of its existence. They are deprived of an
opportunity to know whether or not their acts are
criminal.
I Organized efforts to reform state codes are recent
likely to be challenged in the courts because their
offensiveness has been neutralized by what might
be construed by citizens as an affirmative adminis-
trative choice not to enforce their provisions.5 In
the rare cases that came before the courts challeng-
ing statutes that might be deemed obsolete, the
statutes usually possessed some characteristic that
made them objectionable, and thus unforgotten. A
particular policy of enforcement may resurrect the
statute to harass certain groups, or it may be that
the statute is in glaring conflict with modem con-
ceptions of individual liberty. In the latter case, the
statute might serve as a curb6 on permissible be-
havior in spite of a history of non-enforcement.
Consistent with the notion that "[t]he first re-
quirement of a sound body of law is, that it should
correspond with the actual feelings and demands
of the community, whether right or wrong," 
7 is
the citizen's interest in having some means availa-
ble to ensure that this requirement is fulfilled. The
law must be flexible. But legislation is only as flexi-
ble as it is efficient, and in the case of old forgotten
statutes, legislatures are seldom alert to the need
of clearing the code books of antique or outmoded
enactments. Since the courts are more adapted than
phenomena, and are not a product of legislative self-
consciousness, but of outside initiative. See, e.g., Joost,
Need for Recodification of Criminal Laws of Massachu-
setts, 3 PoRI L.J. 45 (1967); Merrill, Operation Obso-
lescencein Oklahoma, 48 A.B.A.J. 276 (1962); Comment,
Iowa Criminal Law-a Need for Reform, 51 IowA L.
Rxv. 883 (1966).
r That this assumption would be well-founded, see
the discussion in K. DAvis, Disc sTioNAY JusTicE
84-96 (1971) of the deliberate administrative choices by
police to not enforce certain penal statutes in spite of
almost universal ordinances requiring policemen to
apprehend all offenders. Violation of these penal statutes
does not necessarily show moral turpitude or have a
personal effect on other non-consenting citizens. Givel-
ber, The Application of Equal Protection Principles to
Selective Enforcement of the Criminal Law, 1973 U. IlL.
L. FoRum 88, 97 (1973). Examples given in the article
are Sunday closing laws, post-no-bills laws, and licens-
ing laws. See also Kartozian, Dead Law-Dead Letter?,
2 PoRTu LJ. 75, 95 (1966).
6 In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S.
156, 164 (1972), the Court overturned a vagrancy
statute of Elizabethan origin on the grounds that it
was void for vagueness. Justice Douglas, writing for
the majority, remarked that the activities forbidden by
the statute had become part of the amenities of life
incident to freedoms specifically protected by the con-
stitution.
7 O. W. HoLmEs, THE COuuON LAw 36 (reissued,
1963).
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legislatures to reflect the needs of individual justice,
they are often more finely tuned to the current de-
mands of the community. It is the use of courts in
maintaining flexibility in the statutory criminal law
that will be examined here. Two principal means of
meeting the problems caused by obsolete statutes
are available to litigants. The first is a defense to a
prosecution under a statute that takes cognizance
of the present social relationship between that stat-
ute and the defendant. The second is an anticipa-
tory proceeding, such as a declaratory judgment or
injunction, which permits a re-evaluation of the
purpose and fairness of the statute, without requir-
ing its prior enforcement against the litigant.
I. DEFENSES
Since one of the principal hazards posed by the
existence of an obsolete penal statute is the possi-
bility that it may be unexpectedly enforced, some
defenses to surprise prosecutions must be made
available to the defendant. Often the more mun-
dane defenses of self-defense, alibi, duress or neces-
sity are not available, and the defendant needs one
that will exonerate him on the basis of his relation-
ship with the statute, rather than his relationship
to the act committed.
The Desuetude Defense
One historical defense which has received recent
reconsideration8 is the concept of desuetude. This
doctrine was developed in Roman Law and con-
tinues to have vitality in some civil law or quasi-
civil law systems.' Its substance is the idea that
prolonged non-enforcement of a law deprives it of
vitality and effectively repeals it. The doctrine is
based on the philosophy that law reflects the cus-
tom of society and that custom is both the source
and the equal of statutory law.10 Where the doc-
O Compare Bonfield, supra note 1, with Rodgers, supra
note 2.
9 E.g., Norway, Scotland. See Bonfield, supra note 1,
at 402-06 for a brief account of its operation in these
two countries.
10 This philosophy was the basis of Roman law which
found that the source of law was the general practice of
mankind, jus gentium. This law was a changing emana-
tion from society, less susceptible to abstract formula-
tion than to ad hoc consideration on a case-by-case
basis. This attitude is to be contrasted with that of
English common law, which, out of a singular mixture
of Roman precedent, rationalist theory, and substrate
custom, arrived at the seemingly contradictory doc-
trines that "time does not run against the king" and
"statutes in derogation of the common law will be
strictly construed." These two doctrines arose from
the gradual allocation of power between the judiciary
and the parliament in England. The modem result is
trine is in use today certain proofs must be made
before the concept may be invoked. These are that
the statute must not have been enforced at all for
a substantial period of time during which cases
appropriate for application of the statute arose,
and that a new practice contrary to the statute has
developed and been in wide and regular use for a
sufficient period of time indicating that the practice
had been adopted by the community)'
These requirements severely limit the usefulness
of the doctrine, since sporadic enforcement would
prevent the statute from falling into desuetude.
Also there might be some difficulty in determining
whether a statute could be found partially in
desuetude02 The problems of proof are apparent.
Records of prosecutions might be hard to verify,
and the establishment of a contrary custom would
be dependent on a notion of community and upon
the qualifications of the litigant to establish the
existence and prevalence of such a custom. The use
of desuetude in Scottish law demonstrates some of
these problems. There, the burden of proving des-
uetude falls on the party challenging the statute,
and it is not satisfied merely by a finding that there
have been no prior prosecutions under the act for a
considerable period of time, or that it was readily
apparent that the actions prohibited by the statute
were often and openly committed.5
The position of the American courts toward
desuetude is unclear. It was used extensively in
state courts in the nineteenth century, with regard
to both English statutes applied in the colonies
and to older state statutes. 4 The Supreme Court
the supremacy of parliament (which originally was
merely a council of the king) and the rule of stare de-
cisis. See T. PLucENETT, Co xaSE HIsToRY or TE
CommoN LAw 309, 312, 323, 338 (1956); GRAY, supra
note 2, at 190; H. MAmu, ANcICENT LAw c. 3 (9th ed.
1883); C. H. McILwAIN, CONSn UT oNA~ism; ANcENT
Am MoDERx 50 (rev. ed. 1947); Bonfield, supra note 1,
at 398.
nBonfield, supra note 1, at 398-99; Philip, Some
Reflections on Desuetude, 43 Junm. REv. 260,261 (1931).
12 MAra v. Magistrates of Edinburgh, (1913) Sess.
Cas. 1059, 1075. This case held that a statute might be
found partly in desuetude where portions of the statute
were separable.
"3 Brown v. Magistrates of Edinburgh, (1913) Scots
L.T.R. 456, 457, 460. In this case members of the public
sought a declaration that magistrates could not license
cinemas to be open on Sunday in contravention of an
old statute. The court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked
standing, and thus avoided deciding whether the statute
was void for desuetude. But cf. M'Ara v. Magistrates of
Edinburgh, (1913) Sess. Cas. 1059, 1067, 1075-1076.
14 GRAY , supra note 2, at 196, discusseshow the states
adopted only those English statutes which were "suited
to our condition," a phrase that gave wide discretion to
the states to fashion new rules without regard to the
old. Some state cases that utilized the doctrine of
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even applied it once, but the precedent has dubious
value.15 It was flatly rejected as a defense in Dis-
trict of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co.' 6 The
Court held that the failure of the executive branch
to enforce a law did not result in its modification or
repeal since the power to repeal laws is as much a
legislative function as their enactment." The Court
recognized that this attitude could lead to hard-
ship because of lack of notice, but it insisted that
the condition of disuse was only "an ameliorating
factor in enforcement." 18 The ruling in this case
might be explained by the need of the Court to
overrule the segregationist decision of the lower
court1 9 Furthermore, the particular statutes had
received some publicity immediately prior to the
prosecution and the local authorities had an-
nounced that they intended to enforce the law.
20
The later case of Poe v. Ullman4 confused the
issue. In that case the Court used the history of
non-enforcement of the statute to claim the case
was not ripe for adjudication. Without mentioning
the doctrine of desuetude, the Court remarked that
the statute had not been enforced for over eighty
years, and that this was evidence of the actual law
desuetude are: James v. Commonwealth, 12 S. & R.
220 (1805) (Pennsylvania); O'Hanlonv. Myers, 10 Rich.
128 (1856) (South Carolina). Contra, Pearson v. Inter-
national Distillery, 72 Iowa 348 (1887); Snowden v.
Snowden, 1 Bland 550 (1829) (Maryland). See also
Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1181, 1187 (1951).
15Adams v. Norris, 64 U.S. 353 (1860). The action
arose in California and the state law involved was
interpreted in the civilian tradition.
16346 U.S. 100 (1953). In this case the Court upheld
convictions under two acts promulgated in 1872 and
1873 making it criminal to segregate the races in public
facilities. The acts had never been enforced.
i7Id. at 114. The Court quoted two old state cases
as authority for its action.
8 Id. at 117.
b C. J. Stephens of the Court of Appeals had said,
Tihe enactments having lain unenforced for 78
years, in the face of a custom of race disassociation
in the District, the decision of the municipal au-
thorities to enforce them now ... was a determina-
tion that the enactments reflect a social policy
which is now correct, although it was not correct-
else the enactments would have been enforced
heretofore.
John R. Thompson Co., Inc. v. District of Columbia,
203 F.2d 579, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
The Court's concern was probably not confined to
Judge Stephens' statement, however. This case pre-
dated the Civil Rights Legislation of the 1960's and
most of the other Civil Rights Legislation available
was of the same vintage as the acts at issue here. To
hold these acts void for desuetude would effectively void
the others, and deal a severe blow to desegregation
efforts.
20 Reply Brief for District of Columbia at 14-15,
District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346
U.S. 100 (1953).
21367 U.S. 497 (1961).
of the state.n Comparing this with Thompson, the
Court accepted the concept of desuetude in one
situation, but not in another without regard to
consistency. Recent federal cases in the lower courts
indicate an unwillingness to apply the doctrine be-
cause of uncertainty over its legal acceptance.23
The indecision of the Court could be attributed
to the self-restraint exercised by the Court in order
to avoid the accusation that it had usurped legisla-
tive functions. It should be recalled that when
judge-made law becomes obsolete, the courts do
not hesitate to disregard stare decisis and "repeal"
their own rules.24 These changes in judicially-
created rules encompass the interpretation of a
particular statute.1 This activity could be charac-
terized both as an ongoing effort by the courts to
cooperate with the legislatures in maintaining the
statutes as timely reflections of current mores, and
as a check on untrammeled legislative power.26
From the point of view of each of these functions,
21Id. at 502.
n See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 266 F. Supp.
318, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), where the district court
rejected desuetude as a defense to a criminal prosecu-
tion under a previously unenforced federal statute
prohibiting a conspiracy in the United States to destroy
foreign property overseas. The court mentioned that the
validity of the defense was unsettled.
24 A rather frank example of this in another area of
law is Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S.
375 (1970), where the Court disposed of the wrongful
death rule of an earlier case, The Harrisburg, 119 U.S.
199 (1886), on the grounds that it not only had no his-
torical justification, but that it had been largely aban-
doned. The Court found that subsequent state and
federal legislation had indicated that the former rule
was no longer an expression of present policy.
An earlier case, Glidden Company v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530 (1962), stated that stare decisis is not so
rigidly applied in constitutional as in non-constitu-
tional cases. The Court said, though, that when Con-
gress acts on its own understanding and this conflicts
with earlier cases, then the policy underlying the doc-
trine of stare decisis-protection of generated expect-
andes-actually militates in favor of re-examining the
decisions. Id. at 543.
25T0he judicial power to interpret statutes is not
without limits. To preserve the separate integrity of
judicial and legislative functions, courts have evolved
rules of statutory interpretation, the most permissive
of which is that which mandates that the legislative
purpose should be adhered to. Frequent resort to this
role permits a court to change the meaning of the words
of a statute, and thus allows the court more discretion
in interpretation than it might have in the interpreta-
tion of case law under the rules of stare decisis. E. H.
LEvI, AN INTRODUCnON TO LEGAL REASONING 32
(1970).
26Of course, there are dangers in permitting the
judiciary too much freedom to change its interpreta-
tions of statutes. A statutory interpretation becomes a
gloss to the statute, and in effect a quasi-legislative rule.




desuetude should be considered a valid defense to
a criminal prosecution under an obsolete statute.
A recent treatment of the doctrine of desuetude
suggests a legislative solution to the problem of ob-
solete statutes.27 An amendment to the mistake of
law defense of the Model Penal Code is proposed by
one writer.2 This amendment would read,
(3) A belief that conduct does not legally con-
stitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for
that offense based upon such conduct when:...;
or
(c) he acts in reasonable reliance upon a clear
practice of non-enforcement of the statute or other
enactment defining the offense by the body charged
by law with responsibility for enforcement, unless
notice of intent to enforce the statute or other
enactment is reasonably made available prior to
the conduct alleged.
29
It is not difficult to envision a penal statute under
which prosecutions would be very rare, although
the social policy giving rise to the statute would
continue to be strong.30 The proposed defense does
not differentiate this kind of situation from one of
genuine obsolescence. Furthermore, this defense is
grounded on the acceptance of a more broadly
defined mistake of law defense which has yet to
gain acceptance.
Defense of Mistake of Law
The traditional view toward this defense is that
expressed by Holmes, "[To admit the excuse of
ignorance of the law at all would be to encourage
ignorance where the law-maker has determined to
make men know and obey, and justice to the in-
dividual is rightly outweighed by the larger in-
terests on the other side of the scales." 8 ' Culpa-
bility is not subjective, but objective. The concept
of ignorance of the law and that of mens rea are
closely intertwined. In the early development of
these concepts it was felt that if a mistake of law
negated culpability, proof of specific intent should
be required to make a prima facie case. 2 This was
27 Rodgers, supra note 2, at 25-28.
2 Model Penal Code 2.04(3).
29 Rodgers, supra note 2, at 28.
0 See, e.g., the penal statute in United States v.
Elliott, 266 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), which pro-
hibited conspiracies in the United States to destroy
specific property abroad in countries with which the
United States was at peace.
310. W. Hou.-s, T=x CommoN LAw 48 (reissued
1963).32 Hall & Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mans Rea,
8 U. Cr. L. R.v. 641, 644 (1941). This was evident in
the crime of burglary where mistaken entry would
the rarer case, however, and since most criminal law
was in tune with the morals of the time, mistake of
law was not a defense.3 Consequently, ignorance
of the law can presently negate specific intent, but
it is not an excuse for crimes not requiring it. The
distinction between specific and general intent can
be illustrated by the difference between a man who
takes a raincoat from a restaurant under the im-
pression that it is his, thus having no intent even
to perform the act which constitutes the crime, and
the man who buys stolen goods, knowing that
they are stolen, but unaware that his action is a
criminal offense. In the latter case intent to per-
form the act of buying the goods existed, although
intent to breach the statute did not. In the latter
case no defense of mistake is available, since the
rule for criminal intent is that intent to commit
the act is what is required, not intent to breach
the law.
Justification for the rule always returns to the
historical view that law, as the reflection of mores,
is knowable by all. In present society, however,
where there is a sharp increase in crimes requiring
no mental state, and where only the most obvious,
heinous, and publicized of crimes will be known to
most of the population, the justification for the rule
becomes convenience. The problems of proof of ig-
norance of the law would rival those of the insanity
defense for their complexity and hazards.3 There
is also the view that the enforcement of new or
forgotten laws serves to inform the public of their
existence, and thus speeds up their assimilation into
community mores. 6 This latter theory seems based
on the assumption made by Holmes that "public
policy sacrifices the individual for the common
good." 37 It also implies that the mores of the com-
munity are not developed from within, but im.
exonerate the burglar. Hence, the common law de-
veloped the requirement that the prosecution prove
that the burglar broke and entered with the intent to
commit a felony.
a Id.
U N. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CluMNAL LAW 357 (1972).
36Id. at 364. Hall & Seligman, Mistake of Law and
Mens Rea, 8 U. Ci. L. R:v. 641, 647, (1941) suggest
an outline for a general defense of mistake of law that
requires a defendant prove "(1) that he did not know
that his act was criminal under the law; (2) that if it
was morally wrong according to mores, he did not know
that either; and (3) that both beliefs were reasonable on
his part." Aside from their objection that the defense
would be unworkable because of problems of proof,
they argue that allowing ignorance of the law as a
defense encourages ignorance.
36 Hall & Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea,
8 U. Ca. L. Rxv. 641, 648 (1941).




posed from without. This implication negates the
historical justification for the assumption that men
know the law.
The defense has been denied in cases where de-
fendants asserted the existence of a custom con-
trary to the statute violated. A similar result at-
taches when a statute is violated in the belief that
it is unconstitutional and its constitutionality is
later upheld.3 9 In Cox v. Louisiana40 the Court
found that conviction for conduct that had been
expressly authorized by police was a form of en-
trapment. Only in circumstances where the defend-
ant has relied on certain misleading conduct by the
state does the defense exist. 1 Thus, in most prose-
cutions under obsolete statutes, the defense would
not be available unless obsolescence were con-
sidered implicit permission by the state to perform
the prohibited act, and such implicit permission
constituted entrapment.
Defense of Absence of Fair Notice
One could legitimately dispute whether this
defense exists. It was employed in Lambert v.
CaliforniaP where the Supreme Court reversed a
conviction under a Los Angeles municipal ordi-
nance requiring the registration of all persons
previously convicted of a felony. The Court found
the conduct involved wholly passive (a mere
failure to register), and that this characteristic
differentiated the act from those which would
"alert the doer to the consequences of his deed."' 3
33 Commonwealth v. Doane, 55 Mass. 5 (1848).
39 Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir.
1960).
40379 U.S. 559 (1965). The defendants were con-
victed of picketing a state courthouse contrary to a
statute prohibiting demonstration "near" a courthouse.
Before arriving at the courthouse the demonstrators
were advised by the sheriff that if they kept 101 feet
from the courthouse they would not be in violation of
the statute. After arriving there they were permitted
to meet for a few minutes, and then were ordered to
disperse because their continued presence beyond the
time limit set by the police for the demonstration con-
stituted a violation of the law. The court found that the
sheriff had advised the demonstrators that their demon-
stration was not within the proscription of the statute.
The Court quoted Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426
(1959), to support the holding that the sheriff's conduct
was "an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State-
convicting a citizen for exercising a privilege which the
State had dearly told him was available to him." As to
the time limit on the demonstration imposed by the
police, the Court found that the statute did not permit
such an exercise of unfettered discretion.
4 Hall & Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea,
8 U. Car. L. Rlv. 641, 677-83, (1941), discuss some
cases where executive behavior made the enforcement
nugatory.
355 U.S. 225 (1957).
4
3Id. at 228.
Justice Douglas wrote that the concept of notice
was deeply ingrained in the concept of due process,
especially in the myriad of situations where a
penalty of forfeiture might be suffered for a mere
failure to act. He also wrote, "[Where a person
did not know of the duty to register and where
there was no proof of the probability of such
knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently
with due process." 44 This statement seems to
imply that in such situations the state would
have the burden of proving that the defendant
had reason to know of the ordinance. This pre-
sumption is contrary to the assumed knowledge
of the law found in the mistake of law defense.
Lambert has been narrowly construed in subsequent
cases involving similar facts.45
The language in Lamber14 6 concerning the ab-
sence of circumstances which might move a
person to inquire whether his conduct is legal
remains significant, however. It indicates that
there are circumstances in which there is no duty
of inquiry, and consequently no legal responsi-
bility. The duty would doubtless be present where
the act was of dubious legality, endangered the
public, or was so often repeated by the defendant
that he could fairly be charged with knowledge of
its unlawfulness. It could be argued that violation
of an obsolete statute would fall within the Lam-
bert ruling, since there probably would be no
circumstances to put the defendant on notice
that his conduct was illegal.41
The Void for Vagueness Defense
Courts have long refused to uphold convictions
under penal statutes that are too indefinite to be
applied.48
Presently, vagueness as to the persons to whom
the statute applies, the conduct forbidden, or the
punishment which may be imposed can violate fifth
4 Id. at 229-30.48Reyes v. United States, 258 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.
1958); United States v. Juzwiak, 258 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.
1958). These later cases relied on the distinction be-
tween active and passive conduct to uphold the viola-
tion of registration statutes when the defendants were
entering or leaving the country.
46 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957).47 Failure to observe an obsolete statute would seem
to come within the Lambert notion of "passive" be-
havior. First, a defendant would not be acting in an
extraordinary fashion that might lead him to consider
the legality of his actions. Second, if there is total non-
enforcement, there would be no reason to know of the
existence of the statute.48 In United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278 (1891),
the Court overturned convictions on vagueness grounds




and fourteenth amendment due process.49 The ra-
tionale behind the rule is that all persons are en-
titled to be informed as to what the statute com-
mands or forbids. Two evils of vagueness become
the primary bases for application of the doctrine.
These are that a statute "fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contem-
plated conduct is forbidden by the statute," 50 and
that its vagueness encourages arbitrary and erratic
arrests and convictions.5 1 The fair notice require-
ment is not so liberal as its statement would appear.
If the scope of the statute is ascertainable with legal
advice, sufficient warning might be found to uphold
the statute. 2 The fair notice requirement delimits
the presumption that every man knows the law.
The hazards of arbitrary enforcement of an over-
vague statute 3 are weighed against the "principle
of necessity." 1 If there is no clearer way to phrase
the statute, or no better way to formulate enforce-
49 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). In
this case the Court found that a statute proscribing
punishment for certain persons judicially declared to be
gangsters was void for vagueness. The Court said that,
[N]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty
or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes.... [A] statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law.
Id. at 453.
0 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).51Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
12 N. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CxmNAL LAw 87 (1972).
Ostensibly the test of certainty for a statute as set forth
in Lanzetta, and in subsequent federal cases, is that a
statute must be sufficiently complete and precise to
inform reasonable men what conduct is prohibited.
Turf Center, Inc. v. United States, 325 F.2d 793, 795
(9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d
340, 355 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970
(1973). An interpretation of this standard which limits
knowledge to that which the individual defendant
possesses would contradict cases that do not permit a
mistake of law defense when a defendant acts upon the
considered advice of his attorney. In the latter case the
law imputes the knowledge, or lack thereof, of the
attorney to the client. Sinclair v. United States, 279
U.S. 263 (1929). The policy consideration favoring this
view of the fair notice requirement is the same as that
which operates to limit the availability of mistake of
law defenses in general, that the law should not be
formulated to encourage ignorance.
1 The hazards are related to claims of denial of equal
protection in enforcement of the law. There can be a
risk that the vagueness of the statute allows too much
interpretive discretion on the part of police, Shuttles-
worth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965), or
that it lends itself to use by police or prosecutors as a
tool of discrimination, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940), or that it prevents a judge from properly
instructing a jury. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery
Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
4 Note, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 94-95 (1960).
ment powers, then the court must decide the rela-
tive necessity of the statute in its proffered form.5
A recent Supreme Court case involving convic-
tions under an archaic vagrancy statute illustrates
the application of these principles in an obsoles-
cence situation. 8 The Court found the statute void
for vagueness both on the grounds of absence of fair
notice and of risk of arbitrary enforcement. The
majority opinion pointed out that the poor, mi-
norities, and average householders would not be
alerted to the meaning, impact, or even existence of
the vagrancy laws. This statement seems to
broaden the fair notice requirement considerably,
and its language is reminiscent of Lambert. justice
Douglas, author of the opinion, also pointed out
that a mistake of law (lack of mens rea) defense
would not be available here since the statute did
not require specific intentY7 Since the statute con-
tained no standards that could govern the use of
the ordinance, the Court found that it provided an
opportunity to police to harass those persons
whose life-style they found inappropriate.u It was
pointed out that the archaic terms of the statute
were derived from the poor laws of Elizabethan
England and had no present meaning or applica-
tion, nor did they proscribe conduct that was pres-
ently constitutionally protected. 9
The Court's emphasis on this last point leads to
the conclusion that the real basis for the opinion
was that the statute proscribed conduct neither
65 In exercising this power, courts will consider,
the nature of the individual freedom menaced, the
probability of its violation, the potential deterrent
effect of the risks of irregularity and violation upon
its exercise, and the practical power of the Court
itself to supervise the scheme's administration.
Id. at 94.56 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972).
6
7 Id. at 163.
Is Id. at 170. The Court did not attempt to rewrite
the statute, but merely asserted that any vagrancy
statute must fit within fourth and fourteenth amend-
ment standards of probable cause. Id. at 169. Although
the Court did not specifically treat the question, the
absence of administrative controls on the exercise of
police discretion under the vagrancy statute made
judicial intervention necessary. Most states have
statutes requiring police to faithfully enforce the law
and thus have not developed concomitant regulations
governing choices to arrest or not arrest. K. DAvis,
DIscRETioNARY JusTic 83-85 (1971). Whether such
guidelines are constitutionally required is not known.
Cases like Papachristou and those in the selective en-
forcement area (see next section) seem to imply that the
absence of guidelines combined with arbitrary or dis-
criminatory enforcement may cause constitutional
infirmity, but they do offer concrete standards for ad-
ministration by the police.
59 Id. at 164.
[Vol. 65
OBSOLETE PENAL STATUTES
offensive nor harmful to society. From this starting
point the Court found the statute's intent and
language beyond the comprehension of the people
who would fall within its scope, and subject to
grave abuse by law enforcement authorities. This
finding is akin to a finding of desuetude; the social
utility of the statute had long since vanished, and
new customs and notions of liberty arisen in its
place.
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville is an extreme
case; most obsolete 6 statutes do not clearly demon-
strate the vagueness risks resulting from their im-
proper use. Many obsolete statutes would have a
clear meaning on their face and contain sufficient
guidelines for their proper enforcement, but could
still be subject to enforcement abuse. Like a statute
that is over-vague, a statute that is a forgotten relic
deprives citizens of the opportunity to avoid crimi-
nal liability. To apply the vagueness doctrine to a
greater variety of obsolete statutes would require
the development of a test that a statute be found
unconstitutionally vague if it were merely so out
of keeping with modern practice that no notice
could be assumed of its existence. This test would
be virtually identical to a broad interpretation of
Lambert.'
Equal Proleclion in Enforcement Defense
This defense comes into play when a facially con-
stitutional statute is discriminatorily enforced, in-
fringing on the protected rights of the accused. The
leading case for the application of equal protection
principles to enforcement of a statute is Yick Wo
v. Hopkins.6 Here the Court reversed the convic-
tions of a large group of San Francisco Chinese
laundry owners who were singled out as violators of
a statute requiring laundries to be built of brick or
-405 U.S. 156 (1972). Recall that the definition of
obsolescence is broader than that of desuetude. Desue-
tude requires non-enforcement, whereas obsolescence
does not. See note 1 supra.
61355 U.S. 225 (1957). The Court in Lambert stressed
that certain acts would put a defendant on notice of
their illegality. This idea has become established in void
for vagueness cases as well. If the defendant's conduct
was of an inherently evil nature, he could be assumed to
realize that it was proscribed, even if he was unaware
of his status under a particular statute. Hygrade Pro-
vision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925); Miller v.
Strahl, 239 U.S. 426 (1915). This implied notice speaks
to the fair notice requirement of a penal statute. An-
other circumstance which would prevent a successful
assertion of void for vagueness is where such action
appears to be a bad faith effort to evade the law. United
States v. Kahringer, 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
stone. 63 The Court said,
Though the law itself be fair on its face and im-
partial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and ad-
ministered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons
in similar circumstances, material to their rights,
the denial of equal justice is still within the pro-
hibition of the constitution."
The defense has developed in conformity with a
policy against broadening the defense to the point
where it would apply whenever all violators of a
statute were not prosecuted. Full enforcement is
not only an impossibility, it is not even desirable. 65
Therefore, it is not enough to allege that the statute
has not been applied against others who have com-
mitted the same acts. Some deliberate classification
by an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion
or wealth must be affirmatively proved by the de-
fendant in order to overcome his conviction.6 6 This
is an exceedingly heavy burden of proof. Proving
the classification might require penetration of the
unwritten enforcement policies of a law enforce-
ment agency, at the very least. A recent Seventh
Circuit case, United States v. Falk,6 somewhat alle-
viates this burden by ruling that when a defendant
alleges intentional, purposeful discrimination and
sufficient facts to raise a reasonable doubt about
the prosecutor's purpose, then the presumption of
good faith enforcement is overcome. The defendant
does not have to show that he was a member of a
"Id. The Court looked at the administration of the
ordinance and concluded that it was discriminatorily
applied in this case. The ordinance seemed directed
particularly at laundries owned by Chinese. The laundry
owners in question were denied permission to operate
their laundries, whereas white laundry owners were not,
and of the many arrested for noncompliance, only one
person was not Chinese.
14Id. at 373-374. Cf. K. DAvis, DiscRETiONARY
Jusncx ch. 3 (1971), which maintains that partial en-
forcement, in addition to being illegal, diminishes re-
spect for the law, especially when enforcement is left to
the individual discretion of the police. On the defense
of selective enforcement, see generally, The Right to
Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61
CoLtuh. L. Rv. 1103 (1961).
65 Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Crimni-
nal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administra-
tion of Justice, 69 YAIR L.J. 543, 587 (1960).61 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
67 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973). The defendant, who
had been active in the draft resistance movement, was
convicted for failure to carry his selective service card.
The defendant proved to the court that charges for
not carrying cards were usually dropped pursuant to
written policy of the Selective Service System, and
that the Assistant United States Attorney had singled
him out because of his draft counseling activities.
COMMENTS
class but merely that he was selected out for dis-
criminatory treatment.6
Some writers suggest that the resurrection of a
totally unenforced penal statute would clearly vio-
late equal protection principles." This calls into
question whether the use of an obsolete statute that
was occasionally enforced, like the one in Papa-
christoU70 would also be violative of equal protec-
tion. It is more likely that a court would retreat to
the view that in the absence of actual proof of dis-
criminatory use of the statute, irregular use alone
does not violate equal protection. Sporadic en-
forcement over a period of time does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the statute has ceased
to serve its purpose, or that it is no longer part of
the mores of the community. Moreover, the courts
are reluctant to interfere in the discretionary deci-
sions of law enforcement officials and prosecutors
unless substantial evidence of abuse appears. Effi-
cient administration is given high priority n
Thus the equal protection defense does not reach
a primary danger of obsolete statutes. It is ineffec-
tive in the face of long-term sporadic enforcements.
This is more a reflection of the exercise of overly
broad discretionary powers than is a policy of total
non-enforcement. The latter shows a certain degree
of prosecutorial integrity, reflecting a willingness of
law enforcement officials to recognize social reality,
while the former activity assumes the guise of
quasi-legislative decision. The decision to prosecute
then becomes political.
2
Utility of the Defenses
It is apparent that all of these defenses are inter-
related. At the core of each is a balance of the in-
terests of a particular defendant prosecuted under
18 The court imposed the burden of going forward
'with proof of non-discrimination on the government,
and directed that the government must present com-
pelling evidence if the burden were to be met. Id. at 624.
69 Compare Rodgers, supra note 2, at 10-12 with
Givelber, The Application of Equal Protection Principles
to Selective Enforcement of the Criminal Law, 1973 U.
IrL. L. FoRUM 88, 97 (1973). Rodgers finds the distinc-
tion between total non-enforcement and occasional
enforcement crucial to a decision on whether the en-
forcement violates equal protection. Givelber, however,
stresses the qualitative differences between penal
statutes, and concludes that those involving moral
turpitude are more prone to regular and fair enforce-
ment than those which have little, if any, personal
effect on unconsenting others.
70 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
71 Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Crimi-
nal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administra-
tion of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).
7 Bickel, The Supreme Court-Forward: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HA~v. L. REv. 40, 63 (1961).
an obsolete statute against the interest of the state
in preserving respect for the law. From the de-
fendant's point of view the question is one of the
§cope of his penal responsibility; from the prosecu-
tion's, it is a mix of consistency and fairness to the
particular defendant with the long term need for a
coherent, predictable, and efficient system of law
enforcement. Both parties can find guidance by ex-
amining the social purpose of the statute involved,
the present ends served by its enforcement, and its
accommodation to present custom. However, none
of these considerations alone will serve as accepta-
ble reasons for abrogating the statute, unless some
other well-accepted defense can be proved.
The desuetude defense is the one which most di-
rectly reaches the real issue at stake. Its effect is to
rule that since the statute is no longer in conformity
with custom, it is no longer law. However, the con-
cept has not gained acceptance by the Supreme
Court or by a significant number of states. It is
presently viewed as an usurpation of legislative
power. However, as is evident from some cases,
courts are not blind to the political reality of later
custom effectively repealing earlier statutes.Y5 The
political reality has just not yet been enshrined in
an accepted constitutional doctrine.
The mistake of law defense is limited by policy
considerations. One exception to its general un-
availability is when an officer of the state in a posi-
tion to give competent advice on the state of the
law, does so, and the defendant relies upon such
advice to his detriment.7 4 A tacit agreement not to
enforce a statute will not enable a person to rely on
continued non-enforcement.
The fair notice defense illustrated by Lambert has
been called a "derelict on the waters of the law." 75
Indeed it now only stands for the proposition that
where an affirmative duty is imposed upon a citizen,
and violation of the duty requires no affirmative
act, an absence of knowledge concerning the duty
excuses liability, if the circumstances are such that
the citizen had no reason to know of the existence
of the duty.78 If the Lambert ruling were more
broadly applied, it would dictate that ignorance of
an obsolete statute would be an excuse from liabil-
ity, since no circumstances would exist to alert the
7 ' Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
7 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
75 This was J. Frankfurter's prediction in his dissent,
355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957).76Haddad, The Mental Attitude Requirement in
Criminal Law-And Some Exceptions, 59 J. Cmun. L.C.
& P.S. 4, 23 (1968).
[Vol. 65
OBSOLETE PENAL STATUTES
defendant to the existence of the prohibition. A
person would intend to do the act, but without any
awareness of its wrongness, in either the moral or
the legal sense. Unfortunately, this intent is enough
to bestow criminal liability, unless the common law
conception of intent is changed. Presently mere
intent to do the act is sufficient; intent to violate
the law is not required. 7 This rule is based upon the
sound assumption that to require intent to violate
the law would open a loophole that would be ex-
ploited to the detriment of the public, making
broader application of Lambert unlikely.
The void for vagueness defense is also confined.
It is limited to occasions where the statute is un-
dear as to the conduct or persons that it regulates.
It does not extend to situations where the meaning
and scope of the statute have become ambiguous
through non-use, or an unwritten state policy of
non-enforcement. 8 Many obsolete statutes would
be sufficiently precise on their face, but would im-
pose similar problems of lack of fair notice and
risk of arbitrary enforcement to unconstitutionally
vague statutes. A community would have no aware-
ness of the prohibition, and thus no opportunity to
avoid falling within its prohibitions, and law en-
forcement officials would have a power to single out
victims for enforcement that would exceed any
power originally granted under the statute by the
legislature. They would be utilizing the statute con-
trary to legislative intent.
The vagueness defense does not really overlap
the defense of mistake of law. In the case of a vague
statute the latter would be available only when the
defendant's ignorance of the law deprived him of
the specific intent required to prove the offense
under the statute. The former is based on a consti-
tutional guarantee of certainty and disclosure. It
comes into effect only when the statute is such that
reasonable men would be ignorant of its meaning
and scope, even if they read its provisions. Intent
to perform acts exists, but because the limits of the
prohibition are so unclear, the acts performed may
or may not fall within the purview of the statute.
The void for vagueness doctrine also stems from
the rule of statutory interpretation that forbids the
extension of a criminal statute by analogy, and calls
for a strict construction of the statute in favor of
the defendantY9
7 State v. Downs, 116 N.C. 1064, 21 S.E. 689 (1895).
78 Vagueness as a result of judicial or quasi-judicial
construction of a statute would not result in the abroga-
tion of the statute. This situation could be remedied
less drastically by reinterpretation of the statute.
79 3 J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The equal protection in enforcement defense has
been limited by the social desire to retain some dis-
cretion in the law enforcement process. Its existence
acts as a check only on the more extreme cases of
abuse of discretion. Furthermore, it places a heavy
burden of proof on the defendant.
The principal fault with all of these defenses is
that they are too little too late. Aside from the
limits of their application, they can only be invoked
after prosecution is initiated. The accused is sub-
jected to the panoply of harms accompanying a
criminal charge. Furthermore, they focus on the
individual defendant rather than upon the social
harm caused by an obsolete statute. Successful ap-
plication of these defenses will not always result in
the abrogation of the statute but will merely
diminish its effect on the individual before the
court. The next section of this comment examines
another approach to obsolete statutes: an antici-
patory challenge to their constitutionality.
II. jusTIcmn Ty PROBLEMS IN AN ANTIcIPATORY
PROCEEDING TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTI-
TUTIONALITY OF AN OBSOLETE STATUTE
justiciability requirements have two bases, one
mandatory and the other discretionary s° The first,
the Article III case or controversy requirement"l
dictates that litigants must allege "such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of the issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult consti-
tutional questions." S2 The case or controversy
limitation is a rule of power. It describes the courts'
subject matter jurisdiction. The second basis was
well encapsulated in Brandeis' concurring opinion
in Ashwander v. T.V.A.,n where he set forth seven
5604 (Horack Ed. 1943). Although the rule of statutory
construction predates our constitution, it probably bad
its root in a desire to protect individual liberties and
preserve the integrity of the law.
80 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
8'U.S. CoNsT. art. MII.
82 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
297 U.S. 288, 346-43 (1936). The rules are:
(1) the Court will not pass upon the constitu-
tionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary
proceeding.... (2) the Court will not anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it.... (3) the Court will not
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than
is required by the precise facts to which it is ap-
plied.... (4) the Court will not pass upon a con-
stitutional question although properly presented
by the record, if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of....
(5) the Court will not pass upon the validity of a
statute upon complaint of one who fails to show
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rules of judicial restraint. These rules are distilled
from earlier opinions, and represent rules of deci-
sion derived from the gloss put on the words "case"
and "controversy" in the Constitution." They are
applied in cases where the Court has jurisdiction,
but where other considerations make the Court
reluctant to pass on the merits. These other con-
siderations can be expressed in terms of necessity.
The Court balances the relative importance of ad-
judicating the merits in a particular case, against
the policy behind judicial restraint.85 The Court
applies both sets of rules at the threshold of the
case, before treating the merits. This statement rep-
resents more the ideal than the reality, however.
Threshold questions of standing and ripeness often
cannot be answered without consideration of the
merits.86
Satisfaction of these mandatory and discretion-
ary requirements can be particularly difficult when
the constitutional validity of an obsolete statute is
challenged. Examination of one challenge will re-
that he is injured by its operation.... (6) the Court
will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute
at the instance of one who has availed himself of
its benefits.... (7) When the validity of an act of
the Congress is drawn in question.., the Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided.
1 The gloss has been historically derived. Justice
Frankfurter wrote that standing and justiciability
meant,
that a court will not decide a question unless the
nature of the action challenged, the kind of injury
inflicted, and the relationship between the parties
are such that judicial determination is consonant
with what was, generally speaking, the business of
the Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster
when the Constitution was framed.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 150 (1951).
85 The policy was explained by Justice Rutledge in
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947)
as follows,
The policy's ultimate foundations, some if not all
of which also sustain the jurisdictional limitation,
... are found in the delicacy of that function,
particularly in view of possible consequences for
others stemming also from constitutional roots; the
comparative finality of those consequences; the
consideration due to the judgment of other reposi-
tories of constitutional power concerning the scope
of their authority; the necessity, if government is to
function constitutionally, for each to keep within
its power, including the courts; the inherent limita-
tions of the judicial process, arising especially from
its largely negative character and limited resources
of enforcement; withal in the paramount impor-
tance of constitutional adjudication in our system.
Id. at 571.
"6 For a discussion of this problem see Lewis, Con-
stitutional Rights and the Misuse of "Standing," 14
STAN. L. Rav. 433 (1962).
veal the need to adjust the discretionary basis of
justiciability. The following portion of this com-
ment will discuss the adjustment of standing and
ripeness doctrines to first amendment and public
rights cases and show how the discretionary rules
evolved in those cases can be fruitfully applied to
the anticipatory challenge of an obsolete statute.
The Poe v. Ullman Problem
In Poe v. UllmanP two married couples and their
doctor brought a suit for a declaratory judgment
that two Connecticut statutes"' prohibiting the use
of and advice on birth control were unconstitu-
tional. Both couples showed that future pregnancies
would be dangerous to their physical and mental
health and alleged that the threat posed by the
statutes prevented them from obtaining preventive
medical advice for the protection of their health.
In the companion case, their doctor joined in their
claims and alleged that the statutes were depriving
him of liberty and property without due process of
law. All plaintiffs alleged that the State's Attorney
intended to prosecute breaches of state law and
that he considered both the giving of advice on
contraception, and the use of contraceptives to be
contrary to state law. The Supreme Court seized
upon the general nature of this last claim and
elicited the statute's enforcement history in oral
argument,8" and then dismissed the claim for lack
of ripeness. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote in the
majority opinion,
The lack of immediacy of the threat described by
these allegations might alone raise serious ques-
tions of non-justiciability of appellants' claims.
... We were advised by counsel for appellants
that contraceptives were commonly and notori-
ously sold in Connecticut drug stores. Yet no
prosecutions are recorded; and certainly such
ubiquitous, open, public sales would more quickly
invite the attention of enforcement officials than
the conduct in which the appellants wish to en-
gage-. . . What was said in another context is
relevant here. "Deeply embedded traditional ways
of carrying out state policy. . ." -or not carrying
it out- "are often tougher and truer law than
the dead words of the written text." 11
The Court added that the statute's eighty year his-
-7 367 U.S. 497 (1961). Plaintiff Poe was granted the
use of a fictitious name by the Court.
Is CoNe. GFx. STAT. §§ 6246, 6562 (1930). The latter
section is a general accessory provision.
89 29 U.S.L.W. 3260 (1961).
9"1367 U.S. 497, 501-02 (1961).
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tory demonstrated that a tacit agreement existed
on the part of the prosecutors not to enforce these
statutes. 9'
The view of justiciability expressed in Poe is
consistent with earlier decisions. The Court found
that some specific threat of enforcement was neces-
sary to show ripeness, and that a mere allegation
that the State's Attorney stood ready to enforce
all laws was not sufficient.
9 2
Although the plaintiffs in Poe sought declaratory
relief, the precedents the Court applied dealt with
injunctive relief. The standards for the two are very
different. Injunctive relief requires a prior showing
of irreparable injury. A mere threat of prosecution
is not sufficient to show this injury93 except in cir-
cumstances of harassment by law enforcement
officials,' 4 or where the statute challenged was self-
91 Id. at 508.
92 The Court quoted Ex parle La Prade, 289 U.S.
444 (1933), and CIO v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 472 (1945)
as authority. The former case considered whether a
state attorney general could be substituted for his
predecessor in a suit to enjoin enforcement of a statute
when it was not specifically alleged that the new state
attorney general intended to enforce the statute. This
is based on Ex parle Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) which
is the fountainhead of federal injunctions against state
prosecutions. It held that such an injunction is justified
where state officers threaten and are about to commence
proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to en-
force an unconstitutional act against the parties af-
fected. Id. at 156.
In the latter case the Court declined to rule on the
constitutionality of a state statute regulating labor
unions since the statute had not been authoritatively
construed by the state courts. This is an illustration of
the use of the "abstention doctrine." Federal courts will
often abstain from considering the constitutionality of
a state statute until the state courts have authorita-
tively construed it. This is in the hope that the state
construction will eliminate the necessity of considering
the statute's constitutionality. Spector Motor Service,
Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944). The use of
this doctrine shows a decision to abstain to be essen-
tially a determination of justiciability. Comment, Threat
of Enforcement-Prerequisite of a f"ustiiable Controversy,
62 CoLum. L. Rnv. 106,116 (1962). It added, as dictum,
that the case before them would not have been jus-
ticiable anyway since the state officials had agreed not
to enforce the statute pending a ruling on its validity.
CIO v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 472 (1945).
93This attitude towards injunctions against en-
forcement can be illustrated by language from Douglas
v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) where the
majority said,
No person is immune from prosecution in good
faith for his alleged criminal acts. Its imminence,
even though alleged to be in violation of constitu-
tional guarantees, is not a ground for equity relief
since the lawfulness or constitutionality of the
statute or ordinance on which the prosecution is
based may be determined as readily in the criminal
case as in a suit for an injunction. Id. at 163.
'4 Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
executing."' Early cases under the Declaratory
Judgment Act96 required a showing of irreparable
injury" even though the remedy was intended to
eliminate the necessity of having to act at one's
peril, or abandon one's rights because of a fear of
incurring damages."
Justice Frankfurter, author of the majority
opinion in Poe, indicated in Joint Anti-Fascist Ref-
ugee Comm. v. McGrath" that the standard of
justiciability applicable would depend upon
whether the courts find the issue appropriate for a
decision at that time and the hardship of denying
judicial relief. Other cases decided about the same
"1,Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
In this case the Court invalidated a statute over a year
before it was to become effective. The statute required
all parents to send their children to public schools. A
parochial school and a military academy challenged the
statute on first and fourteenth amendment grounds.
They were allowed recovery on the basis of the im-
mediate economic injury they would suffer when par-
ents, in anticipation of enforcement of the act, withdrew
their children from plaintiffs' schools. Id. at 534-35.
A similar example of relief granted when the statute is
self-enforcing is Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926), where a challenge to local zoning
ordinances was permitted before administrative reme-
dies had been exhausted because the realty company
argued that no cooperating purchaser could be found
to aid in seeking administrative remedies.
96 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
97 An example is United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947), which was one of the principal
authorities cited in Poe. In this case twelve government
employees sought a declaratory judgment that Section
9(a) of the Hatch Act which forbids public employees
from taking any part in political management or politi-
cal campaigns was unconstitutional. They also re-
quested an injunction against its enforcement. Only one
of the twelve had violated the act; the others had
sworn out affidavits concerning the activities they in-
tended to engage in. These eleven were denied standing
by the Court.
A hypothetical threat is not enough.... It would
not accord with judicial responsibility to adjudge,
in a matter involving constitutionality, between
the freedom of the individual and the requirements
of public order except when definite rights appear
upon the one side and definite prejudicial inter-
ferences upon the other. Id. at 90.
The Court said that it could,
only speculate as to the kinds of political activity
the appellants desire to engage in or as to the con-
tents of their proposed public statements or the
circumstances of their publication. Id.
For more examples, see Threat of Enforcement-Pre-
requisite of a Justiciable Controversy, 62 CoLuM. L.
REv. 106, 117-24 (1962).
93 S. Rep. No. 1005, 73rd Cong 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
99 341 U.S. 123, 152-153 (19515. In this case three
benevolent associations listed as "Communist" by the
Attorney General of the United States, pursuant to
executive order, sought declaratory and injunctive re-
lief alleging that their membership had diminished,
and that members of the associations had become sub-
ject to ridicule and discrimination.
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time" ° considered as factors in a decision on justici-
ability the degree of judicial intervention in state
political or judicial process, the existence of authori-
tative state court construction of a statute, and the
existence of irreparable injury. What was consid-
ered irreparable injury by the Court in Poe seemed
confined to loss of property or specific threats of
prosecution."0' This narrow concept of injury in
Poe has been the source of a great deal of criti-
cism 3 2
Perhaps the Court felt that the statute in Poe v.
Ullman was not of the same self-executing variety
as the one found in Pierce v. Society of Sisters or
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co 01 because of
the evidence before the Court that contraceptives
were openly sold in Connecticut drug stores'0 4 To
draw this distinction between the two cases fails to
recognize one of the primary dangers that obsolete
statutes imply: that the law can be selectively re-
vitalized through prosecutions for policital pur-
poses or for motives not within the legislative in-
tent. In the case of the Connecticut statute, the
prohibition conformed to the command of the
Catholic church and was a source of some contro-
versy. 0 5 Furthermore, the open and blatant viola-
tions of the law mentioned by the Court would tend
to lead citizens to believe that the law had no
vitality, or, at least, that it would not be enforced.
A citizen would be uncertain as to the legal status
of his conduct. For those citizens who were aware
of the statute's existence, and of the possibility of
prosecution under it, the existence of the statute
might still act as a deterrent against constitution-
ally protected behavior.10
The dilemma of the Poe litigants was considera-
100 See e.g., Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Moore, 33 U.S. 541 (1948).101 Id.; 3 K. DAVIS, A m mSTRATr LAW TREATISE
§ 21.05 (1958).
102 Note, Supreme Court-Jurisdiction for Declara-
tory Judgment-No Case or Controversy where State
Has Failed to Prosecute under Attacked Statute for Eighty
Years, 24 GA. B.J. 530 (1962); Note, Threat of Enforce-
ment-Prerequisite of a Justiciable Controversy, 62
CoLum. L. REv. 106 (1962); Note, Constitutional Law:
Case or Controversy: Judicial Notice of Probable Non-
enforcement of a State Anti-Contraceptive Statute. Poe v.
Ullman (U.S. 1961), 50 CAiro'. L. R.v. 137 (1962).
'0 272 U.S. 365 (1926); 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See
also note 95 supra.
14 367 U.S. 497, 592 (1961).
105 Bickel, The Supreme Court Forward; The Passive
Virtues, 75 HAmv. L. REv. 40, 60 (1961).
60 As long as the Court can indulge in the fiction
that every person is presumed to know the law, it
would not seem unreasonable for a litigant like Poe to
allege that her conduct will be deterred by the mere
existence of a statute that is being persistently violated.
ble. They could obey the law and forfeit what was
subsequently adjudicated a constitutional right, or
disobey it and risk being prosecuted. The Court, by
its application of standing doctrines fashioned for
injunctions, compelled the choice, by denying a
forum to decide the validity of the statute in ad-
vance of its enforcement. Prompted by conduct
that provoked prosecutorial response and convic-
tion, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticutin finally
reached the merits of the challenge to the Connecti-
cut statute, and declared it unconstitutional as
infringing on the zone of privacy created by several
constitutional guarantees. The defendants had
standing to assert the rights of a married couple
because they were convicted under an aiding-
and-abetting statute. The Court compared the case
with others'02 where a litigant was permitted to
assert the rights of others, and ruled that "an ac-
cessory should have standing to assert that the
offense which he is charged with assisting is not, or
cannot constitutionally be, a crime." 109
Poe. v Ullman is more than twelve years old now,
but a recent mention of the case in Doe v. Bolton,
n o
indicates that the Court is still unaware or uncon-
cerned by the consequences of the Poe decision. It
stated that there had been no standing in Poe be-
cause of the lack of a general threat of enforcement
due to the moribund nature of the statute. If any-
thing, this interpretation only exacerbates the
difficulty confronting the future litigant seeking to
challenge an obsolete statute 11
Standing doctrines developed in other areas of
the law should be adapted to this particular prob-
lem. Some of these are more liberal, and recognize
the need to vindicate public harm in the courts.
This adaptation would be in keeping with the
present constant re-examination of the require-
ments of judicial reviewY
2
10 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Dr. Buxton, a litigant in
Poe, and defendant Griswold opened a public clinic to
dispense advice and contraceptives to married couples.
Clinics are regulated by the state, so the founding of a
clinic for an illegal purpose could not be tolerated by
the state.
'10 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
109 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
10 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973). The Court held that
unprosecuted physicians who were consulted by preg-
nant women, did have standing because the abortion
statute had been actively enforced.
' Recall that the Court in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497 (1961) found a lack of justiciability because of the
lack of a specific threat of enforcement.




Two developments are of special interest. Both
are inseparably intertwined, one is the recognition
by the Court of a wider scope of injuries that might
occur if an issue is not adjudicated by the Court in
anticipation of the event, and the other is the
notion that a litigant can serve as a representative
of the public interest, or of a limited group of third
parties not before the Court."'
The challenge of statutes alleged to infringe first
amendment rights is one area where special stand-
ing doctrines have evolved. The policy basis for
this is the desire of the Supreme Court to avoid the
consequences of the self-enforcing nature of those
statutes. Their prohibitions tend to have a "chilling
effect" which reduces the likelihood of a challenge
to their constitutional validity.
Standing in First Anxidment Cases
In the first amendment area, the case which
most directly reveals the contrast with Poe in
standing and justiciability criterion is Epperson v.
Arkansas." There a public school teacher brought
an action for declaratory and injunctive relief
challenging an Arkansas statute making it unlaw-
ful for a teacher in any state-supported school or
university to teach or use a textbook that taught
evolution. Violation of the statute was a misde-
meanor and the violator was liable for dismissal.
After the school issued the teacher a biology text-
book containing a chalpter on evolution, she
brought her action in state court alleging that the
statute was in contravention of the first amend-
ment and unconstitutionally vague. On appeal
from a ruling by the Arkansas supreme court that
ignored the first amendment claim and merely
stated that the statute was a valid exercise of
the State's power to determine the curriculum
for its schools, the Court overturned the statute on
the ground that it favored the cause of one partic-
ular religion in contravention of the establishment
clause.115 The statute was never enforced previously
but the Court acknowledged standing without dis-
cussion, with only justice Black in some doubt
about the justiciability of the case. He pointed out
in his concurring opinion that with a minimum of
effort Arkansas could have shown the case to be
moot, or alternatively, non-justiciable. He wrote,
"the pallid, unenthusiastic, even apologetic defense
M Standing and the use of class actions is not dis-
cussed here.
114 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
n' Id. at 103. The Court did not base its decision on
the vagueness claim.
of the Act presented by the State in this Court in-
dicates that the State would make no attempt to
enforce the law should it remain on the books for
the next century." n The majority opinion also
noted that "the statute is presently more of a
curiosity than a vital fact of life in these States." nl
The liberality of the Court's view towards justici-
ability requirements in this case might have
stemmed from the vagueness claim asserted.'u
However, since this claim was ignored in favor of
the first amendment claim, the Court's decision to
overlook the threshold problems must be attributed
to a desire to reach the merits.
First amendment vagueness cases have devel-
oped a highly flexible standing doctrine which is
well illustrated by N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,"9 and
Dombrowski v. Pfister.2" In each of these cases"'
statutes passed in southern states directed against
civil rights activities were challenged on the
grounds that they were unconstitutionally vague
and violative of the freedom of expression guaran-
teed by the first amendment. In the first case, the
Court stated that the statute would be invalid if
it prohibited privileged exercises of first amend-
ment rights, whether or not the record disclosed
that the petitioners showed that they engaged in
such conduct."' The Court determined that the
N.A.A.C.P. had standing to assert its own rights as
well as those of its members because the organiza-
tion was directly engaged in some of the activities
the statute would curtail. The effect of these state-
ments is that the parties challenging the enactment
could present hypothetical cases where rights might
be violated. The Court also found that there was
no necessity to defer review of the statute until a
prosecution was brought under it. It said,
The objectionable quality of vagueness and over-
breadth does not depend upon absence of fair no-
tice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled
U
6 Id. at 109-10.
W Id. at 102.
ns Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 101-03 (1960), dif-
ferentiates the tests used by the Court in vagueness
claims by whether or not they involve a first amend-
ment claim. If they do not, then the test is whether the
litigant is within the scope of statutory indefiniteness,
rather than within the scope of constitutional immunity.
If they do involve first Amendment claims, then the
only burden on the litigant is to show that he belongs
to a general class that might suffer discrimination.
9 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
-0 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
"' In each case the plaintiffs sought both declaratory
and injunctive relief.
8n371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963).
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delegation of legislative powers, [m] but upon the
danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amend-
ment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute
susceptible of sweeping and improper application.
... The threat of sanctions may deter ... almost
as potently as the actual application of sanctions."'
Dombrowski 2 1 relied heavily on the language in
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button to reach a similar, but more
far-reaching result. In Dombrowski state court pro-
secutions were pending against several of the peti-
tioners. But the Court set aside the usual rule of
abstention in these situations and determined that
special circumstances were present. These were,
that a prosecution would not be the proper vehicle
for the settlement of the issues because it would
only determine the vagueness of the statute with
regard to the narrow facts of each case, and that a
whole series of prosecutions would have to be liti-
gated before the statute would be authoritatively
construed. As the Court pointed out, the mere oc-
currence of these prosecutions would have a chilling
effect, regardless of their success or failure.126 Fur-
thermore, this chilling effect would lessen the prob-
ability of the requisite prosecutions occurring. The
Court found that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient
irreparable injury to warrant the issuance of an
injunction because of both the pending prosecutions
and past harassment, as well as the self-enforcing
nature of the statute."' It also added the liberal
standing notion that a petitioner in such a first
amendment case did not have to show that his con-
duct could not be regulated by a more specific pos-
ing of the statute.12
This shows an inclination of the Court to permit
the consideration of hypothetical cases under the
statute beyond the scope of the particular one be-
fore it. This is based on a compulsion to do justice
beyond the particular case before the Court, and
to settle the issue finally with respect to all persons
who might eventually be touched by it.
We believe that those affected by a statute are en-
titled to be free of the burdens of defending prose-
"' Note that these are tests used in cases where void
for vagueness is invoked as a defense to prosecutions
under criminal statutes with first amendment overtones.
See note 118 supra.
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
125 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
1'" Id. at 487.
1
2 7 Id. at 489.
m Id. at 486. This is the functional equivalent of the
statement in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432
(1963) that the petitioners did not have to show that
their activity came within the prohibitions of the
statute.
cutions, however expeditious, aimed at hammering
out the structure of the statute piecemeal, with no
likelihood of obviating similar uncertainty for
others.19
In short, the litigants in this situation are entitled
to assert the rights of others as well as themselves,
whether or not they have standing themselves.
Dombrowski was not to remain untouched, how-
ever. In Younger v. Harris15 there was an appeal
from the grant of an injunction by the district
court against the enforcement of the California
Syndicalism Act"' on grounds that it was void for
vagueness in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments. The Supreme Court granted the ap-
peal of the State's District Attorney, Younger, that
no federal court should give an injunction against
the enforcement of a state statute when a prosecu-
tion under that statute was currently pending, and
when the issue raised in connection with the sta-
tute's validity could be treated in the defense to the
prosecution. The circumstances where the Court
might give an injunction were limited to those
where irreparable injury would result."' "LT]he
cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to de-
fend against a single criminal prosecution, could not
by themselves be considered 'irreparable' in the
special legal sense of that term." 133 The threat
would have to be one that could not be eliminated
by the defense of a single prosecution, or there
would have to be other extraordinary circum-
stances, such as bad faith prosecution or continued
harassment" 4
29 Id. at 491.
0 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The appellees were Harris,
who had been indicted under the act, Dan and Hirsh,
who claimed that the prosecution of Harris would in-
hibit them, as members of the Progressive Labor Party,
from peacefully advocating the program of their party,
and Broslawsky, an instructor of history who claimed
that the prosecution of Harris made him uncertain
whether he could teach the doctrines of Karl Marx in
his classroom. All claimed that unless the prosecution
of Harris were enjoined, they would suffer irreparable
injury. The district court found the statute void for
vagueness and overbreadth in violation of the first and
fourteenth amendments.
"' CAL. PENALu COD)E §§ 11400, 11401 (1970).
In Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), decided
the same day, reached the same conclusion where a
declaratory judgment was sought while a state prosecu-
tion was pending.
"' Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
"4 The rationale behind this strict notion of irrepara-
ble injury is based both on the desire to restrain equity
jurisdiction, so as not to erode the role of the jury, and
the maintenance of separate state law enforcement
functions.
The grounds which would justify interference by the
Court in state process are closely related to those seen
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The Court limited possible application of Dom-
browski by saying that the mere existence of a chill-
ing effect was not a sufficient basis for preventing
state action, and that the chilling effect of a state
statute would not be relieved by an injunction
against prosecution because most citizens would
still remain uncertain whether their conduct would
be criminally sanctioned 8  The only relief that
would accomplish that objective, said the Court,
would be an injunction prohibiting all prosecution
under a statute pending its rewriting. Except in
special circumstances,' 36 this would be unacceptable
to the Court as an interference in federal-state rela-
tions. Whenever the constitutionality of a state
penal statute is at issue, the federal courts will not
automatically assume control. To do so would
imply that state courts could not be depended upon
for the correct and impartial consideration of the
problem. This is an assumption the Court has
steadfastly refused to make.""r In Younger v. Harris
the Court stated that it expressed no view as to
when federal courts could act when there was no
in cases like United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th
Cir. 1973); see note 67 supra, where selectivity in prose-
cution violated the equal protection guarantee. Inten-
tional discrimination in enforcement is a ground for
reversal of a conviction. It is interesting to speculate
whether it would constitute a bad faith prosecution for
the purpose of an injunction restraining further pro-
ceedings, as in Younger. Whether it would must turn
on the availability of a full remedy in state courts. If
the remedy in Falk were available in state courts, then
the Court would rule to abstain from considering the
case, because there would be an adequate remedy at
law. The only reason that the Falk remedy would not
be available in state courts would be political, since
the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protec-
tion applies to the states. In such a case, the Court
might, on the model of Donbrowski and N.A.A.C.P.
v. Button heed the political pressures in the state, and
find that, realistically, the defendant had no adequate
remedy other than a federal injunction.
15 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50 (1971).
3 Id. at 51.
n7Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 121 (1971). The
concurring opinion of Justice Brennan points out that
state procedings will ordinarily provide a concrete
opportunity to secure vindication of constitutional
claims, with ultimate review remaining in the Supreme
Court.
In certain circumstances, however, the Court will
assume the incompetence of states to arrive at fair
solutions without federal intervention. One such case
was the constitutionality of the death penalty, Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The unifying factor of
the five separate concurring opinions was the recogni-
tion that state death penalty statutes, and their dis-
cretionary enforcement were discriminatory. The Court
seemed to recognize that many states were caught be-
tween either abolishing the death penalty or making it
mandatory, or leaving it to the discretion of the trial
court. While either of the former approaches might be
politically inexpedient, the latter was unconstitutional.
prosecution pending in state courts when federal
proceedings began.21n
In a recent case, Steflel v. Thompson,"9 the Court
decided that when no state prosecution was pend-
ing, federal courts could act consonant with the
usual standing and justiciability limitations. The
plaintiffs in Ste.ffel had not been arrested but were
threatened with arrest for the distribution of hand-
bills in a shopping center. They asked for a declara-
tory judgment that the criminal trespass statute
under which they could be prosecuted was being
applied in violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments. The Court ruled that it was not nec-
essary for the plaintiffs to expose themselves to
actual arrest or prosecution in order to claim the,
infringement of their constitutional rights. On the,
issue of abstention," 0 the Court declared,
... a refusal on the part of the federal courts to
intervene when no state proceeding is pending
may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla
of intentionally flouting state law and the Charyb-
dis of foregoing what he believes to be constitu-
tionally protected activity in order to avoid be-
coming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding.14'
In addition, the Court also differentiated between
an injunction and a declaratory judgment; find-
ing that to require a showing of irreparable injury
for a declaratory judgment would be to defeat the
purpose of Congress in legislating the remedy. To
the contention that a declaratory judgment would
not lie as to a claim that the statute was unconsti-
tutionally applied, the Court replied that such a
declaration would be less disruptive of state en-,
forcement policies than a declaration that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional in too. This last state-
ment reflects the Court's recognition of multiple
applications of the statute which would have no
relation to freedom of expression.
The Supreme Court's view of standing in first
amendment cases is a special accommodation to the
particular problems those cases engender. Not only
m Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
9 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
10 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had
affirmed the district court judgment denying declara-
tory relief on the ground that the policy of abstention
set out in Younger v. Harris and Sainuels v. Mackell
applied to this case, and that the plaintiffs had to make
a showing of bad faith harassment in order to qualify
for relief.
M Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). In oral
argument, counsel for the plaintiffs had described the
plaintiff's situation as one which had elevated the rule
of "watch it, boy" to statutory dignity. 42 U.S.L.W..
3300 (U.S., Nov. 20, 1973) (report of oral argument).
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are an individual's interests jeopardized, but also
those of unnamed others, whose conduct might be
regulated by their uncertainty as to the permissible
scope of their conduct. This "chilling effect" di-
minishes the possibility of litigation challenging a
statute which regulates expression. This effect
necessitates accelerated review, a relaxation of the
discretionary rules on justiciability, and a limited
interpretation of the policies against interference in
state law enforcement processesm
Comparison of Epperson, Dombrowski, Younger,
and Steffel reveal how reduced a role rules play in
the outcome of these cases, and how important in-
stead are the individual circumstances presented to
the Court. The Court in each case considered a mix
of policy considerations; whether the statute was
susceptible to constitutional applications, how
readily the statute could be adequately'" construed
in a single adjudication in a state court, the availa-
bility of a state remedy, and the attitude of the
state law enforcement officials toward the statute.
Standing to Assert the Rights of Others
The Supreme Court has been consistently re-
luctant to permit a plaintiff to gain standing by
asserting the rights of others. This is not to say that
no plaintiff can ever assert those rights, he just
may not assert them for the purpose of satisfying
the threshold requirements of adverseness. In
Tileston v. Ullman,'" a physician sought a declara-
tion that two Connecticut birth control statutes'"
outlawing the use of birth control devices were un-
constitutional as applied to a physician. The doctor
urged that the lives of some of his patients would be
endangered if they obeyed the statute, but he did
not assert any personal fourteenth amendment loss
of liberty or property. The Court decided that since
his patients were not parties to the proceeding, and
the Court could find no basis for permitting the
doctor to assert the patients' constitutional claims,
the suit should be dismissed.
Some writers have found Pierce v. Society of
Sisters4" to be irreconcilable with Tileston. The
difference between the two cases is not only that
4 Comment, The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. Rxv. 844, 855-56 (1970).
41 Recall that a statute must give fair notice as to
what it forbids, Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451
(1939).
1 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
'4 Com. GEN. STAT. §§ 6246, 6562 (1930). These
statutes were the same ones challenged in Poe v. Ull-
man, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) and Griswold v. Connecticut,
.381 U.S. 479 (1968).
146 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See note 95 supra.
the plaintiffs in Pierce did allege immediate, palpa-
ble economic injury, but also the availability of a
timely resolution of the case for the third parties
whose rights were asserted. In Tileston, the patients
could sue at any time and no special injury would
occur if their doctor was not permitted to assert
their rights. In Pierce, on the other hand, suits by
the parents could not occur until the schools had
already suffered irreparable economic injury.
Similar reasoning prevailed in Barrows v. Jack-
son where the Court permitted a Caucasian being
sued for breach of a restrictive covenant to assert
the rights of non-Caucasian persons who wished to
buy homes in spite of such covenants. This was a
special situation, the Court said, because it would
be difficult, if not impossible, for the persons who
would be hurt most by a ruling allowing states to
enforce restrictive covenants, to bring their claims
before that court or any other court. 1 Shelley
v. Kramer 49 ruled that restrictive covenants could
not be enforced in equity against Black purchasers
because that would constitute state action denying
them equal protection. Thus, in Barrows, the Court
had to find a way to permit the White seller to a
non-Caucasian to assert the rights of the buyers, or
else nullify the result in Shelley. White sellers would
be deterred from selling their houses to non-Cau-
casians by the prospect of suits for the breach of the
restrictive covenants. The Court resolved this
dilemma by deciding that the rule precluding a per-
son from invoking the rights of others was one of
the discretionary rules of self-restraint that the
Court had developed for its own governance, rather
than part of the constitutional requirement of case
or controversy. Then the Court ruled that this rule
of self-restraint was outweighed by the need to
remedy a harmful situation in this case. 50
A closer analysis of the reasoning and facts in
Barrows reveals that the Court did not even breach
its own rule of self-restraint. The action was for
breach of contract, and both parties had standing
tobebefore the Court on that basis. Therefore, the
defendant could assert the illegality of the contract
as a defense. 5'
The standing issue in Barrows is similar to the
standing issue in McGowan v. Maryland,1 15 where a
-4' 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
11 Id. at 258.
9 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
150 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
'61 Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 249 (1953).
1- 366 U.S. 420 (1961). In McGowan the Court did
allow the defendants to assert the unconstitutionality
of the statute as one "establishing" a religion. The
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defendant to a criminal prosecution under a Sunday
Closing Law was not permittted to assert the un-
constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that
it prohibited the free exercise of religion. The Court
ruled that since the defendants had only asserted
their own economic injury, and not the inhibition
of their own religious freedom or that of their cus-
tomers, they had no standing under either the
Tileston or Pierce doctrines.53
In both Barrows and McGowan, standing to as-
sert the rights of others was based on an evidentiary
limitation of relevance. In Barrows, the defendant
asserted the rights of the non-Caucasian buyers as
a defense to the action against him for breach of
contract. Since the contract would be unenforcea-
ble if contrary to public policy, infringement of the
rights of the non-Caucasian buyers was determina-
tive of the defendant's legal status. In McGowan,
the defendants were limited in their constitutional
claims to those which were related directly to the
behavior for which they were prosecuted.
Griswold v. Connedicutu'1 conferred standing to
assert the rights of others in another criminal prose-
cution. The Court, citing Barrows, ruled that the
accessory had standing to assert that the offense
which he is charged with assisting is not a crime.
This is similar to the idea in Barrows that one
should be able to assert as a defense to a breach of
contract that the contract was contrary to public
policy because it violated the rights of others. The
Court also added that "[t]he rights of husband and
wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or ad-
versely affected unless those rights are considered
in a suit involving those who have this kind of con-
fidential relation to them." 1 5 This change of posi-
tion after Poe v. Ullman n 6 might be attributed to
the presence of different Justices on the Court.1
Related to the determination of who may have
standing to assert the rights of others, is the deter-
mination of what harmed or threatened interests
suffice to give a dispute the necessary adversity.
Court said, "[a]ppellants here concededly have suffered
direct economic injury, allegedly due to the imposition
on them of the tenents of the Christian religion." Id.
at 430. This decision has been subject to criticism; see,
e.g., Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others 35 U. CHr.
L. REv. 601, 630-31 (1968).
1366 U.S. 420, 429-430 (1966).
1 381 U.S. 479 (1968). See text accompanying note
107 supra.
I'5 Id. at 481.
156367 U.S. 497 (1961).
157 By 1968, Justice Frankfurter, the author of the
majority opinion in Poe v. Ullmnan had left the Court
and Justices Fortas, Marshall and White had joined it.
Some cases under the Administrative Procedure
Act' 3 illustrate the Court's development of a flexi-
ble set of standards that could be utilized in the
anticipatory challenge of an obsolete statute.
In Data Processing Service v. Camp' 9 the Court
reviewed earlier definitions of protected interests,
and ruled that freedom from competition was an
interest that would be protected by the Court.
160
The Court found that "generalizations about
standing to sue are largely worthless as such," and
that to satisfy the Article I cases or controversy
requirement, one only had to show that the case
would be presented in an adversary context and in
a form historically viewed as capable of judicial
resolution. 1 This requirement of injury in fact was
satisfied by the showing that the respondent bank
was preparing to perform services for one of Data.
Processing's customers. Beyond that the standing.
requirements depended upon the kind of suit that
was before the Court. The test to be employed in
satisfying this latter determination of compliance
with the Court's own rules of judicial review is
"whether the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of in-
terests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question."2 162
Whether or not the interest was a legal right that
had been invaded was not for threshold determina-
tion, said the Court. That determination went to
Iss 5 U.S.C. § 702 provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof.
169 397 U.S. 150 (1969). Plaintiffs who provided data
processing services to businesses appealed a ruling by
the Comptroller of the Currency permitting national
banks to make data processing services available to
other banks and bank customers. They alleged that
competition by the banks would cause them injury,
and also that the respondent bank was preparing to
provide such services for customers who had previously
contracted for these services with Data Processing.
110 In an earlier case, Tennessee Power Co. v. T.V.A.,
306 U.S. 118 (1938), the Court ruled that plaintiffs who
would be severely injured economically by T.V.A.
lacked standing to challenge the statute authorizing
T.V.A., because they had no legal right to be free from
competition. They stated that a litigant challenging the
constitutionality of a statute had to allege the existence
and violation of a legal right. Id. at 137. The meaning
of legal right test in T.V.A. is "one of property, one
arising out of contract, one protected against tortious
invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a
privilege." Id. For the history and use of the legal right
test see 3 K. DAvis, AnxwIsTRA=vE LAW TREATi E
§ 22.04 (1958).
161397 U.S. 150, 151-53 (1969).
112 Id. at 153.
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the merits.' The Court determined that there was
an interest to be protected on the basis of the gen-
eral policy apparent in the statutes conferring
authority on the comptroller of the currency' l6
The more recent case of Sierra Club v. Morton"6'
delineates the outer limits of standing to assert the
rights of others. Although the plaintiff Sierra Club
did not have standing to ask for a declaratory
judgment in the case, the Court hinted that if
their complaint was drafted to allege injury to
its members, that would be sufficient to allow
proceedings on the merits. The Club had pro-
ceeded on the theory that its long-standing concern
with matters of conservation, and its expertise in
such matters gave it standing to represent the
public under the Administrative Procedure Act. e6
The Court did not find this theory sufficient to
satisfy constitutional standing requirements. It
said that its origin was a misinterpretation of the
theory of private attorneys general.'x ' A private
attorney general is one upon whom Congress has
conferred the right to seek judicial review of agency
decisions.' 6 As interpreted in Data Processing and
Sierra Club, the private attorney general must still
show some injury in fact to satisfy the Article III
case or controversy requirement. This injury must
be more than a harm to a cognizable interest,
69 it
must be one that is personal to the litigant himself.
The injury need not be unique to the litigant, or
even to a small group of people. That it may not
be an economic injury, but one that reflects aes-
thetic, conservational, or recreational values, does
not deprive it of appropriateness for protection by
the judiciary. The Court mentioned that to allow
standing to the Sierra Club on the basis of its "spe-
163Id. The Court is saying here that a "zone of
interests" is broader than a legal right and may include
interests not readily definable as rights.
164 Id. at 157.
165 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The Sierra Club, a member-
ship corporation with a "special interest" in wildlife
conservation, brought an action for a declaration that
the proposed Disney development plan of Mineral King
in Sequoia National Forest was contrary to federal
laws and regulations governing state parks and game
refuges, and for temporary and permanent injunctions
against the issuing of construction permits for the
project. The Club did not allege any injury to its mem-
bers or to its own corporate entity.
166 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
167405 U.S. 727, 736 (1972). The Court traces the
Sierra Club's theory to dictum in Scripps-Howard Radio
v. F.C.C., 316 U.S. 414 (1942) to the effect that "these
private litigants have standing only as representatives
of the public interest."
"6 The right is conferred in the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
169 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
cial interest" would be to allow any group, no mat-
ter how short-lived to vindicate its own value pref-
erences through the judicial process.17 °
The standing doctrines just examined show the
sensitivity of the Court to the need for flexibility
in its construction of the Article III case or con-
troversy requirement. In the first amendment area
the Court has been solicitous to avoid the chilling
effect of an overbroad or vaguely construed statute
regulating expression. Such a chilling effect is not
confined to first amendment behavior, however.
Any penal statute that for reasons of antiquity,
non-enforcement, arbitrary enforcement, or vague-
ness no longer provides citizens with clearly ascer-
tainable prohibitions can have the same chilling
effect upon not only permissible, but constitution-
ally protected behavior.
In seeking a court examination of the validity of
an obsolete statute a citizen must allege some vio-
lated interest in order to show adversity. In allow-
ing greater latitude in the nature of the interests
that will suffice for this function, the Court should
keep in mind the policy behind its rulings in cases
like Sierra Club."' There are many interests that
need protection that cannot be readily reduced to
economic or statutory terms.
Once the citizen can get standing under this ex-
panded notion of interest, he can make his chal-
lenge. Even if he never specifically asserts the rights
of others, the precedent he creates may benefit
future victims of the statute's prohibitions. How-
ever, the chilling effect and potential for arbitrary
enforcement of an obsolete statute should activate
a response from the Court. The mere presence on
the code books of the obsolete statute serves to
make it self-executing. Not only will the citizen be
inhibited from performing the act forbidden, thus
reducing the likelihood that the obsolete statute's
validity would be reviewed incident to a criminal
prosecution, but the non-enforcement behavior of
the state can deprive him of even the opportunity
of asserting its invalidity as a defense. Therefore,
an anticipatory challenge by a citizen would dem-
onstrate the kind of urgency that was apparent in
the Barrows"' and Pierce'7 cases. No better party
to bring the action may be forthcoming. Not only
is the litigant seeking to remove a harmful am-
biguity, but he is providing a means to check the
1
0 Id. at 739-40.
7 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
'-2 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
"'Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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untrammeled rule-making power that an obsolete
statute provides to law enforcement officials.
CONCLUSION
Two approaches to the threats posed by obsolete
statutes have been explored. The first, the defense
to a criminal prosecution, is dependent upon the
"cooperation" of the state. Since the statute must
be enforced, it is only available after the defendant
has had the injurious experience of being arrested.
Furthermore, if the defendant is not successful in
challenging the validity of the statute on appeal, he
is left with a criminal record, and the slim hope that
his prosecution may have provoked sufficient public
outrage to bring about legislative repeal.
The second approach, an anticipatory proceed-
ing, is potentially more fruitful. It suffers none of
the disabilities of the first. Its use, however, de-
pends upon the application by analogy of justicia-
bility doctrines from other areas of the law to the
challenge of an obsolete statute.
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JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF NON-STATUTORY IMMUNITY
A prosecutor confronted with a witness claiming
the privilege against self-incrimination has various
options. The most obvious and least appealing one
is to forego his attempts to secure the necessary
evidence from the witness and try to obtain it from
other sources. The other alternatives are more at-
tractive. He may immunize the witness pursuant
to the specific statutory authority granting him
power to do so, or he may seek an informal arrange-
ment, a non-statutory promise of immunity,
whereby the witness, waiving his privilege against
self-incrimination, agrees to cooperate with the
prosecutor in return for the latter's promise not to
prosecute. In making his choice, the prosecutor will
have to consider the facts of each case; no specific
rules can be stated which are always applicable.
The availability of the last option, however, gives
him greater flexibility since the terms of these in-
formal agreements could be tailored to meet the
requirements of each case, especially where the
other alternatives are limited or disadvantageous.
This comment will discuss these informal ar-
rangements. Although its purpose is not to examine
the broad issues of constitutionality and statutory
interpretation of the statutes authorizing immuni-
ties, a subject widely discussed by other com-
mentators, a general background in this area is
necessary for an understanding of the subject mat-
ter. The comment will then consider the ramifica-
tions of informal immunity arrangements, point out
their beneficial and detrimental effects, and com-
pare their present judicial treatment with the
previous judicial attitude toward these agreements.
Although every witness has a general duty to
furnish relevant and truthful testimony, the privi-
lege against self-incrimination permits suppression
of facts that might result in criminal prosecution
and subsequent punishment.' A grant of immunity,
however, withdraws this limited privilege. Since
the danger of self-incrimination has disappeared, a
witness' justification for claiming the privilege no
longer exists. He may no longer stand mute; his
refusal to testify may result in a finding of con-
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V:
No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself....
This privilege has been also extended to the States.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
tempt.2 The Supreme Court acknowledged the im-
portance of grants of immunity in law enforcement
in a recent decision where this practice was chal-
lenged as unconstitutional. 3 The Court said that
2 See Fraser v. United States, 452 F.2d 616 (7th Cir.
1971), holding that no showing of probable cause or
reasonableness is required to compel the witness to
testify after immunity has been granted.
3 In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972),
the Court resolved any prior doubts as to the constitu-
tionality of "use" immunity statutes. The statute in-
volved in Kastigar was the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 [hereinafter cited as
Crime Act], which provides in its relevant parts:
6002. Immunity generally.-Whenever a witness
refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other informa-
tion in a proceeding before or ancillary to-
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee
of the two Houses, or a committee or a subcom-
mittee of either House, and the person presiding
over the proceeding communicates to the witness
an order issued under this part, the witness may
not refuse to comply with the order on the basis
of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no
testimony or other information compelled under
the order (or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information)
may be used against the witness in any criminal
case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a
false statement, or otherwise failing to comply
with the order.
6003. Court and grand jury proceedings.-(a)
In the case of any individual who has been or
may be called to testify or provide other informa-
tion at any proceeding before or ancillary to a
court of the United States or a grand jury of the
United States, the United States district court for
the judicial district in which the proceeding is or
may be held shall issue, in accordance with sub-
section (b) of this section, upon the request of the
United States attorney for such district, an order
requiring such individual to give testimony or
provide other information which he refuses to give
or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, such order to become effective as
provided in section 6002 of this part.
(b) A United States attorney may, with the ap-
proval of the Attorney General, the Deputy At-
torney General, or any designated Assistant Attor-
ney General, request an order under subsection (a)
of this section when in his judgment-
(1) the testimony or other information from
such individual may be necessary to the public
interest; and
(2) such individual has refused or is likely to
refuse to testify or provide other information on
the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.
The use immunity statute of Kastigar prohibits only
the use of the compelled evidence and its fruits against
the defendant; thus, the witness may still be prosecuted
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this device is indispensable in certain categories of
crimes.
4
While the ability to grant immunity to prospec-
tive witnesses increases the discretionary power of
the prosecutor, it also increases the possibility that
this power may be abused. First, the evidence se-
cured by the grant of immunity might be subject
to attack as unreliable. The witness, hoping for
favorable treatment, might testify to anything that
is expected of him without necessarily telling the
for crimes referred to in his compelled testimony only
if the subsequent prosecution is based on independently
obtained testimony. Transactional immunity, on the
other hand, precludes prosecution of a witness on any
acts that he has testified to. The latter immunity may
not be revoked even though the testimony provided
was not truthful, but the witness may be prosecuted
for perjury resulting from false testimony. For example,
CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. 1324 (West, 1970):
In any felony proceeding or in any investigation
or proceeding before a grand jury for any felony
offense... if a person refuses to answer a question
or produce evidence of any other kind on the
ground that he may be incriminated thereby, and
if the district attorney of the county... in writ-
ing requests the superior court for that county to
order that person to answer the question or produce
the evidence, a judge of the superior court shall set
a time for hearing and order the person to appear
before the court and show cause, if any, why the
question should not be answered or the evidence
produced, and the court shall order the question
answered or the evidence produced... unless it
finds that to do so would be dearly contrary to the
public interest, or could subject the witness to a
criminal prosecution in another jurisdiction, and
that person shall comply with the order. After
complying, and if, but for this section, he would
have been privileged to withhold the answer given
or the evidence produced by him, that person shall
not be prosecuted or subjected to penalty or for-
feiture for or on account of any fact or act concern-
ing which, in accordance with the order, he was
required to answer or produce evidence. But he
may nevertheless be prosecuted or subjected to
penalty or forfeiture for any perjury, false swearing
or contempt committed in answering, or failing to
answer, or in producing, or failing to produce,
evidence in accordance with the order.
For a full treatment of constitutional and statutory
questions, see Note, Witness Immunity Statutes: The
Constitutional and Functional Sufficiency of "Use Im-
munity," 51 B.U.L. Rxv. 616 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Immunity Statutes]; Comment, Tie Federal Witness
Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the
Constilutional Tightrope, 72 YArn L.J. 1568 (1963).
For an extensive survey of current immunity see 8
WIGuo E, EViDENcE § 2281, at n.11 (T. McNaughten's
rev. 1961).4Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 447 and
n.15 (1972). The significance of the immunity grants
becomes apparent when one considers the Watergate
controversy. Some participants have accepted im-
munity in exchange for cooperation with the Watergate
prosecutors. For an illustration of the bargaining in-
volving the immunity grants, see Chicago Sun Times,
Feb. 28, 1974, at 2, col. 1.
truth.5 Second, the immunization involves a "social
cost;" a person who violated the law is freed in ex-
change for his questionable testimony.6 Third, the
existence of this power creates a danger that a prin-
cipal offender might be immunized from prosecu-
tion through either the ignorance or the collusion
of the prosecutor. Fourth, this broad discretionary
authority enables a politically ambitious prosecutor
to select targets for prosecution for his own personal
reasons.
In summary, the potential for abuse of this power
is substantial. Thus, when the legislature grants
prosecutors this discretion, it presumably concludes
that the need for this prosecutorial authority out-
weighs its negative aspects. This judgment has
never been rejected by any court.
General Considerations
At the outset, the term "non-statutory immun-
ity" 7 is defined as an agreement whereby the
witness waives his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and agrees to cooperate with the prosecutor in
exchange for a promise of non-prosecution.8 The
difference between this situation and plea bargain-
ing resulting in a guilty plea is small but significant.
Where non-statutory immunity is offered, the wit-
ness incriminates himself and others, perhaps even
testifying as a state's witness against other accom-
plices, with only the promise by the prosecutor as
security from prosecution. As part of the bargain,
however, he might plead guilty to other offenses.
In plea bargaining in its pure form, the defendant
pleads guilty in an open courtroom to reduced
charges" with a justifiable expectation that the
terms of the bargain will be kept by the prosecu-
tor1 The crucial distinction between these two
5 People v. Brunner, 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 913-914,
108 Cal. Rptr. 501, 505 (1973).
68 d.
7This term will be used interchangeably in this
comment with non-statutory promise of immunity.
sThe prosecution of an offender might also be pre-
cluded where, for example, the statute of limitations
has run or the right to a speedy trial has been violated
or where the suspect's other constitutional rights have
been violated resulting in impracticability or impos-
sibility of securing a conviction. This comment will not
deal with these types of accidental "immunity."
9 See generally Gentile, Fair Bargains and Accurate
Pleas, 49 B.U.L. REv. 514 (1969); Comment, Guilty
Plea Bargaining: Compromises By Prosecutors to Secure
Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1969).
10See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971),
where the Court said:
This phase of the process of criminal justice and
the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a
plea of guilty must be attended by safeguards to
insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the
1974]
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arrangements is a waiver of the privilege against
self-incrimination" and, to a lesser extent, the de-
gree of judicial participation in these arrangements.
Unlike plea bargaining where the admission of guilt
takes place in a courtroom, the waiver of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination where non-statutory
immunity is offered in return occurs outside the
courtroom. In the latter instance, incriminating
testimony is given without the court's admonish-
ment of the constitutional privileges available to
the witness.12 Of course, it is possible to have a
combination of both arrangements. The defendant
can provide the detailed incriminating testimony
after his plea of guilty pursuant to a valid and en-
forcible agreement.
3
The cases to be discussed in this comment could
have been governed by the applicable statutory
provisions. The fact that they were not is an indi-
cation either that the prosecutor made a conscious
choice between the statutory and non-statutory
immunities, or that there was unintentional non-
compliance with the available statutory proce-
circumstances. These circumstances will vary, but
a constant factor is that where a plea rests in any
significant degree on a promise or agreement of
the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of
inducement or consideration, such promise must
be fulfilled.
Id. at 262.
See also THE REPORT ON TE PROSECUTION FUNCTION,
TENTATIVE DRAPT, ABA PROJEcT, Mnmrum STAND-
AmS OF CRuINAL JUSTICE which provides:
4.3(c) If the prosecutor finds he is unable to fulfill
an understanding previously agreed upon in the
plea discussions, he should give notice promptly
to the defendant and cooperate in securing leave
of the court for the defendant to withdraw any
pleas and take other steps appropriate to restore
the defendant to the position he was in before the
understanding was reached or plea made.
"A plea of guilty is a waiver of the defendant's
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to the
extent that the defendant voluntarily admits his guilt.
But the waiver of the privilege in non-statutory im-
munity cases goes beyond the mere plea of guilty; it
involves furnishing detailed testimony which presum-
ably will be used against others.
Furthermore, the waiver of the privilege in the
context of non-statutory immunity is more damaging
to the defendant than a guilty plea. Where the latter
is withdrawn or successfully challenged, the defendant
can be restored to the position he was before the plea
was made. The same result is not that easily achieved
where the defendant has supplied detailed incriminating
testimony. See note 71-72 and accompanying text infra
for a more complete discussion of this problem.
2 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), hold-
ing that a trial court must determine that a defendant
is aware of his constitutional rights and understands
the consequences of his plea of guilty. See also Rule 402
of the Illinois Supreme Court, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I10A,
§ 402 (1969), providing for a detailed procedure to be
followed in plea bargaining.
11 See note 10 sutera
dures.11 The reasons for the prosecutor's choice will
vary with the facts of each case; but one of them,
perhaps the most important, is that the prosecutor
has a witness who is willing to cooperate. The avail-
ability of non-statutory immunity is especially de-
sirable to a prosecutor where the immunity statute
grants transactional immunity, an all-or-nothing
proposition. The prosecutor faced with a recalci-
trant witness will be hesitant to grant transactional
immunity thereby precluding further prosecution
since he is uncertain that the procured evidence will
be helpful or that the witness will in fact testify
truthfully.15 Non-statutory immunity, on the other
hand, permits the prosecutor to tailor the breadth
of immunity given to the witness. For example, a
witness might be willing to "sell" his cooperation
for a plea of guilty to reduced charges. The judicial
approval of use immunities8 does not reduce the
effectiveness of non-statutory immunities; but, on
the contrary, it may stimulate a greater interest in
this kind of bargain among prospective defendants.
Faced with the limited protection afforded by a
compelled use immunity, a witness hoping for a
better deal might be more willing to cooperate with
law enforcement officials.
Performance Required of Proseculion
The question of the legal effect of non-statutory
promises of immunity requires consideration of two
distinct issues: 1) the scope of the inherent power
of the prosecutor to grant immunity from prosecu-
tion, and 2) the enforceability of these promises
after incriminating testimony is given in reliance
upon them. The first issue deals with the extent of
discretion in prosecution. The second calls for a
broader consideration of fairness and protection of
defendants' constitutional rights.
When faced with the question whether the prose-
cutor has inherent power to grant immunity, some
courts have not separated the two issues. In deny-
ing the prosecutor's power they have also con-
cluded that the promise is not binding on the prose-
cution, even after the defendant has performed his
part of the bargain. A recent decision by a Mary-
land appellate court in Bowie v. State7 is a typical
14The various immunity statutes impose certain
procedural requirements such as a court order approving
the application for immunity. Non-compliance will
invalidate the immunity grant. See Crime Act, supra
note 3, § 6003.
1i Once the witness has been given transactional
immunity he may be prosecuted only for perjury; the
immunity grant is not revocable.
16 See note 3 supra.
"7 14 Md. App. 567. 287 A.2d 782 (1972).
[Vol. 65
NON-STATUTORY IMMUNITY
illustration of this approach. The defendant in that
case was indicted for drug-related offenses. While
the case was placed on the inactive docket, the de-
fendant cooperated with the prosecution in ex-
change for a promise of immunity i s Although the
defendant failed, in the court's view, to prove the
existence of an agreement, 9 the court stated the
controlling law. Since the authority to confer im-
munity from prosecution requires explicit authori-
zation by the legislature,20 neither the prosecutor
nor the judge has the inherent power to grant
immunity. The court reasoned that the legislature
decides whether particular conduct is to be deemed
criminal and therefore, the prosecutor, in the ab-
sence of statutory authorization, should not be able
to pervert legislative intent by his actions.
21
Starting with the proposition that the promise of
immunity was outside the scope of prosecutorial
power, the court concluded that such a promise was
not enforcible even where the defendant performed
his part of the bargain in good faith. Thus the de-
fendant would be entitled only to an equitable
claim of immunity which, however, would not bar
prosecution.Y
IIt was not clear whether the alleged offer of im-
munity pertained to the offense named in the indict-
ment or involved possible future criminal charges which
might have rested on the incriminating testimony to be
furnished by the defendant while cooperating with the
prosecution.
19 The defendant had the burden of showing:
(1) precisely what the agreement was,
(2) his own performance in fulfillment of the agreed
obligation,
(3) an unjustified breach of the agreement by the
prosecution.
Id. at 573, 287 A.2d at 786.20 Maryland has no general immunity statute.
21 The court cited Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244,
177 N.E. 489 (1928), where justice Cardozo said:
The conclusion, we think, is inescapable that a
power to suspend the criminal law by the tender
of immunity is not an implied or inherent incident
of a power to investigate. It may be necessary for
fruitful results in a particular instance, but it is not
so generally indispensable as to attach itself auto-
matically to the mere power to inquire. Whether
the good to be attained by procuring the testimony
of criminals is greater or less than the evil to be
wrought by exempting them forever from prosecu-
tion for their crimes is a question of high policy as
to which the law-making department of the govern-
ment is entitled to be heard.
Id. at 260-61, 177 N.E. at 495.
" An equitable claim of immunity is based on the
doctrine of approvement as enunciated by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Ford, 99 U.S. 594 (1878). In
that case the Court held that where an accomplice has
cooperated with the prosecution by incriminating
himself and others, relying on the promise of immunity,
he is entitled only to an equitable claim of immunity
which may result in a recommendation for executive
pardon or clemency, but does not entitle him to absolute
Although a purely logical approach to the en-
forcement of non-statutory promises of immunity
would necessitate the conclusion reached by the
Maryland court, that conclusion was merely dic-
tum. Similarly, in most of the cases following the
Bowie approach, the pronouncements that the de-
fendant's performance did not validate otherwise
impermissible promises were not essential to the
holding against the defendant. In these cases the
defendant breached his part of the agreement
thereby extinguishing his claim to the enforcement
of the agreement,2 or the prosecutor attempted to
compel the defendant to accept non-statutory im-
munity,24 or the prosecuted accomplice of the wit-
ness challenged the validity of the agreement25
The justification for denying the prosecutor the
power to immunize witnesses stems from the ap-
prehension, intimated in the opinions, that this
power, if available, will be abused.I However, the
stated reasons for denying that power range from
the exclusivity of legislative authority to grant im-
munity to other less forceful ratiocination of'the
Bowue-type rule. Some cases said that the discretion
of the prosecuting attorney is not unlimited, citing
as an example the fact that a prosecutor's successor
in office may reinstitute proceedings against a wit-
ness even when a nolle prosequi has been entered by
thepredecessor, or that a grand jury might, without
the consent of the prosecuting attorney, institute
such proceedings.2Y These superficial explanations
immunity as a matter of course. The federal courts
have apparently abandoned this doctrine. King v.
United States, 203 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1953).
For holdings similar to the Bowie approach, see, e.g.,
Frady v. People, 96 Colo. 43,40 P.2d 606 (1934); State v.
Meyers, 330 Mo. 84, 49 S.W.2d 36 (1932).
2
3See, e.g., United States v. Boulier, 359 F. Supp.
165 (E.D. N.Y. 1972); United States v. Hinz, 35 F. 272
(N.D. Cal. 1888).
SSee, e.g., Isaacs v. United States, 256 F.2d 654
(8th Cir. 1958); Foot v. Buchanan, 113 F. 156 (N.D.
Miss. 1902); Ex parte Irvine, 74 F. 954 (S.D. Ohio 1896);
State v. Roberts, 4 Conn. Cir. 271, 230 A.2d 239 (1967);
People v. Rockola, 339 Ill. 474, 171 N.E. 559 (1930);
Apodaca v. Viramontes, 53 N.M. 513, 212 P.2d 425
(1949); Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E.
489 (1931); Commonwealth v. Carrera, 424 Pa. 551,
227 A.2d 627 (1967).25 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 77 Wash. 423, 462 P.2d
933 (1969); State v. Crepault, 126 Vt. 338, 229 A.2d
245, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 915 (1967).
2GThese fears have been already discussed in the
context of the statutory immunity. The dangers of
broad discretionary power to grant immunity are
applicable to non-statutory immunity as well.
21 Both of these explanations fail to take into account
practical realities in the administration of justice.
First, the guarantee of speedy trial precludes a sub-
stantial delay between the date of the arrest or in-
dictment and the trial itself. See Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.
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or even the underlying misgivings suffice only if the
question of prosecutorial power to grant immunity
is considered in isolation. Where the prosecutor
obtains a benefit from the defendant's performance
of the bargain and then subsequently breaches his
promise, the interest at stake is the fair administra-
tion of justice, not merely the liberty of a de-
fendant, or the extent of prosecutorial power.n
Some courts have struggled to develop a legal
doctrine which would permit the enforcement of
non-statutory promises of immunity where the de-
fendant performs his part of the bargain even where
the bargain exceeded prosecutorial authority. En-
forcements of these agreements either avoid the
question whether the promise was within the scope
of the prosecutorial authority or implicitly recog-
nize this authority. A 1923 decision of the Illinois
supreme court held an agreement to be valid be-
cause it involved the honor and dignity of the state,
and declared that public policy was best served by
holding these inducements enforcible in order that
some, if not all, the wrongdoers are punished.
29
A more recent decision of the New Jersey su-
preme court in State v. Ashby 9 avoided reliance
upon the vague and indefinite meaning of "public
policy" and "honor" by adopting the contract
doctrine of consideration as the basis for enforcing
promises of non-statutory immunity. This con-
ceptual approach is technical and evasive; it does
not explicitly examine the unfairness of the prose-
307 (1971). Second, the statement that the successor
is not bound by the prior actions of his predecessor
evades the issue altogether; the immunity promise of
a prosecutor is not made in his personal capacity but
in his capacity as government agent. See Spomer v.
Littleton, 94 S.Ct. 685 (1974); Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). Further, the grand jury
system, although initially adopted as a check upon
unlimited prosecutorial discretion, has lost its esteemed
position because it has become a rubber stamp for the
prosecutor. This result follows from the nature of the
grand jury itself. Although the jurors may take part
in the interrogation of witnesses, they are almost en-
tirely dependent on the prosecutor to guide them and
provide them with legal expertise. See Note, Grand
Jury: Bulwark of Proseutoridl Immunity, 3 Loy. UNIv.
L.J. 305, 311 (1972).
2sSee United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428
(4th Cir. 1972) (en banc); United States v. Paiva, 294
F. Supp. 742, 747 (D.D.C. 1969).
29 People v. Boglowski, 326 Ill. 253, 157 N.E. 181
(1927), where the defendant remained in jail for three
years being reassured continuously that he would "get
out" as soon as the case was over. Cf. People v. Rockola,
339 Ill. 474, 171 N.E. 559 (1930), where the promise by
a suspect to give incriminating testimony was not en-
forcible against him.
30 State v. Ashby, 81 N.J. Super. 350, 195 A.2d 635
(1963). See also Application of Parham, 6 Ariz. App.
191, 431 P.2d 86 (1967) (dictum).
cutor's violation of the agreement after having ob-
tained quid pro quo from the defendant. Thus, un-
der this doctrine, the enforceability of the bargain
turns upon the consideration supplied by the de-
fendant; this approach necessitates a determination
of the adequacy of such consideration. Where the
accused becomes a witness for the prosecution,
there is a gain to the public interest since the given
testimony presumably increases the likelihood of
the conviction of the other accomplices. But if no
useful evidence is furnished and the defendant
merely pleads guilty to a reduced charge in return
for the dismissal of other charges, then the promise
not to prosecute on the other charges would be in-
valid, for the "public is not recompensated for fore-
bearing to try the defendant for the highest degree
of his offense." 31 The dissent in Ashby argued that
the outcome should not be controlled by whether
the defendant furnished "sufficient" consideration
in becoming a witness for the state, but rather
should depend on the promise itself-whether it is
fair to permit the prosecution to benefit from its
own misconduct. If the prosecutor had no author-
ity to make promises, then he should not be able to
profit from his violation of the limitations upon his
powers. The doctrine of consideration as enunciated
in Ashby has limited application since it would
deny enforcement of non-statutory immunity
where the prosecutor, after securing incriminating
testimony, decides not to use the defendant as a
witness for the state against other accomplices.
The Louisiana supreme court adopted a more ex-
pansive view of the consideration doctrine.*2 It said
that the agreement should be enforced:
... [W]here the accused in reliance on such a
pledge, has carried out his part of the agreement
and in doing so may have relinquished valuable
fundamental rights, such as the constitutional
guarantee that he cannot be compelled to give
evidence against himself, a trial on the merits,
and the possibility of being exonerated if the evi-
dence is weak and insufficient to sustain a convic-
tion.n
n 81 N.J. Super. at 363-64, 195 A.2d at 642. This
distinction between considerations in terms of furnish-
ing evidence and "mere" pleas of guilty to reduced
charges has been abrogated by the Supreme Court's
holding in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971),
where it was said that if a plea of guilty was induced
by a promise, that promise must be kept.
12 State v. Hingle, 242 La. 844, 139 So. 2d 205 (1962).
33 Id. at 859, 139 So. 2d at 210. Hingle was cited
approvingly in Austin v. State, 49 Wisc. 2d 727, 183
N.W.2d 56 (1971), where the defendant was convicted
of armed robbery upon a plea of guilty entered pursuant
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This approach, unlike the Ashby rule, emphasizes a
waiver of defendant's statutory or constitutional
privilege; it does not attempt to weigh public bene-
fits arising from the increased likelihood of con-
victing accomplices. It would give effect to a plea
of guilty to a reduced charge as well as to agree-
ments of non-statutory immunity. Yet, it requires
the defendant to waive some of his rights. Thus
cooperation with a prosecutor to procure informa-
tion incriminating others would not constitute
sufficient consideration where the procured testi-
mony did not relate to the offense for which the
defendant was prosecuted.3 This distinction be-
tween cooperation involving furnishing self-in-
criminating testimony and supplying evidence to
incriminate others concededly makes sense in the
context and the purpose of the immunity statutes.
The privilege against self-incrimination is a per-
sonal privilege; it may not be invoked to protect
others.35
A California appellate court in People v. Brun-
iter" used the contractual theory of estoppel to
to an agreement made with the prosecuting attorney
and approved by the court. In exchange for the guilty
plea to the offense charged and an agreement that the
court could consider for the purpose of sentencing an
additional uncharged crime admitted by the defendant,
the prosecuting attorney agreed not to prosecute the
defendant for the uncharged offense. Subsequently, the
defendant sought to have his guilty plea vacated on
the grounds that the illegality of the agreement de-
prived him of his bargained expectations. The court's
holding that the agreement was enforcible rested upon
due process notions of fairness and decency. This
analysis treats the consideration doctrine as inter-
changeable with notions of fairness.
1 See Hunter v. United States, 405 F.2d 1187 (9th
Cir. 1969), where the defendant was promised immunity
from prosecution in exchange for cooperation to secure
information not related to the pending charge. The
court's holding that the agreement was not enforcible
rested on two alternative grounds: 1) the prosecutor
had no authority to make the promise (the Bowie v.
State approach, see notes 17-22 and accompanying text
supra); 2) the defendant had not surrendered constitu-
tional or statutory safeguards as consideration for the
promise of immunity.
Accord, Application of Parham, 6 Ariz. App. 191, 431
P.2d 86 (1967) where the defendant was promised
immunity from pending charges for burglary and theft
if he cooperated with the prosecution to apprehend
narcotics violators. After the defendant had performed
some undercover work for the police, the burglary
charges nevertheless were brought against him. The
Arizona court held that the promises were not en-
forcible. Yet, by way of dictum the court said that
court approval of the promise not to prosecute (the
Arizona practice requires court's approval before pend-
ing charges can be dismissed) in exchange for self-in-
criminating evidence is valid.
" See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
3632 Cal. App. 3d 908, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1973).
enforce the bargain made by the prosecutor and the
defendant. The defendant, a member of the Man-
son gang, was promised immunity from prosecution
by the district attorney if she would provide in-
criminating testimony as to her involvement in the
crime which would also incriminate other members
of the gang. The defendant gave her testimony
under these circumstances even though the prose-
cutor who had the authority to grant statutory
immunityM had failed to obtain it.3 When the de-
fendant subsequently recanted her testimony and
claimed the fifth amendment privilege, she was in-
dicted for participation in the crime. The trial court
dismissed the indictment and permanently en-
joined the state from prosecuting the defendant.3'
On review, the appellate court upheld the decision
of the lower court stating that it would be "anom-
alous" 41 for the prosecutor to argue that the
agreement is void because of non-compliance with
the statute where the statute gives the district at-
torney the sole discretion whether or not to obtain
statutory immunity for a reluctant witness.41 The
court's reasoning in Brunner, though enforcing the
agreement on the basis of the consideration doc-
trine, does not treat as dispositive the question of
whether the prosecutor had the authority to make
37 CAL. PEN. CoDE Amx. § 1324 (West, 1970). The
statute authorizes the district attorney to request
the county court to give transactional immunity to a
witness who claims the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion so that evidence may be secured.
Is It is not ciear whether the failure to obtain the
statutory immunity was a result of an intentional
choice by the prosecutor based on the general con-
siderations discussed in the text or was a result of in-
advertence. Although the following is mere conjec-
ture, it is likely that the prosecutor intentionally chose
to seek an informal arrangement with the defendant.
Since California grants only transactional immunity,
the prosecutor would be totally precluded from prose-
cuting the witness on the original charges. The only
means of insuring that the defendant testified truthfully
and fully would be perjury and contempt proceedings.
But if an informal bargain were made instead, failure
of the defendant to meet the terms of the bargain
would relieve the prosecutor from fulfilling his promise.
39 AL PEx. CODE, AiNN. § 1385 (West, 1970) pro-
vides that the trial court may upon its own motion,
and "in furtherance of justice," dismiss a pending ac-
tion.
40 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 915, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501, 506
(1973).
41 In upholding the agreement, the court rejected the
doctrine of approvement (see note 22 supra) which the
prosecution had suggested as the sole remedy available
to the defendant. The court also discussed the desir-
ability of putting the agreement in writing to avoid any
disputes over the substance of the agreement and to
prevent "dishonesty, equivocation and misunder-
standing." Id. at 914, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
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that promise.C It was sufficient that the defendant
had performed in reliance on the promise. Thus the
court's analysis is in direct conflict with Bowie v.
State,43 where it was indicated that defendant's
good faith compliance with the agreement did not
validate an illegal promise.
A federal court decision, United States v. Paiva,M
uses the question of prosecutorial discretion as a
starting point for its analysis. In that case the de-
fendant agreed to cooperate with the prosecution
in exchange for immunity from prosecution. The
agreement, however, did not require the defendant
to testify about possible accomplices. 45 Upon the
defendant's refusal to provide that information, a
refusal justified by the agreement, the prosecutor
indicted the defendant for the original offense. The
court held the agreement enforcible casting aside
the doctrine of approvement which the government
had suggested was applicable.46 The government's
contention that enforcement of the bargain would
violate the principle of separation of powers pro-
voked a judicial definition of the relationship be-
tween prosecutors and the courts. The court said
the judiciary, while exercising its supervisory pow-
ers over the administration of justice, may require
the executive branch to adhere to the standard of
fair play. Although the prosecutor has almost
unlimited discretion to enforce criminal laws,4 his
4 The court said that "we agree with the district
attorney that section 1324, the witness immunity act,
regulated the grant of immunity from criminal prosecu-
tion." Id. at 912, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 504. These words
may indicate acknowledgement by the court that the
prosecutor had no authority to make the promise.
43 14 Md. App. 567, 287 A.2d 782 (1972). For com-
plete.analysis of that case, see notes 17-22 and accom-
panying text supra.
" 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969). Cf. Mallon v.
State, 49 Wisc. 2d 185, 181 N.W.2d, 364 (1970), where
the trial judge, pursuant to the stipulation between the
prosecutor and the defendant, heard testimony con-
cerning uncharged crimes during sentencing hearing.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin said by way of dictum
that this stipulation precluded the state from prosecut-
ing on these uncharged offenses. In emphasizing the
prosecutor's broad discretionary powers, the court
implied that the prosecutor had the authority to make
the promise in question.
45 294 F. Supp. 742, 743 (D.D.C. 1969). The defend-
ant also pleaded guilty to four felonies.46 See note 22 supra explaining the doctrine of ap-
provement. Although the .Paiva court did not expressly
reject the doctrine, it questioned its vitality.
47 Because this power [to formulate proper stand-
ards of law enforcement] stems from and is directed
to the judiciary, it is not an infringement on the
nearly unlimited discretion of the U.S. Attorney
to determine, for instance, whether as here to enter
into agreements, how to charge, whether to seek
indictment, and in general to prepare his cases
for trial. That is the executive function.
294 F. Supp. 742, 747 (footnotes omitted).
conduct may be subject to judicial review where an
agreement with the defendant involves "the use of
the judicial process." 48 Further, the court said that
the judiciary may not avoid the exercise of its re-
sponsibility. Failure to act "would create a void
leaving the defendant helpless," 19 for the interest
at stake is the "public confidence in the fair and
honorable administration of justice" 50 which is
prerequisite for respect for the rule of law.
The Paiva decision appears to concede that the
prosecutor has discretionary authority to make
promises of non-statutory immunity subject only
to standards of fair play. Unlike Bowie v. State"1
which denied that authority on the ground that the
power to immunize a witness must be explicitly
granted by the legislature, the Paiva court seems to
say that the judiciary will not guard against the
prosecutor bargaining away his right and duty to
prosecute. The emphasis is no longer on whether
the promise is within the permissible authority; it
no longer suffices for the prosecutor to argue that
he or another government official exceeded his
authority. A promise of non-statutory immunity
will be enforced even though the resulting expan-
sion of prosecutorialpowers might bring about their
abuse.
The notion that the prosecutor has the discre-
tionary authority whether or not to prosecute,
subject only to a limited judicial check, is espoused
by the Court of Appeals for District of Columbia in
United States v. Ammidown.- 2 There the prosecution
and the defense reached an agreement whereby the
defendant agreed to plead guilty to a reduced
charge and cooperate in securing conviction of an
accomplice in exchange for a promise that he would
not be prosecuted on a more severe charge. The
trial judge refused to accept the agreement holding
that public interest would be violated if the de-
fendant were allowed to escape from prosecution
for the more severe offense. The Court of Appeals
said that the prosecutor alone should decide
whether to prosecute since he is most aware of
48 Id. The mere attempt to prosecute the defendant
in violation of the initial agreement involves the "use
of the judicial process." Id. at 746-747.49 Id. at 747. The court qualified its broad language,
however. It said that the defendant must be prejudiced
by the failure of the prosecution to fulfill its part of the
agreement. This essential element was present in this
case. The defendant, in addition to pleading guilty to
four felonies, furnished detailed incriminating testi-
mony.60 Id. at 746-47, citing Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369, 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (1958).51 See notes 17-22 and accompanying text sutra.
497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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government resources and the evidence available
to secure a conviction. The courts may interfere
with this discretion only upon explicit finding that
the action is contrary to the public interest. That
interference is justified only when there is over-
whelming evidence that the discretion has been
abused; a mere disagreement over the conception
of public interest is not sufficient.
The rationale of the Anznidown decision provides
additional support for the proposition that the
prosecutor has the power to grant informal im-
munity. It would be logically inconsistent for the
prosecutor to assert that he has broad discretionary
powers and then argue that the promise was outside
his authority when an attempt is made to enforce
it. A court following the Ammidown reasoning
would presumably conclude that a prosecutor has
grossly abused his discretion where he denies the
validity of his bargain.
The court of appeals held explicitly that an un-
authorized promise to grant non-statutory im-
munity by a federal prosecutor will be binding upon
the government.ns The defendant alleged that he
made an agreement with the prosecutor of one
district to cooperate with the prosecution by in-
criminating himself and others in exchange for a
plea of guilty to reduced charges and for dropping
pending charges against him in another district.5
The court recognized that ordinarily immunity in
the federal system may be granted only upon com-
pliance with statutory requirements.55 Neverthe-
less, where the defendant has provided incriminat-
ing testimony, the agreement may be enforced. 56
That the promise was made in one district and
breached in another did not invalidate the agree-
ment if the defendant fulfilled his part of it. The
court reasoned that since the jurisdiction of the
United States extends to all districts and states,
promises made by an agent of the United States
with apparent authority will be binding upon the
United States even though the agent's actions were
51 United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir.
1972) (en banc).
4 The federal officials in the other district were not
a party to the agreement. Thus, the promise was dearly
outside the ordinary scope of the prosecutorial discre-
tion.
51 See Crime Act, supra note 3, § 6003.
56 Since the case before the court involved only the
defendant's allegations, the court remanded the case to
the district court for factual determinations.
5 The court cited the Paiva decision as the control-
ling law. 454 F.2d 426, 428. This decision goes even
further since in Paiva the promise was made and
breached within the same district.
not authorized and went beyond the ordinary scope
of the federal prosecutor's powers.-3
A recent decision by the Supreme Court in San-
tobello v. New York 9 apparently dispenses with con-
sideration as a prerequisite to the enforcement
of a plea bargain. The defendant pleaded guilty to
a lesser offense on the condition that other felony
charges be dropped and that the prosecutor not
make a sentence recommendation. At the sentenc-
ing hearing, a new prosecutor recommended a
particular sentence. The issue before the Court was
enforcement of the bargain. The Court concluded
that where a plea of guilty is induced by a promise,
the defendant may be entitled to enforce the bar-
53 The dissent argued that federal officials in one
district could not by any agreement interfere with the
discretion of the federal prosecutor in another district.
454 F.2d 426, 431 (Boreman, J., dissenting). Yet the
dissent recognized the injustice to the defendant who
makes incriminating statements in reliance upon an
unauthorized promise, an injustice which cannot be
remedied since the effect of those statements will hound
the defendant even though the evidence itself is not
admissible. See Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371
U.S. 341 (1963), which holds that evidence and the
fruits of it, obtained as a result of a promise of immun-
ity, is not admissible because it was procured by an
improper inducement. The conclusion reached by the
majority in Carter finds additional support in the
Supreme Court's analysis of the scope of the authority
of a federal prosecutor in Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150 (1972). There an accomplice was promised
immunity from prosecution if he testified against the
defendant. At the trial, neither the prosecution nor the
accomplice disclosed this promise. The Supreme Court
held that neither the authority of the United States
attorney to make the promise nor his failure to inform
his superiors or associates was controlling. The defense
was prejudiced since the jury did not have an oppor-
tunity to consider how much credibility should be
given to the accomplice's testimony in light of the
promise made. The Court said:
The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it
is the spokesman for the Government. A promise
made by one attorney must be attributed, for these
purposes, to the Government.... To the extent
this places a burden on the large prosecution offices,
procedures and regulations can be established to
carry that burden and insure communication of all
relevant information on each case to every lawyer
who deals with it.
Id. at 154.
Cf. Roberts v. United States, 472 F.2d 1195 (5th
Cir. 1973) (promises that state's charges will be dropped
in exchange for plea of guilty to federal charges are
permissible) (dictum). Accord, Buckles v. U.S. District
Court, 488 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1973). But see United
States v. Boulier, 359 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. N.Y. 1972).
See also People v. Brock, 45 Ill. 2d 292, 259 N.E.2d 12
(1970), where it was held that the district attorney in
Illinois had performed his part of the agreement by
contacting Tennessee officials requesting them to drop
charges pending against the defendant in that state;
the latter's refusal did not vitiate the agreement since
the Illinois prosecutor had no authority, real or appar-
ent, to dismiss charges pending in another state.
69 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
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gain as initially proposed by the prosecution.6" In
light of the importance of plea bargaining in the
prompt and final disposition of many criminal
cases, non-enforcement of bargains would decrease
the willingness of a suspect to enter into plea ne-
gotiations. To allow a prosecutor to be free of the
obligations imposed by an agreement would not
only be contrary to the public interest but would
also outrage the sense of fairness. 61
The Santobello decision could be extended by
analogy to non-statutory promises of immunity.
Although the Court did not state explicitly the
grounds upon which the bargained plea agreements
are to be enforced, its holding is apparently based
on notions of fairness as expressed in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
6 2
Application of these principles would not eliminate
important questions of self-incrimination under the
fifth amendment in cases of informal immunity, but
would provide an additional remedy. Since the sup-
pression of evidence obtained in violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination is not a fully
restorative cure,6 insistance that the prosecutor
fully comply with the terms of the agreement would
provide the necessary protection of this constitu-
tional right.
In summary, it would seem that previous judicial
disapproval of promises of non-statutory immunity
has given way to more liberal treatment. Regard-
less of the conceptual bases of these decisions,
recent cases enforce informal promises if the de-
fendant has relied upon them to his detriment.
64
The apparent shift is beneficial to all parties con-
cerned. The defendant, knowing that the agreement
6 The Court remanded the case to the state court to
fashion the appropriate remedy: to grant specific per-
formance or vacate the plea of guilty. But the Court
said that specific performance may be granted. See note
10 supra.
61404 U.S. 257, 266 (Douglas, J., concurring) (1971).
1
2 See, e.g., Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524
(1973), where the court's decision rested on the "essen-
tial demands of fairness" contained within the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment.
63See Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S.
341 (1963), holding that where incriminating testimony
is obtained in violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination, such testimony is inadmissible against
the defendant. For a complete analysis of a situation
where this remedy would not correct fully transgression
of the defendant's rights, see notes 71-72 and accom-
panying text infra.
The question whether the prosecutor has an in-
herent power to grant non-statutory immunity loses its
importance since the courts are willing to enforce a
promise even if no authority for it existed. It would add
logical consistency if the authority were granted; but in
light of judicial enforcement of these agreements this
inconsistency becomes secondary.
will be enforced, will be more willing to bargain in
hope of favorable treatment. The prosecutor, on
the other hand, obtains the benefit of having a
cooperative witness-he is no longer restricted to
statutory immunities. 6 The court's docket may
also be reduced to some extent. 6 The problems that
might arise from abuse of these broad discretionary
powers could be handled through administrative
controls. 6
Performance Required of Defendant
Once the defendant enters into an agreement
with the prosecution, it is essential that he perform
fully and in good faith."' When the agreement is
breached by the defendant, the prosecution is not
bound by its own promise and may prosecute him
for the original crime.69 The notion that the de-
fendant's non-compliance with the terms of the
agreement releases the prosecutor from his obliga-
tions can be rationalized within the framework of
every conceptual doctrine used by the courts to
analyze the validity of non-statutory immunity.
Where the doctrine of consideration is applied, the
non-performance or insufficient performance is said
to be a failure of consideration. The prosecution,
which is the aggrieved party, may repudiate the
65The prosecutor will not be able to compel the
witness to accept non-statutory immunity. Where the
witness cannot be induced to cooperate, the prosecutor
will have to rely on the compulsive statutory immuni-
ties.
66 Cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1972).
67 See United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th
Cir. 1972) (en banc), where the court said:
If there be fear that an United States Attorney
may unreasonably bargain away the government's
right and duty to prosecute, the solution lies in the
administrative controls which the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States may promulgate to regu-
late and control the conduct of cases by the United
States Attorneys and their assistants. The solution
does not lie in formalisms about the express, im-
plied or apparent authority of one United States
Attorney, or his representative, to bind another
United States Attorney and thus to visit a sixteen
year sentence on a defendant in violation of a bar-
gain he fully performed.
There is more at stake than just the liberty of this
defendant. At stake is the honor of the government,
public confidence in the fair administration of
justice, and the efficient administration of justice
in a federal scheme of government.
Id. at 428.
Cf. Crime Act supra note 3, § 6003-05 which requires
permission of the Attorney General of the United
States before any grant of immunity is made.
68 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426
(4th Cir. 1972) (en banc); People v. Brunner, 32 Cal.
App. 3d 908, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1973).
69 People v. Brunner, 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 914-917,
108 Cal. Rptr. 501, 506-07 (1973).
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agreement, and as in any other contract, seek to be
placed in its original position. Similarly, under the
doctrine of fairness the defendant forfeits his
grounds for asserting his claim where he, himself,
is guilty of bad faith.
At this point, the difference between statutory
transactional immunity and the non-statutory
promise of immunity becomes significant. Where
the former has been granted, bad faith of a witness
may only result in a perjury proceeding or con-
tempt charge ° But where a non-statutory promise
was given, the witness could be prosecuted for the
original crime notwithstanding the possibility that
he might have incriminated himself, even though
the incriminating evidence would be inadmissable
against him in a subsequent prosecution?' Thus,
the defendant must adhere very strictly to the
terms of the bargain or otherwise find himself in a
worse position than if he had initially refused to
cooperate with the prosecution
2
The question of what performance by the de-
fendant will be deemed satisfactory cannot be
answered simply and fully. One thing seems dear:
the courts will not permit the prosecutors to apply
their own standard of performance and initiate
proceedings against the witness if they are dis-
70 See note 3 supra for a more detailed explanation
of the consequences of granting transactional and use
immunities.
71See Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S.
341 (1963). The overall result of agreement and breach
of the agreement is almost equivalent to use immunity.
Although it is arguable that use immunity places the
witness in the same position as though he had not pre-
viously testified, the realities of a criminal trial must be
considered. The incriminating testimony, though itself
not admissible, does in fact illuminate other available
and independently obtainable evidence; especially
where the trial court rules on both the admissibility of
the evidence and then, as a trier-of-fact determines the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Furthermore, the incriminating testimony, though
not admissible in the case-in-chief, may have an effect
upon the defendant's election to take the stand at trial.
The prosecutor, knowing the defendant's prior testi-
mony, can formulate questions to reach the facts raised
by that testimony without an overt reference to it.
Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1971) (Setz,
J., concurring). Thus the defendant loses more than
the "mere" benefit of the bargain. See generally Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), holding that incrimi-
nating testimony, not admissible in case-in-chief be-
cause of the violation of the rule enunciated in Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), can be used to
impeach the defendant if he takes the stand. For an
excellent analysis of the question decided in Harris, see
Cole, Impeachment With Unconstitutionally Obtained
Evidence: Coming to Grips With The Perjurious Defend-
ant, 62 J. Cmn. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1971). See also Comment,
Impeachment, Use Immunity and the Perjurious Defend-
ant, 77 Dic. L. Rxv. 23 (1972).
2 See note 71 supra.
pleased with the latter's consideration." This is es-
pecially true when there is a factual dispute as to
the terms of the agreements, and charges and
countercharges of bad faith by both partiesY
4
The People v. Brunne7 5 decision which touched
upon questions of the permissible terms of an agree-
ment and how strictly the defendant must adhere
to them is merely an example of one court's hand-
ling of these matters. It nevertheless might be
indicative of the judicial conceptualization of the
factual dispute and, therefore, deserves a closer
examination. The Brunner court said that prose-
cutors may not bargain for conviction of accom-
plices but only for truthful testimony.7 Although
no justification for that statement was provided,
the explanation lies in the role of district attorney
and the possible effect of bargains for convictions
upon the credibility of a witness-accomplice. As
a public official, the prosecutor must secure justice,
rather than a conviction based on questionable
testimonyY7 There is also a substantial possibility
that the jury might view the testimony of the
witness-accomplice as "bought" when confronted
with the admission that the freedom of the witness
depends on whether conviction of other accom-
plices is obtainedY8
Moreover, the Brunner court used the doctrine of
"substantial performance" when faced with the
question of the adequacy of the defendant's per-
formanceY9 This pragmatic approach goes to the
causal relationship between the bargain made and
the result of the witness' cooperation. If the final
outcome of the case against other accomplices
seems to be what the prosecutor could have rea-
73This follows from the court's role as an examiner of
whether the defendant has given consideration or detri-
mentally relied on a promise.74 See People v. Brunner, 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 914,
108 Cal. Rptr. 501, 506 (1973). To prevent this problem,
all terms of the agreement should be put down in writ-
ing.
70 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 108 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1973). See
notes 36-42 and accompanying text supra.
76 Id. at 916, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
7 See In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 487 P.2d 1234,
46 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1971); People v. Perez, 58 Cal. 2d
229, 373 P.2d 617, 23 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1962).78 Although the promise of immunity in exchange for
testimony does not itself make the evidence inadmis-
sible against the other defendants, the possibility of the
evidence being false increases substantially where a
bargain for conviction of accomplices is made. Cf.
People v. Brunner, 32 Cal. App. 3d 908, 917, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 501, 507 (1971).
79... [In our opinion the People got substantially
what they bargained for... [W]e conclude, albeit
somewhat pragmatically, that enough of the bar-
gain was kept to make it operative.
32 Cal. App. 3d 908,916,108 Cal. Rptr. 501, 507 (1973).
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sonably expected, and if some of the evidence
given by the witness-accomplice is used, then the
bargain would be enforced although there was no
strict adherence to it by the defendant.80
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in a
post-Santobello decision discussed the conduct of a
prosecutor in the context of plea bargaining."' The
norm set down by the court requires, in addition
to good faith, a high degree of competence in execut-
ing the responsibilities of the office. The court's
analysis prohibiting making any promises which are
unfulfillable would apply to assurances relating to
the actions of other parties. A prosecutor who is
chargeable with knowledge of the limitations of
third parties may not enter into an agreement
which creates an expectation that the third party
will act in a particular manner where, in fact, the
expected course of action is prohibited to the third
party. For example, a promise to recommend a
specific sentence, which in itself is a fulfillable
promise, would be a misrepresentation or an im-
proper promise where the proposed sentence could
not be legally imposed by the court.82
The decision also deals implicitly with situations
where the defendant is aware that the terms of the
agreement exceed the prosecutor's authority. In
11 In Brunner the defendant at one point recanted
her testimony and also invoked her privilege against
self-incrimination. But it may be argued that the doc-
trine of substantial performance is applicable only
where the fact situation is similar to Brunner: a factual
dispute as to the terms of the agreement, charges and
countercharges of bad faith, the seriousness of the
potential charges facing the witness in the event that
the agreement would not be binding upon the prosecu-
tor, and the importance of the evidence given by the
witness.
81 Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944 (1st Cir.
1973). Although the case is not concerned with immun-
ity, the standards enunciated by the court should apply
to promises of non-statutory immunity. The defendant
in that case pleaded guilty in exchange for a sentence
recommendation. Although the terms of the agreement
were disputed, it appeared that the minimum under-
standing of all parties was that the recommendation
would suggest a sentence which would be concurrent
with the state sentence that the defendant was then
serving. However, the proposed sentence could not
have been legally imposed.
The court said the prosecutor must make recom-
mendations to both the defendant and the court which
are legally permissible as well as consistent with the
terms of the agreement. Furthermore, the judicial
refusal to follow the recommendation or judicial aware-
ness of the impropriety does not make the failure to
fulfill a promise or to make a proper promise a harmless
error. Since the defendant bargains for a meaningful
promise, a promise to recommend an illegal sentence
deprives the defendant from the benefit of the bargain.
2 See note 81 supra.
those circumstances the defendant's reliance upon
the promise would seem to be unjustifiable," he
would not be entitled to protection from prosecu-
torial misconduct where he has full knowledge of
the underlying facts. Although the leading cases
enforcing non-statutory promises of immunity re-
quire prejudice to the defendant as an essential
factor, bad faith of the defendant in attempting to
take advantage of this misbehavior would result in
a denial of judicial protection
3 5
Conchision
As indicated, the main reason for refusing en-
forcement of non-statutory promises of immunity
is the judicial fear that the government's right and
duty to prosecute would be bargained away. But
this attitude seems to be outmoded and out of
touch with practical realities. First, the wide use of
statutory immunities shows the acceptance of this
device as a proper means of law enforcement. Inso-
far as the government's right to prosecute is con-
cemed, it is of no consequence whether the
immunity was effected through statutory means or
through an informal procedure since the same re-
sult would follow.8 6 In failing to enforce the non-
statutory promises of immunity, the courts should
not hide behind the statement that the prosecutor
has no inherent power to grant immunity and
therefore the agreements are not binding. The
proper procedure is to adopt administrative con-
trols in the prosecutor's office which would prevent
unauthorized actionsn7 rather than ride roughshod
over the defendant's rights in an attempt to avoid
the abuse of prosecutorial discretion.
8 In Correale, the defendant knew that sentence
recommendations by the prosecutor were not binding
on the trial court, but he was not aware of the fact that
proposed sentence could not be legally imposed. Al-
though the court implied that the defendant's attorney
should be charged with the knowledge of law, the court
concluded that the defendant may rightfully assume
that the prosecutor, a public official, will only recom-
mend the possible.
8 Of course, the issue of justifiable reliance under
these circumstances will depend on the nature of the
prosecutorial misconduct and the sophistication of the
defendant. A defendant who has been represented by
counsel throughout the whole transaction would have
less standing than a defendant dealing with the prose-
cutor without assistance of counsel to claim good faith
reliance.
85 See note 68 supra.
81 Even where the statute requires a court's order,
the judiciary performs only a ministerial function. See
Crime Act, supra note 3, § 6003(b).
87 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1972).
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THE IMPOSITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AND THE RIGHT TO
TRIAL BY JURY-AN UNHERALDED EXPANSION OF CRIMINAL LAW?
Administrative agencies have long employed
various means to achieve compliance with their
regulations. Today agencies commonly utilize the
imposition of some type of monetary sanction for
an alleged violation of an agency rule. In the ma-
jority of instances, an individual accused of a viola-
tion receives no jury trial to determine guilt or
innocence. The agency itself performs this function.
Many of these administrative actions take on the
character of a criminal proceeding in view of the
fact that agencies frequently impose severe sanc-
tions. Through this process, an unannounced ex-
pansion of criminal liability has taken place; ad-
ministrative agencies, instead of the nation's courts,
are regularly meting out punishment similar to that
formerly imposed only in judicial proceedings. This
comment examines the doctrinal roots of tradi-
tional agency practice regarding the imposition of
penalties in order to determine whether this prac-
tice is constitutional. This evaluation requires the
examination of the constitutional position of the
agency itself in relation to specific constitutional
guarantees applied in criminal proceedings.
These are two possible means of imposing penal-
ties as a result of the violation of an administrative
regulation. In some situations the legislature itself
fixes the penalty for violation of the rule promul-
gated by the agency, the collection of which occurs
within the judicial process; in other cases the legis-
lature delegates to the agency the quasi-judicial
power to adjudicate penalties or forfeitures.'
Modem statutes tend to use the second method
as the primary means of enforcement. The premise
that the isolation of the entire administrative en-
forcement proceeding from judicial control best
serves the interests of speed and efficiency may
justify this policy. One of the primary purposes of
an administrative body is to provide a relatively
swift solution to a pressing problem. In order to
permit effective problem-solving by administrative
agencies, the agencies generally possess significant
' See Note, Administrative Penalty Regulations, 43
CoLum. L. Rxv. 213 (1943). The author takes the posi-
tion that the second type of penalty would generally be
held invalid as a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine or as an improper delegation of judicial au-
thority. History obviously has proven this prediction
incorrect.
amounts of authority to insure compliance with
their directives. One expert in the field of adminis-
trative law illustrated the basic justification for
placing effective enforcement powers in the hands
of administrative agencies in the following way:
So much in the way of hope for the regulation of
claims to a better livelihood has been made to rest
upon the administrative process. To arm it with
the means to effectuate those hopes is but to pre-
serve the current of American living. To leave it
powerless to achieve its purpose is to imperil too
greatly the things that we have learned to hold
dear.
2
In the interests of efficiency and effectiveness, cer-
tain constitutional requirements, particularly the
right of trial by jury, are being ignored today.
In recent times, the basic nature of administra-
tive sanctions has been changing. New legislation
now permits increasingly severe monetary fines.3
2J. LANis, TE AnmNsTRATivE PRocEss, 122
(1938).
3 As an example of this modern type of administrative
statute, consider the Illinois Environmental Protection
Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111k, §§ 1001-1051 (1971).
This legislation created a Pollution Control Board,
which was delegated both quasi-judicial and quasi-
legislative authority. Title 12 of the Act gave the
Board the power to assess large monetary fines for
violation of its regulations.
Any person who violates any provision of the Act,
or any regulation adopted by the Board, or who
violates any determination or order of the Board
pursuant to this Act, shall be liable to a penalty of
not to exceed $10,000 for said violation and an addi-
tional penalty of not to exceed $1,000 for each day
during which violation continues, which may be
recovered in a civil action, and such person may
be enjoined from continuing such violation as here-
inafter provided.
The Polution Control Board itself acts as fact finder in
any enforcement proceeding; the determination of
guilt or innocence is made by that administrative
agency alone. No trial by jury is possible and the ju-
diciary does not enter into the proceeding at all unless
an appeal is made.
The Board exhibited no reluctance in utilizing the
power to penalize. From July of 1970 through Decem-
ber 31, 1973, the Board imposed a total of $1,011,292.51
in penalties. Of this amount $598,800.85 has been col-
lected; the remainder is either receivable or under ap-
peal. The largest single fine levied to date was for
$149,000, imposed upon the GAF Corporation for
water pollution in Joliet, Illinois. Penalties collected
go directly into the state's general revenue fund. In-
terestingly, this legislation is regarded as one of the
COMMENTS
The potential sanctions available arguably exhibit
traits traditionally regarded as more criminal than
civil in nature. This characterization becomes cru-
cial when one considers that if administrative pro-
ceedings actually do possess a primarily criminal
nature, they consequently require all of the consti-
tutional protections guaranteed to one accused of
a crime.
In general, courts have made little objection to
the delegation of judicial functions which enable
the administrative agency to levy large fines. The
agencies therefore functioned as courts in many in-
stances without offering constitutional protections
which a court traditionally must provide to an ac-
cused. As a preliminary inquiry, an analysis of the
administrative agency's quasi-judicial function is
necessary to place the agency in proper constitu-
tional perspective before dealing with specific con-
stitutional provisions possibly relating to adminis-
trative action.
Position of the Administrative Agency within its
Constitutional Framework
Can the agency constitutionally impose a severe
monetary fine? Is it, and should it be, regarded as
the equivalent of a "special" trial court which need
not provide basic constitutional guarantees?
A legislature, in granting to an agency the power
to impose severe sanctions, has delegated an
amount of judicial power to that agency. The legis-
lature cannot go past a certain point when making
this grant of power; should the delegation be too
broad, invalidation of that legislative act will result.
Since the emergence of administrative law as a
viable force in our legal system, the nation's courts
have attempted to draw this line clearly, but with
little success. A large amount of precedent offers
some aid in the determination of the constitution-
ality of a given delegation of power.
In general, the delegation to an administrative
agency of the authority to determine either guilt or
most effective and comprehensive environmental pro-
tection statutes devised. See E. HAsxELL AND V. PaicE,
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEM1ENT, ch. 1 (1973).
See also Comment, The Illinois Environmental Pro-
tection Act-A Comprehensive Program for Pollution
Control, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 345 (1971).
It should be noted that the Illnois statute is not
particularly unique in the potential severity of its fines;
in fact it is rather typical. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2282
(1970); N.Y. ENvm. CONSERvATION LAW § 71-2103
(McKinney 1972); UTAx CODE ANN. § 54-7-25 (1954);
10 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1274 (Supp. 1973); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.94. 431 (Supp. 1972). Cf. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640 (1970).
innocence in criminal cases, or to impose criminal
sanctions, is void; the primarily judicial nature of
those activities demands such a result. In theory,
experts regard this rule as settled since the 1930's.
4
But, as a practical matter, courts have experienced
difficulty in developing a test which distinguishes
purely judicial functions from those characterized
as administrative.'
Since the 1930's, most courts have been unwilling
to delve deeply into the scope of a given delegation
of authority and, as a result, the courts rarely in-
validate a statute on the grounds of an improper
delegation of judicial power to an administrative
agency. In upholding delegations, modem courts
often hold that the power delegated to an agency is
only quasi-judicial, that power being simply "inci-
dental to the duty of administering the law." I
Thus, if the power to punish is only "incidental" to
the administrative process, this reasoning validates
such delegations. In fact, this logic would seem to
validate almost any delegation of authority. How-
ever, not all courts accept this reasoning, and
4 See K. DAVIs, 1 ADmINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE,
§ 2.13 (1958) for a general description of the develop-
ment of this viewpoint.
5See generally, Brown, Administrative Commissions
and the Judicial Power, 19 MINN. L. REv. 261, 275
(1935). The author stated:
The question whether judicial powers have or have
not been validly conferred is determined not by the
character of the issues which are referred to the ad-
ministrative body for decision.
Brown further said that, viewing the situation realis-
tically, there would be little to prevent large measures
of the judicial function from being conferred upon ad-
ministrative bodies. This observation has proven cor-
rect in the succeeding four decades.
6People ex rel. Rice v. Wilson Oil Company, 364
Ill. 406, 410, 4 N.E.2d 847, 850 (1936). The court im-
plies that it was possible to distinguish between ad-
ministrative and judicial functions. See also Montana-
Dakota Co. v. Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951);
United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S.
533 (1919); Farmer v. United Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, 110 F. Supp. 220 (D.C. Cir. 1953);
Dept. of Finance v. Gandolfi, 375 Ill. 237, 30 N.E.2d
737 (1940); State ex rel. Ebert v. Loden, 117 Md. 373,
83 A. 564 (1912); cf. Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft
Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954); United States v. Grimaud,
220 U.S. 506 (1911); Wycoff v. Public Service Comm.,
13 Utah 123, 369 P.2d 283 (1962).
7 The New Jersey supreme court, in Jackson v. Con-
cord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 126, 253 A.2d 793, 800 (1969),
upheld the delegation of what seemed to be a purely
judicial function and made the following statement
which is illustrative of the position of many courts to-
day:
At this advance date in the development of admin-
istrative law, we see no Constitutional objection to
authorization to an administrative agency to
award, as incidental relief in connection with a
subject delegated to it, money damages, ultimate
judicial review being available.
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occasionally, a statutory delegation is overturned
The power to punish either by confinement of the
person or by the assessment of fines is traditionally
associated with criminal law and carried out only
by the courts. Court decisions occasionally recog-
nize the logical inconsistency in permitting an
administrative agency to impose penalties which
have the effect of punishment.9 Nevertheless, a
court rarely invalidates a delegation on these
grounds because, it is reasoned, the agency sanction
is not truly punishment, but rather only remedial
or compensatory in nature. 0
The doctrine of separation of powers is closely
akin to issues raised in the consideration of the dele-
gation of authority. In theory, the delegation of an
inordinately large amount of authority to an ad-
ministrative body violates the principles embodied
in the concept of separation of powers. Arguably,
many modem administrative schemes which allow
the imposition of serious fines and penalties with-
out formal judicial proceedings violate the doctrine
of separation of powers. At least in theory, those
statutes vest both judicial and legislative power in
the hands of the administrative agency. Early
courts tended to accept arguments based upon the
separation of powers concept," but this trend later
8 See, e.g., Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557
(1922); People v. Swena, 88 Colo. 337, 296 P. 271
(1931); Reid v. Smith, 375 Ill. 147, 30 N.E.2d 908
(1940); Broadhead v. Monaghan, 238 Miss. 293, 117
So.2d 881 (1960); State ex rel. Lanier v. Vines, 274
N.C. 486, 164 S.E.2d 161 (1968); Tite v. State Tax
,Comm., 89 Utah 404, 57 P.2d 734 (1936).
The Court in Lipke, supra at 562, warned that the
administrative process would be subjected to constitu-
tional restraints; it was said that within this setting
"The guarantees of due process of law and trial by jury
are not to be forgotten or disregarded." (emphasis
added)
9 In People V. Swena, 88 Colo. 337, 339, 296 P. 271,
273 (1931), the California supreme court stated that
the power to punish "... belongs exclusively to the
courts except in cases when the [state] constitution
confers such power upon some other body." Certain
state constitutions confer the power to punish on other
bodies, but the federal Constitution does not. See also
Tite v. State Tax Comm., 89 Utah 404, 57 P.2d 734
(1936), which invalidated the administrative assess-
ment of tax penalties because of an improper delega-
tion of the power to punish.
0 The distinction between remedial or compensatory
sanctions and punitive sanctions will be discussed
infra.
11 Prior to the complete acceptance of the adminis-
trative process, statements such as the following, made
by the Indiana supreme court in Langenberg v. Decker,
131 Ind. 471, 473, 31 N.E. 190, 193 (1892), were com-
mon:
The encroachment of one of these departments
upon the other is watched with jealous care, and is
generally promptly resisted, for the observance of
reversed itself.12 Today, invalidation on these
grounds would be unlikely unless a transfer of the
whole of the power of a particular branch took
place."
In theory, the validity of the principle of separa-
tion of powers remains unchallenged; even recent
cases concede its existence stating that "of course,
the [administrative agency] cannot intrude upon or
usurp the court's function of adjudication." '
4 But
in practice, instead of invalidating administrative
actions as violative of this concept, courts gen-
erally evade its strict application. In essence, only
the facade remains.15 The separation of powers doc-
trine will not be available to compel trial by jury
in the administrative setting.
this division is essential to the maintenance of a
republican form of government.
See also Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Co., 274
U.S. 160 (1925); I.C.C. v. Brimson, 153 U.S. 447
(1894); Kentucky and Indiana Bridge Co. v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 37 F. 567 (D. Ky. 1889).
2An implicit willingness to accept the fact that
administrative agencies do violate the concept of sep-
aration of powers can be seen in more recent opinions.
See, .e.g., Chairman of United States Maritime Com-
mission v. California Eastern Line, Inc., 204 F.2d 398
(D.C. Cir. 1952); Atcheson, T. & S.F. Ry. v. United
States, 231 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ill. 1964); In re Larsen
44 Cal. 2d 642, 283 P.2d 1043 (1955).
13 This more moderate position is well illustrated by
the following quotation from the Illinois supreme
court in People v. Franklin, 352 Ill. 528,534, 186 N.E.
137, 145 (1933):
It [the doctrine of separation of powers] does not
mean that the legislative, executive and judicial
powers should be kept so entirely separate and dis-
tinct as to have no connection or dependence the
one upon the other, but its true meaning, both in
theory and in practice, is that the whole power of
two or more of these departments shall not be
lodged in the same hands.... [Tihere is a theo-
retical or practical recognition of this maxim and
at the same time a blending and admixture of dif-
ferent powers. This admixture ... is considered by
the wisest statesmen as essential in a free govern-
ment as a separation.
14 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632,
641 (1950).
15A curious anomaly developed with respect to
court interpretation of the vitality of the concepts of
delegation of authority and separation of powers as ap-
plied to the Illinois Environmental Protection Act,
supra note 3. Evidently prompted by the large fines
set by the Polution Control Board, three appellate
districts found an invalid delegation of judicial author-
ity and violations of the separation of powers concept.
See Cobin v. Pollution Control Board, 16 Ill. App. 3d
958, 307 N.E.2d 191 (1974); Southern Illinois Asphalt
Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 15 Ill. App.
3d 66, 303 N.E.2d 606 (1973); City of Waukegan v.
Pollution Control Board, 11 Ill. App. 3d 189, 296
N.E.2d 102 (1973). Two other appellate courts came to
the opposite conclusion. See Incinerator, Inc. v. Pollu-
tion Control Board, 15 Il. App. 3d 514, 305 N.E.2d 35
(1973); Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency, 9
Ill. App. 3d 711, 292 N.E.2d 540 (1973).
1974]
COMMENTS
In imposing a fine or penalty for an alleged viola-
tion of an administrative regulation, the agency
must afford the accused basic due process of law.
Flexibility is the keynote characterizing due proc-
ess.16 With this flexibility in mind, the question
becomes what requirements due process imposes on
an administrative agency attempting to levy a
$100,000 fine for a violation of its regulations. Does
due process require all the constitutional protec-
tions traditionally afforded to a party accused of a
crime or will less rigid protections be adequate? In
particular, must the issue of guilt or innocence be
determined by a jury or can the administrative
agency itself perform this function without violat-
ing due process of law? These issues are at the heart
of the problems examined in this comment.
Beyond specific constitutional requirements such
as the sixth and seventh amendments, (which may
or may not be applicable in the administrative set-
ting), some type of basic due process must be ac-
corded everyone brought before an administrative
agency; 7 Precedent establishes this precept firmly,
although in somewhat vague and ill-defined terms.18
The Illinois supreme court resolved the matter in
City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board, 57 Ill.
2d 170, 311 N.E.2d 146 (1974) by upholding the delega-
tion to the Pollution Control Board. The court did not
even consider whether the penalty imposed was crimi-
nal; evidently this issue was not raised by the parties
before the court. The court said:
It is not disputed that there is before us only the
question of the imposition of civil penalties. There
is no contention that the penalties concerned here
were designed to be or are considered criminal
sanctions.
It is regrettable that this crucial issue was not even
reached by the court.
11 Mr. Justice Frankfurter characterized the flexi-
bility of due process in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1950),
as follows:
... [D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances. ... 'Due proc-
ess' cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous
limits of any formula. .. . 'Due process' is not a
yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate process of
adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of
judgment by those whom the Constitution en-
trusted with the unfolding of the process.
17 See generally Gellhorn, Administrative Prescription
and Imposition of Penalties, 1970 WASH. U.L. Rxv.
265, Note, Administrative Law-Due Process Implica-
tions in Agency Proceedings, 13 B.C. IND. & Com. L.
Rav. 184 (1972).
18 See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14-
15 (1937), in which Mr. Chief Justice Stone said:
"... [I]n administrative proceedings of a quasi-judicial
character the liberty and property of the citizen shall
be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair
play. See also Southern R. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U.S.
190 (1933).
A lack of due process in an administrative proceed-
ing will void the action taken by that agency.19
Courts recognize the special nature of the quasi-
judicial proceedings conducted by administrative
agencies and consequently limit the formal due
process requirements necessary in more traditional
judicial hearings. The New York Court of Appeals
stated that:
[I]t is the instinct of our jurisprudence to extend
court principles to administrative or quasi-judicial
hearings insofar as they may be adapted to such pro-
cedures. 0
In "adapting" conventional due process require-
ments to the administrative realm, many courts
exhibit a tendency to modify or abandon the con-
stitutional protections offered in a true criminal
proceeding.2 The justification for these relaxed pro-
cedural requirements is usually necessity and ex-
pediency, coupled with the fact that some form of
judicial review is generally available. Undoubt-
edly an administrative proceeding would proceed
at a generally faster pace if, for example, the agency
19 When a court does determine that due process is
lacking, the response is usually simple and straight-
forward. For example, consider this statement of the
Sixth Circuit in N.L.R.B. v. Newberry Lumber &
Chemical Co., 123 F.2d 831, 838 (6th Cir. 1942):
This court would unhesitatingly refuse to enforce
an order of an administrative board or agency, if
issued pursuant to an unfair hearing or without
due process of law. The requirement of fair trial
and fair play is binding on administrative agencies
as well as on courts.
Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Prettyman, 117 F.2d 786, 792 (6th
Cir. 1941), which held: "Even if the order of the Board
were justified by the facts, . . . the necessity of ac-
cording due process of law to the respondent is not
obviated. No order is justified if obtained without due
process of law. . . ." See also Consolidated Edison Co.
v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197 (1938); Voight v. Webb, 47
F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Wash. 1942).
20 Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312,320,118 N.E.2d
452, 458 (1954) (emphasis added).
2See, e.g., In re Groban, 164 Ohio St. 26, 128 N.E.2d
106, aff'd, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), which held that due
process did not require that the right to counsel be
honored at an administrative hearing. See also Yakus
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), which upheld the
validity of a material allocation suspension order is-
sued under the authority of the Price Control Act
during World War II. The Court found no violation of
due process. See also Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182
(1943), in which the Court upheld the validity of a
section of the Price Control Act which denied the
power of the district court to enjoin enforcement of
the Act. But see Note, Right to Counsel-The Riglht to
Assistance of Counsel in Administrative Proceedings,
34 NoTRE Daim LAW. 90 (1958), which was critical of
the majority decision in Groban. The vigorous dissent
of Mr. Justice Douglas was discussed at length.
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did not need to prove to a jury that the individual
was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The courts have developed few generalized state-
ments dealing with the issue of due process in the
administrative setting; rather, they tend to ex-
amine the specific circumstances surrounding each
individual proceeding to determine if an individual
received due process. As a result of this case-by-
case approach, few general guidelines have
emerged. Instead, rulings have developed which are
restricted to their own facts.ss
Due process in the administrative setting also
includes the requirements of the specific constitu-
tional guarantees contained in the sixth and seventh
amendments. However, the extent of their applica-
bility in this area of the law is unclear. The deter-
mination of whether due process of law demands a
trial by jury in certain non-judicial proceedings
must be made in light of precedent construing those
two provisions of the Constitution.
Specific Constitutional Provisions
The Constitution outlines the requirements of
trial by jury in three separate locations: section 3 of
article I, the sixth amendment, and the seventh
amendment. These provisions, of course, apply to
traditional court proceedings but their applicability
in the administrative realm is less certain. The
advent of administrative law has forced the courts
to attempt to reconcile the principles set forth in
the Constitution with an adjudicatory process not
envisioned by the framers of that document.
Our system of jurisprudence places a high value
on the institution of trial by jury.23 However, the
12 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(administrative suspension of welfare benefits); Barsky
v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (administra-
tive suspension of driver's license); Estep v. United
States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946) (Selective Service order);
West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,
294 U.S. 63 (1935) (state utilities commission); French
v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 378 F.2d 468 (10th Cir.
1967) (administrative suspension of aircraft inspector's
license); Williams v. Mulcahey, 250 F.2d 127 (6th
Cir. 1955) (deportation order); Unglesby v. Zimny, 250
F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (Navy discharge board).
2 See, e.g., Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350,
353-54, (1943), where the Court, in discussing the
right to a jury trial under the Federal Employers Li-
ability Act, stated:
The debatable quality of an issue, the fact that
fair-minded men might reach different conclusions,
emphasize the appropriateness of leaving the ques-
tion to the jury.... The jury is the tribunal under
our legal system to decide that type of issue, as
well as all issues involving controverted evidence.
... The right to trial by jury is a basic and funda-
right to a jury determination of factual issues is not
unlimited. Some courts hold that administrative
determination of factual issues does not violate due
process requirements; due process does not always
imply that all factual determinations be made by a
jury.24 Following this generally restrictive view-
point, a number of state and federal courts have
further refined this position. For example, restric-
tive interpretations of a jury's right to review the
validity of an administrative order are common.
2
Similar restrictions have developed with respect to
emergency situations which require immediate
remedial action on the part of the administrative
agency. Where immediate need is shown, courts
have tended to be less demanding when determin-
ingwhether dueprocess of law requires trial by jury
in a given situation.
2
The seventh amendment states that:
In suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court
of the United States, than according to the rules of
the common law.n
mental feature of our system of federal jurispru-
dence.
For a discussion of this statute (45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.)
(1970), and its effect upon the right to trial by jury
see Comment, The Federal Employers Liability Act and
Trial by Jury, 21 OH10 ST. L.J. 422 (1960). Further
elaboration upon the right to trial by jury is found in
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397 (1943),
in which Mr. justice Black dissented. He stated:
The founders of our government thought that trial
of fact by juries . .. was an essential bulwark of
civil liberty. For this reason, among others, they
adopted Article MI, section 2 of the Constitution
and the Sixth and Seventh Amendment.
See also Morrison Hotel v. Kirsner, 245 Ill. 431, 92
N.E. 285 (1910).
2 See, e.g., Unemployment Compensation Commis-
sion v. Willis, 219 N.C. 709, 713, 15 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1941).
25 "The Constitutional right to trial by jury does
not include the right to have that body pass on the
validity of an administrative order." United States v.
Heikkinen, 240 F.2d 94, 99 (7th Cir. 1957). The court
of appeals relied principally on Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 (1944). But cf. United States v. Hindman,
179 F. Supp. 926 (D. N.J. 1960).2
1 See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 158 (1921),
in which Mr. Justice Holmes stated:
A part of the exigency is to secure a speedy and
summary administration of the law and we are not
prepared to say that the suspension of ordinary
remedies was not a reasonable provision of a
statute reasonable in its aim and intent.
Accord, Taylor v. Brown, 137 F.2d 654 (1943), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 787 (1944). Cf. Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 (1944); North American Cold Storage Co.
v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
1974]
COMMENTS
This Constitutional provision is of little use to
one seeking to obtain a jury trial in the administra-
tive setting. As the wording of the amendment
indicates, it guarantees the right to trial by jury
in suits at common law and does not apply to crim-
inal actions.8 History itself places limits on the use
of the seventh amendment and a historical ap-
proach determines the scope of that provision's
applicability.2 9
The most significant limitation on the seventh
amendment, from the stand-point of administrative
law, is the fact that administrative proceedings
themselves were unknown to the common law.
They were modern inventions obviously not in
existence in 1791, when the amendment was
adopted. Consequently, courts (primarily during
the 1930's, when the administrative agency was
being fit into the Constitutional framework) have
interpreted the seventh amendment in a manner
rendering it inapplicable to administrative pro-
ceedings.
' The distinction between civil and criminal actions
is crucial in the determination of whether one brought
before an agency and threatened with a significant fine
or penalty is entitled to a jury trial under the sixth
amendment. It will be discussed at length infra.
29 See, e.g., Dimick v. Scheindt, 293 U.S. 474, 476
(1935), where the Court outlined the proper interpre-
tation of the seventh amendment in the following man-
ner:
In order to ascertain the scope and meaning of the
Seventh Amendment, resort must be had to the ap-
propriate rules of common law established at the
time of the adoption of that Constitutional pro-
vision in 1791.
See also Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman,
295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935), in which the Court stated:
"The right to trial by jury thus preserved is the right
which existed under the English common law when the
Amendment was adopted."
For an examination of the historical developments
relating to the seventh amendment, see Henderson,
The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARv. L.
REv. 289 (1966). See also Capital Tractor Co. v. Hof,
174 U.S. 1 (1898).
No right to trial by jury exists in equity under the
seventh amendment. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,
369 U.S. 469 (1962); BeaconTheaters, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1958). See also Comment, The Seventh
Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes: History Adrift in
a Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 503 (1973); Note,
Constitutional Provision for Nonjury Trial Under the
Seventh Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401 (1973). In a
summary proceeding, there is no right to jury trial.
See, e.g., Bank of Columbia v. Ohely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
235 (1819); Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist,
128 Va. 351, 105 S.E. 141 (1920). Cf. Murray's Lessee
v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272 (1855). There is also no right to a jury trial
in a condemnation proceeding. See, e.g., United States
v. 243.22 acres of Land, 129 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 698 (1943). Nor is there a right
to a jury trial in a suit against the sovereign. See, e.g.,
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
Chief Justice Hughes clearly enunciated this
position in N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co."0
He stated:
The Amendment thus preserves the right which
existed under the common law when the Amend-
ment was adopted.... Thus it has no application
to cases where recovery of money damages is an in-
cident to the equitable relief even though damages
might have been recovered in an action at law.
... It does not apply where the proceeding is not
in the nature of a suit at common law.3'
The Court further stated that the administrative
proceedings instituted under the National Labor
Relations Act were statutory in nature and, hence,
were not suits at common law.4 A more recent in-
terpretation yielded substantially the same
thoughts: "If the historical analogue was tried to a
jury at English common law in 1791, then it is
triable by right to a jury trial today in contempla-
tion of the Seventh Amendment." 11 Obviously,
there was no historical analogue to the modem ad-
ministrative process in 1791.
Generally, the courts continue to allow a legisla-
ture to provide an alternative means of adjudica-
tion in certain administrative settings. With respect
to the administrative collection of taxes, the Su-
preme Court stated: "It is within the undoubted
power of Congress to provide any reasonable sys-
tem for the collection of taxes and recovery of them,
when illegal, without a jury trial." " In situations
where neither statute nor the Constitution demands
a jury trial, courts have tended to deny this pro-
cedure.35 Thus, without express statutory authori-
zation, the right to trial by jury will generally be
lost in the administrative setting. 6 As a conse-
30 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
11 Id. at 48.
12The court in Simmons v. United States, 29 F.
Supp. 285, 286 (W.D. Ky. 1939), further elaborated
on this point by saying: "It [the right to trial by jury]
is not applicable to causes arising in equity or to civil
cases of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, or to
remedies subsequently provided for by statute and which
did not previously exist." (emphasis added). See also
People v. Keith, 38 Ill. 2d 405, 231 N.E.2d 387 (1967).
3Ochoa v. American Oil Co., 338 F. Supp. 914
(S.D. Tex. 1972).
34 Wichwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S. 101 (1927).
35 See, e.g., Wirtz v. District Congress #21, Brother-
hood of Painters, 211 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
The court there stated:
Where Congress has intended trial by jury under
circumstances where the right was not Constitu-
tionally guaranteed, it has expressly so provided.
Id. at 255.
36 However, it should be noted that, in some circum-
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quence of firmly established precedent, the seventh
amendment is plainly inapplicable within the ad-
ministrative setting, but the same cannot be said
with absolute certainty for the sixth amendment
and article III.
Article III and the Sixth Amendment
Article 111 and the sixth amendment's provide
for trial by jury in all criminal situations. These
provisions require trial by jury in a criminal pro-
ceeding, as distinguished from the seventh amend-
ment, which deals only with civil proceedings.
This distinction requires the classification of a
proceeding as civil or criminal in nature; this classi-
fication, in turn, will determine which constitu-
tional sections govern. The distinction between a
civil and a criminal proceeding blurs upon the
consideration of modern administrative sanctions. 9
The determination as to whether the proceeding
and the sanction imposed by the agency are indeed
criminal in nature is a difficult one; yet, it is central
to all issues concerning trial by jury.4'
stances, this right has been guaranteed by express
statutory provision. See, e.g.. 11 U.S.C. § 42 (1970)
(bankruptcy proceedings); 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1970)
(admiralty claims). See also Ochoa v. American Oil
Co., 338 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Beaty v.
Massey-Hite Grocery Co., 211 S.C. 242, 44 S.E.2d 535
(1947).
7 Article III, section three reads as follows:
The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Im-
peachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall
be held in the State where the said Crimes shall
have been committed within any State, the Trial
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress
may by Law have directed.
IThe sixth amendment contains the following pro-
visions:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
i"partial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, and to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fence.
19 Confusion results and speculation often occurs as
to when a trial by jury is called for. See Comment,
Constitutional Law-Right to Jury Trial in Indirect
Criminal Contempt in Federal Courts, 57 Micia. L. Rxv.
258, 260-61 (1958), where the author stated:
It is clear that deprivation of jury trial was a
prindpal grievance against the King. But evalua-
tion of the extent of 'jury trial' as written into
the Constitution invites a great deal of inference
and guess-work.
10 Speaking directly to this point, one commentator
stated:
However, the basic difficulty of this seemingly simple
doctrine is the complexity of distinguishing civil
monetary penalties from criminal monetary pen-
alties. ... Whatever the practical difficulties, it is
clear that even the theoretical necessity for making
Historical construction of article III recognizes
the fact that not all criminal actions received jury
trials at common law.' Courts have similarly con-
strued the sixth amendment. Decisions recognize
that any definition of the terms utilized in article
I or the sixth amendment must refer to the his-
torical meanings of these terms.42 The relationship
between article III and the sixth amendment is
relatively simple; the scope and nature of the right
protected in each is identical and one does not en-
large the rights guaranteed by the other.4 Also, the
provisions of the sixth amendment now apply fully
to the states as well as the federal government."
In order to maintain some semblance of the con-
cept of separation of powers, an administrative
agency may not act as a court and pass judgement
on a purely criminal matter. As a result of this
accepted doctrine, legislatures attempt to avoid
any improper delegations of judicial authority to
the agency by labelling both the proceeding and the
sanctions to be imposed as ciall.4' By utilizing such
language, a legislature indicates its intention that
the agency be regarded as a mere creditor. In the
event that a party refuses to pay a fine assessed by
the agency, that agency can then go into a court
and proceed in the form of a civil action for the
distinctions between civil and criminal penalties
has been questioned under the press of modern
problems calling for decisive legal action.
Polelle, The Illinois Environmental Protection Act:
Constitutional Twilight Zone of Criminal and Civil Law,
61 ILL. B.J. 514, 584 (1973).
41 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S.
63 (1930); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). The
most important of these common law limitations re-
moves the right to trial by jury in petty criminal situ-
ations. This distinction will be discussed at length,
infra.
4'See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276
(1930), in which the Court made the following state-
ment:
It must be consequently taken that the word 'jury'
and the words 'trial by jury' were placed in the
Constitution of the United States with reference
to the meaning affixed to them in the law as it was
in this country and in England at the time of the
adoption of that instrument.
43See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). See
also Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peerst, 26 U. CHI.
L. Rv. 245, 260 (1959).
4 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1965), was
the first case to so hold.
45 See, e.g., section 1042 of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act, supra, note 3, which states:
Any person who violates any provisions of this act
or any regulation adopted by the Board ... shall
be liable to a penalty of not to exceed S10,000 for
said violation and an additional penalty of not to
exceed $1,000 for each day during which violation




recovery of a debt.46 This labelling also lessens the
burden of proof; civil proceedings do not require
that a violation of agency regulations be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 However, the words
of the statute alone will not end all court inquiry
into the true nature of the administrative proceed-
ing under a given statute.48
The courts have analyzed several factors in de-
termining whether an administrative action is civil
or criminal. The courts study such elements as the
nature of the offense itself, the overall character of
the entire proceeding and the nature of the penalty
to be imposed. Through the application of these
criteria, courts have drawn a very hazy line of
demarcation between criminal and civil law. In
fact, some may choose to characterize this distinc-
tion as more of a non-distinction; decisions show
very little logical consistency in this area.
In order to determine whether the sixth amend-
ment and article M apply in a particular adminis-
trative context, it is first necessary to define the
word "crime" as it is used within the Constitution.
Crime may be broadly defined as an offense against
social order or morality. 49 Examination of the
offense prosecuted before the administrative agency
46 In the system established in Illinois, for example,
the appellate court is the first judicial body which
deals with any sanction assessed. The circuit (trial)
courts of Illinois do not enter into the process of en-
vironmental control. Of course, there are no juries
provided at the appellate level. Even if an agency de-
cision to levy a fine were first appealable to the lowest-
level court, established principles of administrative law
would not allow a trial de novo at that point; there could
be no reconsideration of the agency's findings as long
as the record of the agency's proceedings provided sub-
stantial evidence to affirm the conclusions reached. Cf.
N.L.R.B. v. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. 747
(1951).
47See, e.g., United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37
(1914). But see Wycoff Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, 13 Utah 123, 369 P.2d 283 (1962), in which at
least clear and convincing evidence of guilt was re-
quired for the imposition of a fine.
481It should be noted that not all administrative
statutes attempt to characterize their sanctions as
civil. The Harbors and Rivers Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 401 et seq., is an example of a statute which clearly
imposes criminal punishments for violations of its pro-
visions with the result that a jury trial is available. See
generally Bass Angler Sportsman Society v. United
States Steel, 324 F. Supp. 412 (S.D. Ala. 1971); Com-
ment, Criminal Liability Under the Refuse Act Permit
Program, 63 J. Cnm. L.C. & P.S. 306 (1972). In addi-
tion to civil penalties provided, some administrative law
statutes provide alternate criminal penalties to be im-
posed only after proper criminal proceedings. See, for
example, section 1044 of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act, supra note 3, which makes it a misde-
meanor to violate any regulations of the Pollution Con-
trol Board.
41 Mr. Tustice Harlan developed that concept in
will act as a starting point for consideration of the
true nature of the administrative proceeding.
Courts often view the nature of the offense itself as
a mandatory consideration. 0 A court should not be
expected to end its inquiry into the nature of the
proceeding simply because the legislature has
chosen to insert the term "civil" into the statute
being examined. The administrative agencies deal
with many offenses which are plainly "crimes" in
the broadest sense of that term (e.g., unfair labor
practices, environmental pollution, consumer prob-
lems, etc.). They are offenses against the public to
which the state has attached certain sanctions to
be recovered in a proceeding prosecuted in the name
of the state.
Consideration of the nature of the offense gives
the courts an opportunity to look carefully into the
overall nature of the proceeding. A court must, in
essence, consider the purposes of the statute and
determine whether it may be characterized as civil
or criminal. Most courts tend to view administra-
tive proceedings as civil in nature, perhaps because
the legislature has characterized the given proceed-
ing as civil rather than criminal. Although courts
do, at least in theory, look beyond the legislative
classification, results would indicate that more of-
ten than not, they conduct only a superficial in-
quiry, relying instead upon the legislature charac-
terization.'
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888). He stated:
The word crime, in its more extended sense, com-
prehends every violation of public law; in a limited
sense, it embraces offenses of a serious or atrocious
character.
Another court defined the term in this manner:
A crime is an offense against the state directly or
indirectly affecting the public, to which the state
has annexed certain punishments and penalties
and which it prosecutes in its own name in what
is called a criminal proceeding.
State v. Thomas, 318 Mo. 605, 608, 300 S.W. 823, 826
(1927).0 See, e.g., Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68
(1904), where the Court stated:
The truth is, the nature of the offense and the
amount of the punishment prescribed rather than
its place in the statutes determine whether it is to
be classed... among crimes or misdemeanors.
See also District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63
(1930); United States v. Bishop, 261 F. Supp. 969
(N.D. Cal. 1966), which restated this basic position.
51See generally Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S.
103, 108 (1909), in which the Court upheld an action
for collection of a penalty for a violation of an immi-
gration law. The Court stated:
It must be taken as settled law that a certain sum,
or a sum which can readily be reduced to a cer-
tainty, prescribed in a statute as a penalty for the
violation of a law, may be recovered by a civil
action, even if it may also be recovered in a pro-
ceeding which is technically criminal.
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The landmark case of Helvering v. Mitchell 2 il-
lustrated this reliance upon legislative intent. In
that decision, the Court upheld a 50 per cent "re-
assessment" of taxes imposed upon fraudulent
taxpayers. The majority reasoned that this was not
a criminal penalty requiring formal criminal proce-
dures; only a civil action was necessary to collect
the penalty imposed. The main issue, in the eyes
of the Court, was whether the Congress intended
to create a criminal proceeding by enacting the
enabling legislation. The Court said simply: "That
question is one of statutory construction." 51 By
such reasoning, the Court left itself open to criti-
cism that it abdicated its judicial function by
allowing the legislature to make the final deter-
mination between civil and criminal proceedings.
To act in this manner would encourage wholesale
evasions of Constitutional rights guaranteed to
those charged with criminal acts.M
A civil proceeding is characterized as remedial or
compensatory in nature, as distinguished from a
criminal proceeding, which is penal (i.e., its main
objective being punishment). 55 Over one hundred
years ago, the Supreme Court, in discussing a pro-
ceeding which led to the administrative imposition
of a sanction for the violation of certain import
laws stated that one must:
... [C]onsider the nature and the purposes of the
statute.... Is it strictly punitive or is it remedial?
... [T]he amount here receivable is in the propor-
tion to the value of the goods abstracted... not
at all in proportion to the degree of criminality.
... It therefore must be considered remedial, as
providing indemnity for loss.
5 6
Thus, the idea of compensation rather than punish-
ment is a key element in the distinction between a
52303 U.S. 391 (1938).
5
3Id. at 399. See also Stockwell v. United States, 80
U.S. 531, 546 (1871).
54 But not all courts will accept a legislative relabel-
ing to avoid constitutional protections See e g, State
ex rel. Wilcox v. Gilbert, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N.W. 953
(1914).
15One commentator explained the dichotomy be-
tween penal and nonpenal regulations in the following
manner:
... Penal regulations are designed to deter viola-
tions of other regulations. ... [Iln the case of re-
medial regulations, obedience of the regulation will
itself improve the situation even if the deterent ef-
fect, which may be present, fails to operate.
See Note, Administrative Penalty Regulations, 43
CoLurm. L. Rv. 213, 217 (1943).
6 Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. 531, 546-47
(1871). See also N.L.R.B. v. Koher, 351 F.2d 798
(D.C. Cir. 1965); N.L.R.B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg.
Co., 130 F.2d 765 (1st Cir. 1942). But see Stout v.
State ex tel. Cauldwell, 36 Okla. 744, 130 P. 553 (1913).
civil or remedial proceeding and one characterized
as criminal. A remedial proceeding does not seek to
punish but only to protect the public from im-
proper conduct.,' If a statute measures and defines
the damages due from a causally connected loss,
courts will generally view it as remedial.Y Applying
this type of test, many modern administrative pro-
ceedings and their sanctions are punitive or crimi-
nal rather than remedial or civil in nature. How-
ever, contemporary courts rarely engage in such
analysis.
The distinctions between a civil and a criminal
proceeding are exceedingly fine; if a court wishes it
can take advantage of established precedent and
hold that almost any proceeding is primarily civil
in nature.69 This wealth of precedent covers a vari-
ety of administrative proceedings.6 In proceedings
characterized as civil, frequently only a monetary
loss was at stake, unlike the more conventional
criminal proceeding, which might subject a de-
fendant to more serious consequences such as a loss
of personal liberty." As the New York court of
1 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Thompson Products, Inc.,
130 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1942). Cf. Virginia ex rel. Shiff-
lett v. Cook, 333 F. Supp. 718 (W.D.Va. 1971); Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 F.
307 (7th Cir. 1919).
6s See, e.g., Sherman & Sons Co. v. Bitting, 26 Ga.
App. 299, 105 S.E. 848 (1921).
59The result of such a determination would, of
course, be that the protections provided by the sixth
amendment and Article I would be lost. See, e.g.,
United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
6 See, e.g., Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, rehear-
ing denied, 364 U.S. 855 (1960) (proceedings of Civil
Rights Commission); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895)
(contempt proceeding); Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S.
556 (1883) (habeus corpus proceeding); Wood v. State,
440 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1971) (parole hearing); Purex
Corp. Ltd. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp.
584 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (Federal Trade Commission pro-
ceeding); United States v. Schneider, 139 F. Supp. 826
(S.D. N.Y. 1953), aff'd., 347 U.S. 284 (1954) (Federal
Communications Commission proceeding); Howell v.
Collector, Internal Revenue, 175 F.2d 240 (6th Cir.
1949) (Internal Revenue proceeding); United States v.
Lee Huen, 118 F. 442 (N.D. N.Y. 1902) (deportation
hearing): In re Application of William Clark, 65 Conn.
17, 31 A. 552 (1894) (grand jury proceeding); Varholy
v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So. 2d 267 (1943) (quarantine
order); People v. Stout, 74 Ill. App. 2d 87, 242 N.E.2d
264 (1968) (municipal ordinance violation); In re
Fox's Estate, 162 Mich. 531, 127 N.W. 668 (1910)
(inheritance tax proceeding); State ex rel. Wilcox v.
Gilbert, 126 Minn. 95 149 N.W. 953 (1914) (nuisance
abatement proceeding); Commonwealth v. Mahoning-
town Men's Club, 140 Pa. Super. 413, 14 A.2d 356
(1940) (license revocation proceeding); Johnson v.
Nelms, 171 Tenn. 54, 100 S.W.2d 648 (1937) (lunacy
hearing).
61However, it is possible that a simple monetary
fine can have severely adverse effects upon an individual
or corporate entity. This is particularly true with re-
spect to marginal business operations, which may not
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appeals stated: "The effect of the recovery is merely
to charge the defendant with a pecuniary liability,
while a criminal prosecution is had for the purpose
of punishment of the accused." 62 It is doubtful
whether this logic holds up in light of modern ad-
ministrative penalties which can be extremely
onerous. Yet courts continue to apply this reason-
iug.
Courts have occasionally characterized adminis-
trative proceedings as criminal rather than civil in
nature 2 Should a court determine that the pro-
ceeding is criminal in nature, an administrative
body loses its authority to adjudicate the matter.
A criminal proceeding demands the presence of the
judiciary and not merely that of an administrative
body.61 If a court characterizes a proceeding as
criminal, it is implicitly willing to go beyond the
mere form of the proceeding and view its substance
in detail.
65
Although courts show a reluctance to recognize
the criminal nature of some administrative pro-
ceedings, this is not the case with contempt pro-
ceedings, where the distinction between civil and
criminal is also very significant.66 Courts could
be able to bear such a loss. Recent precedent, which
recognizes that sanctions not involving a loss of liberty
may, nevertheless, be criminal, will be discussed in
this context, infra.
62 People v. Briggs, 114 N.Y. 56, 65, 20 N.E. 820,
823 (1889).
"See, e.g., United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568
(1931); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885);
United States v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546 (1878); Highland
Supply Corp. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 F. Supp. 15
(E.D. Mo. 1963). Cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S.
24 (1964).
6
4 See, e.g., Highland Supply Corp. v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 221 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Mo. 1963).
15 In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35,
(1885), the Court performed this type of detailed anal-
ysis with the following results:
We are ... clearly of the opinion that proceedings
instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeit-
ure of a man's property by reasons committed by
him, though they may be civil in form, are in their
nature criminal.
The Court illustrated well the possible harms which
could come about if such practices were allowed to
continue:
If the government prosecutor elects to waive an
indictment and to file a civil information against
the claimants-that is, civil in form-can he by
this device take from the proceeding its criminal
aspect and deprive the claimants of their immuni-
ties as citizens?... This cannot be. The informa-
tion, though technically a civil proceeding, is in
substance and effect a criminal one.
See also United States v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546 (1878);
cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1964).
66 See, e.g., Ex pare Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925);
People ex rel. Environmental Protection Agency v.
Illinois C. R.R., 12 Ill. App. 3d 549, 298 N.E.2d 737
(1973).
draw from the precedent in this area of the law
when dealing with administrative proceedings.
Bloom v. Illinois" recently indicated that the dis-
tinction between civil and criminal contempt is a
viable one. In this case, the Supreme Court applied
the provisions of the sixth amendment to criminal
contempt proceedings. After dismissing arguments
that the interests of efficiency and prompt adminis-
tration of justice demanded juryless adjudication
in all contempt proceedings," the Court held that
the sixth amendment required a trial by jury in
criminal contempt proceedings. This case is signifi-
cant because it evidences a willingness on the part
of the Court to re-examine the true nature of these
proceedings, and where necessary, to apply basic
constitutional protections. Such expansions of the
applicability of the sixth amendment may help to
allay criticism of the fact that the Court has, over
the years, shown a tendency to define criminal
proceedings in a rather restrictive way and thereby
to limit the scope and applicability of article III
and the sixth amendment.69
When determining the overall nature of the ad-
ministrative proceeding, the courts also study the
character of the sanction to be imposed. Older
precedent, which tended to construe penalties as
civil in nature, is of questionable value today in
light of modem administrative statutes with their
increased penalty potential.
The basic divisions between civil and criminal
sanctions are identical to those set by the courts
when examining the nature of administrative pro-
ceedings.70 The purpose of a civil sanction can be
defined as remedial (as providing an indemnity for
a loss) while a criminal sanction has as its primary
goal deterrence or punishment. Again, the intent of
the legislature controls the decisions of some
courts." But under the better view, held by many
6 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
18 Speaking to this point, Mr. Justice White said:
... [C]onsiderations of efficiency must give way to
the more fundamental interest of insuring even-
handed exercise of judicial power. Perhaps to some
extent we sacrifice efficiency, expedition and econ-
omy, but the choice in favor of jury trials has been
made, and retained, in the Constitution. Id. at 209.
69 See, e.g., Note, When Is a Criminal Trial not a
Criminal Trial-The Case Against Jury Trials in Juve-
nile Court, 46 ST. JoHN's L. Rlv. 26 (1971); Comment,
Constitutional Law-Michigan Criminal Sexual Psycho-
path Act-Confinement in State Prison Under Act Denies
Right to Trial By Jury, 35 U. DET. L.J. 527 (1959).
70 See p. 351 supra.
n1 See United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914);
South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Southern P. Ry., 239
S.C. 227, 122 S.E.2d 422 (1961); Zarnott v. Timldn-
Detroit Axle Co., 244 Wis. 596, 13 N.W.2d 53 (1944);
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courts, the statutory phraseology no longer con-
stitutes the only factor to be examined.
Rather, many courts today use a "primary na
ture" test; that is, a court examines the practical
implications of the sanction and passes judgment
as to the sanction's primary nature, taking into
consideration statutory language. If the sanction
is primarily regulatory or remedial, the court views
it as civil in nature 72 if it is punitive or penal, the
court labels it criminal.73 Again, the case of Helver-
ing v. Michel 4 is instructive; as already noted the
Court there upheld the administrative imposition
of a $360,000 "re-assessment" of taxes. The Court
professed to apply a primary nature analysis when
considering the sanction imposed. The majority
reached the conclusion that the sanction was re-
medial in nature and that Congressional intent was
not to punish but rather to safeguard revenue
sources.7 5 In most areas, the Court has recently76
cf. Commonwealth v. State Loan Corp., 116 Pa. Super.
365, 176 A. 516 (1935).
The court in Madonna v. State, 151 Cal. App. 2d
836, 840, 312 P.2d 257, 260 (1957), illustrated its de-
pendence upon legislative characterization in this
manner:
The fact that the statute provides that the penalty
shall be recovered by a civil action has been re-
garded as conclusive of the nature of the action.
Is not the court abdicating a certain amount of judicial
responsibility by taking such a position?
72See, e.g., United States v. Stockwell, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 531, 547 (1871), where the Court said that be-
cause the Congress had labeled a sanction as civil, it
".... must therefore be considered as remedial, as pro-
viding indemnity for loss."7 'A discussion of criminal sanctions appears infra.
74303 U.S. 391 (1938).
76 At 303 U.S. 391, 402, the majority stated:
That the Congress provided a distinctly civil pro-
cedure for the collection of the additional fifty per-
cent indicates clearly that it intended a civil, not
a criminal, sanction.... Civil procedure is incom-
patible with accepted rules and Constitutional
guarantees governing the trial of criminal prosecu-
tions and where civil procedure is prescribed for
enforcement of remedial sanctions, those rules and
guarantees do not apply... Thus the determina-
tion of facts upon which liability is based may be
made by an administrative agency instead of by a
jury.
See also Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381
(1940); cf. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S.
617 (1937); United States v. Bishop, 261 F. Supp.
969 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
Yet using a primary nature test would seem to lead
to a different result than was obtained in Mitchell.
Perhaps the Court placed more reliance on legislative
intent than it acknowledged.
76 An exception to this general rule appears in cases
dealing with the Congressional power to regulate im-
migration. Courts have always reasoned that, since the
Congress possessed plenary powers to control this
area, its intent should be given greater consideration;
if that body wished to provide for administrative im-
position of penalties for violation of such statutes, it
emphasized a primary nature test placing some-
what less weight upon legislative intent.7
Plainly, some administrative agency sanctions
are purely remedial. For example, the National
Labor Relations Board regularly reinstates em-
ployees dismissed from employment unfairly and
courts routinely uphold such action as remedial in
nature.78 This sanction is designed to make whole
those damaged by improper actions of the em-
ployer. 9 A significant amount of case law recog-
nizes the remedial nature of certain sanctions.80
could do so because of the plenary powers Congress
possessed in this field. In Oceanic Steam Navigation
Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909), the Court
upheld this type of statute and said:
In accordance with settled judicial construction,
the legislation of Congress... has proceeded on the
conception that it was within the competency of
Congress when legislating as to matters exclusively
within its controls, to impose appropriate obliga-
tions and sanction their enforcement by reasonable
money penalties, giving to executive officers the
power to enforce such penalties without the neces-
sity of invoking the judicial power.
See also Elting v. North German Lloyd, 287 U.S. 324
(1932); Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329
(1932). But see 1 DAvis, AgmnmIsrzAvE LAW TREATisE
2.13 (1958). Professor Davis suggested that the Court's
reasoning in its line of precedent was incorrect because
such a broad interpretation of Congressional authority
could, in effect, allow the Congress to impose criminal
penalties without criminal proceedings in almost all
situations through the utilization of the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.
17 See, e.g., Rex Trailer Co., Inc. v. United States,
350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex rel. Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). See generally Polelle, supra
note 40.78 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.,
306 U.S. 240 (1939); cf. International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union v. N.L.R.B., 366 U.S. 731 (1961).79 Although the Court generally declares that sanc-
tions must be remedial rather than punitive, the Court
has upheld the practice of not reducing back pay by
unemployment compensation payments. See N.L.R.B.
v. Gullet Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951). The employee
is made more than whole, thus violating the concept
of indemnity intertwined in the remedial sanction.80 See, e.g., Steuart v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398 (1944)
(material allocation suspension during World War I);
Brown v. Wilemon, 139 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 748 (1944) (suspension order); Wright v.
S.E.C. 112 F 2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940) (expulsion order of
S.E.C.); United States v. Oregon Short Line Ry., 180
F. 483 (D.C. Ida. 1908) (sanction for violation of safety
statutes); Southern Ry. v. Melton, 56 Fla. 617, 47 So.
969 (1909) (railroad commission sanction); Vissering
Mercantile Co. v. Annunzio, 1 ll. 2d 108, 115 N.E.2d
306 (1953) (state minimum wage act); Prawdzik v.
City of Grand Rapids, 313 Mich. 376, 21 N.W.2d 168
(1946) (state license revocation); Wycoff Co. v. Public
Service Comm., 13 Utah 123, 369 P.2d 283 (1962)
(sanction for violation of commission order); cf. United
States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S.
258 (1947) ($700,000 sanction for contempt of court).
But cf. Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386




A number of court decisions have invalidated
sanctions considered to be penal or criminal be-
cause they were imposed without proper process.
This was particularly true in the tax area prior to
the decision in Helvering v. Mitchell." These deci-
sions reasoned that additional "taxes" assessed for
violations of various statutes were not taxes at all
but really penalties which could not be imposed
summarily. Their purpose was punishment rather
than any remedial effect. Mitchell and its progeny
reduced the significance of these early cases, but
the tax/penalty dichotomy is still relevant to the
distinction between civil and criminal administra-
tive sanctions. Both share many common factors
and it is disappointing to see them almost totally
ignored by modem courts.
The agency may impose a sanction either to in-
flict a punishment or to obtain a desired result
2 If
a court believes that the penal aspects outweigh the
remedial, it will permit only judicial imposition of
that sanction. In certain situations, such as cases
of imprisonment, the penal aspects of the sanction
are obvious. In Wong Wing v. United States,8' the
Supreme Court invalidated a sixty-day jail sentence
imposed by an administrative agency upon an
alien who entered the country illegally. The Court
pointed out that brief "administrative detention"
prior to deportation would be permissible, but not
an actual jail sentence, which was viewed as puni-
tive in nature.M The court also held that the order
of deportation was not itself punishment.
81 See, e.g., United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568
(1931); Lipke v. Lederer, 59 U.S. 557 (1922); Regal
Drug Co. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386 (1922); Dukich v.
Blair, 3 F.2d 302, 305 (E.D. Wash. 1925), appeal dis-
missed, 270 U.S. 670 (1926). The district court judge
reflected the viewpoint prevailing prior to Helvering
when he stated:
Neither do the settled usages or methods of pro-
ceeding existing in the common or statutory law
... lend any support to the establishment of sum-
mary administrative procedure for the infliction of
punishment for the violation of penal laws. Who-
ever heard of penalties imposed as punishment for
crime being collected or enforced by distraint pro-
ceedings?
Such a method is neither suitable nor appropriate
to the nature of such a case, and is clearly not sanc-
tioned by established usages or customs, either in
this or in the mother country.
This is an excellent example of the primary nature test,
the better reasoned approach toward examination of
the sanction imposed, but the one which the Court re-
jected in Mitchell.
82 Root v. MacDonald, 260 Mass. 344, 157 N.E. 684
(1927). Cf. Lewis v. Anderson, 72 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.
Cal. 1947).
16.3 U.S. 228 (1896).
8 The Court considered trial by jury a mandatory
requirement in this type of situation:
Difficulties arise since it is not always dear that
the sanction itself has punishment and deterrence as
its primary goals. In situations short of actual de-
tention, it is difficult to determing exactly when a
penalty becomes primarily criminal. This is par-
ticularly true with respect to those monetary sanc-
tions which have increased dramatically in size
during the past two decades.
The Court has dealt with the concept of penal
sanctions in two relatively recent decisions, which
may indicate a trend for the future. In Trop v.
Dulles" the Court characterized as penal a statute
depriving one of his citizenship because of desertion
from the Armed Forces in time of war. The court
voided the statute because it was considered penal
in nature and failed to provide for a judicial deter-
mination of guilt or innocence. Chief Justice War-
ren applied a primary nature test in reaching the
conclusion that punishment was the statute's goal.8
Thus, the Court recognized that that statute was
criminal in nature and the sanction could not be
applied outside of the judicial process.n
... [B]ut when Congress sees fit to further promote
such a policy by subjecting the persons of such
aliens to infamous punishment at hard labor or by
confiscating their property.., we think such legis-
lation, to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial
to establish the guilt of the accused.
Id. at 237.
85 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
8H Chief Justice Warren set out the guidelines for
this test in these words:
In deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court
has generally based its determination upon the pur-
pose of the statute. If the statute imposes a dis-
ability for the purposes of punishment-that is, torepr mand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.-
it has been considered penal.... The controlling
nature of such statutes normally depends on the
evident purpose of the legislation.
In view of the Court's definition of the purposes of
punishment (to reprimand and deter), the Chairman of
the Illinois Pollution Control Board recently made an
interesting statement concerning the reasons for the
imposition of large fines under the Illinois Environ-
mental Protection Act, supra, note 3. Mr. Jacob Du-
melle, the Board Chairman, stated that the large fines
were levied to "deter offenders and would-be offenders
from violations." These sentiments were confirmed by
the Pollution Control Board Newsletter #80, dated
February 1, 1974. In the Newsletter, it was stated that
one of the reasons for the imposition of penalties was to
act as a deterrence to the polluter and others so that
potential violators would weigh the financial hazards
of violations.
By relying strongly on the element of deterrence, the
Board would seem to be classifying its sanctions as
penal in nature, in light of the Court's definition of
that concept.
8 It should be noted that the Court still viewed legis-
lative intent as a significant, although not controlling,
factor in their decision. See the discussion of Helvering
v. Mitchell, p. 353 supra.
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Perhaps even more significant was Kennedy v.
Meidoza-Martinez.8n This case held that the sixth
amendment required a jury trial when a person was
threatened with loss of citizenship for having fled
the country in wartime to avoid the draft. In this
statute the Congress employed a criminal sanction
without affording the accused the protections of the
sixth amendment during the denaturalization
proceeding. The Court voided the legislation by
simply saying:
If the sanction these sections impose is punish-
ment, and it plainly is, the procedural safeguards
required as incidents of a criminal prosecution are
lacking. We need go no further."9
The Court further provided insights into the factors
to be considered in determining whether a sanction
was remedial or punitive in nature. The majority
recognized that the factors involved, such as the
nature of the offense, the character of the proceed-
ing, and the nature of the sanction imposed, all
tended to blend together and yield one result.90
The Court additionally found that manifestations
of Congressional purpose indicated that it was the
intent of that body to punish through the statute
in question.
These two cases marked the first instance in
which the Court recognized the fact that an in-
dividual could suffer deprivation as serious as im-
prisonment without actually being incarcerated.
By so holding, the concept of penal sanctions was
significantly expanded to include at least one type
of penalty which did not involve any possible jail
term. Thus, the Court went beyond precedent and
recognized that loss of citizenship was indeed a
criminal sanction. The prior and somewhat more
restrictive view of criminal punishment encom-
-s372 U.S. 144 (1963).
81 Id. at 167. For a general discussion of Kennedy,
see Comment, The Concept of Punitive Legislalion and
the Sixth Amendnent: A New Look at Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Marlinez, 32 U. Car. L. REv. 290 (1965).
10The following statement illustrates the applica-
tion of these factors:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative dis-
ability or restraint, whether it has historically been
regarded as a punishment... whether its opera-
tion will promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence, whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the al-
temative purpose assigned are all relevant fo the
inquiry, and may often point in differing direc-
tions.
Id. at 168, 169.
passed only those sanctions which involved loss of
liberty.
This necessary broadening of the concept of
penal sanctions lends itself to application in the
field of administrative sanctions. Yet the last dec-
ade has shown no further expansion of this posi-
tion.
91
After Mendoza-Marlinez, it seemed possible that
the Court would re-assess its position on the scope
of the rights provided by the sixth amendment and,
in the process, perhaps extend those guarantees
into the administrative realm.3 But for unknown
reasons, such an extension has not yet occurred.
Perhaps the most recent administrative statutes,
which often grant an agency the authority to im-
pose heavy monetary sanctions, will provide the
impetus to guide the nation's courts in this direc-
tion. Logic would seem to dictate this course of
action. It is possible that more courts will come to
the recognition that, even if an act is not formally
labeled as a crime, the proceeding has become
primarily criminal in nature if true punishment
has been imposed.9
91 The only exception to this statement was contained
in a brief statement within the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Harlan in Oesterlich v. Selective Service
System Board No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 243 (1968), where
he hinted that the concept of penal sanctions may also
include delinquency reclassifications by the Selective
Service Board. Harlan stated that the Court did not
presently have to decide that issue but, indications
were that at least Harlan would have been sympathetic
to such an argument. He said:
The problem is exacerbated by petitioner's non-
frivolous argument that induction pursuant to the
delinquency reclassification procedure constitutes
'punishment' for violation of collateral regulations,
without jury trial, right to counsel, and other con-
stitutional requirements .... This would, at the
very least, cut against the grain of much that is
fundamental to our constitutional tradition.
(emphasis added).
Harlan cited Mendoza-Martinez in his discussion.
9" See Comment, The Availability of Criminal Jury
Trials Under the 6th Amendment, 32 U. Cm. L. Rxv.
311, 323 (1965). The author had high hopes that
Mendoza-Martinez signified only a beginning in the
Court's move toward a recognization of the truly
criminal nature of certain sanctions which had been
designated as civil:
The decision in Mendoza confirms the impression
that the Court is moving away from the traditional
understanding of the Sixth Amendment.... Since
the Mendoza Court held that a denaturalization
now required a jury trial, juries for other non-
criminal sanctions may logically be! re-considered.
In light of the Court's high regard for jury trials,
it seems likely that the expansion will be dramatic.
We are still awaiting that dramatic expansion and it is
currently nowhere in sight.
93Some courts do recognize this fact. See, e.g.,
United States v. Krapf, 180 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.
1960), aff'd., 285 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1961).
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Even if the proceeding and the sanction in ques-
tion were primarily criminal in nature, and so
recognized by a court, a jury trial would not be
required if the sanction imposed were "petty" in
nature. On the other hand, should the potential
sanction be "serious," the right to trial by jury
would then exist. Consequently, the individual
must also show the serious nature of the threatened
penalty before the sixth amendment comes into
play.
Courts recognized the distinction between petty
and serious offenses and sanctions in historical
times.94 These early decisions exhibit a tendency to
define the nature of petty offenses and sanctions
rather broadly, thereby restricting the right to trial
by jury.95 Most often, the court examines two key
elements when making this determination: 1) the
severity of the potential penalty and 2) the moral
quality of the act.96 As a result of almost constant
re-litigation of these matters, the line differentiat-
ing between petty and serious sanctions has shifted
a great deal during this century.
Duncan v. Louisianae shows an increased willing-
94 See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Of-
fenders and the Constitutional Guiaranty of Trial by Jury,
39 HAnv. L. REv. 917 (1926), for a thorough historical
analysis of the distinction between petty and serious
offenses. But see Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!,
26 U. Cm. L. Rav. 245 (1959), for an intense criticism
of the view taken by Frankfurter and Corcoran.
91A broad test for making this distinction was
stated in Shick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68 (1904):
The truth is, the nature of the offense and the
amount of punishment prescribed, rather than its
place among the statutes determine whether it is
to be classed among serious or petty offenses.
See also Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969);
Smith v. United States, 128 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1942).
96See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300
U.S. 617 (1937); United States v. Bishop, 261 F. Supp.
969 (N.D. Cal. 1966). Cf. Baker v. City of Fairbanks,
471 P.2d 386, 393 (Alaska 1970), in which the court
established the following test to determine whether a
jury trial was required:
Not only must the maximum possible punishment
be considered, but one must also look at the social
and moral opprobrium which attaches to the of-
fense, the degree to which it may be regarded as
anti-social behavior, the possible consequences to
the defendant in terms of loss of livelihood and
whether the offense is one traditionally regarded
as a crime.... It is then necessary to balance the
consequences to the defendant against the consider-
ations of social and governmental expediency.
391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court stated:
... [T~he penalty authorized for a particular crime
is of major significance in determining whether it
is serious or not and may in itself, if severe enough,
subject the trial to the mandates of the Sixth
Amendment.
Id. at 154. See generally Comment, The Petty Offender's
Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial: The Denial in
Duncan v. Louisana, 36 Ta.NN. L. REv. 763 (1969);
ness on the part of the Court to recognize the fact
that the sanction alone may, if severe enough,
require a trial by jury. In Duncan, the Court hinted
that a sanction of more than six months in jail
and/or a fine of $500 might be serious and therefore
require a trial by jury. However, the majority
refused to establish any hard and fast line at the
time. Acceptance of the six month limit took place
two years later in Baldwin v. New York9 and
precedent does indicate that $500 may be the
second part of the threshold currently favored by
the Court.9 9
Unquestionably, these decisions indicate an ex-
pansion of the coverage of the sixth amendment'10
into areas not previously regarded as necessitating
jury trials. But the line between petty and serious
sanctions still lacks complete clarity. One cannot
yet be sure at which point a monetary fine moves
from the petty into the serious category, and thus
activates the sixth amendment. Precedent in this
area is confusing. 0' Even if it were possible to void
an administrative agency's imposition of a fine by
convincing the court that the overall proceeding
was criminal in nature (i.e., for the purpose of
punishment), theindividual could still easilylose the
right to a jury trial because of the further limitation
on the applicability of the sixth amendment im-
posed by the petty sanction exception.
Comment, Jury Trials in Louisiana-The Implications
of Duncan, 29 LA. L. Rxv. 118 (1968).
399 U.S. 66 (1970). See also Comment, Jury Trials
for Misdemeanants in New York City: The Effects of
Baldwin, 7 CoIum. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 173 (1971).
91 See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
Recent precedent also declared criminal contempt
proceedings to be serious and not petty, thus requiring
trial by jury. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
11 Perhaps the furthest expansion of this doctrine
occurred in United States v. Polk, 438 F.2d 377 (6th
Cir. 1971), in which the court held that a $35,000 fine
for contempt of court required a jury trial. There was
no possibility of incarceration of the defendant corpor-
ation in this action, but nevertheless, the court applied
the reasoning of several recent Supreme Court decisions
(mostly notably Cheff and Bloom) by analogy. Accord,
County of McLean v. Kickapoo Creek, Inc., 51 Ill. 2d
353, 282 N.E.2d 720 (1972). But see United States v.
United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947),
which had upheld a $700,000 fine for criminal contempt
imposed without a trial by jury. Cf. In re Jersey City
Educational Association, 115 N.J. Super. 42, 278 A.2d
206 (1971).
0 The court, in City Court of City of Tuscon v. Lee,
16 Ariz. 449, 494 P.2d 54 (1972), vented its frustration
in this manner:
... [O]ne looking to the past will find a jumble of
offenses with no coherent rational principle by
which one can determine the line between which is
petty and serious....
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Conclusion
Through the increasing use of severe administra-
tive sanctions, we are witnessing a gradual incur-
sion by the administrative process into areas of the
law heretofore regarded as criminal. Constitutional
protections such as the right to trial by jury are lost
for those subjected to these proceedings. Restric-
tive interpretations of select Constitutional pro-
visions presage such a result. Yet the nation's
courts refuse to ameliorate the situation.
Historical analysis and significant precedent
indicates that the seventh amendment is inap-
plicable to agency functions. The sixth amendment,
however, is more absolute in its terms than is the
seventh; the wording states that all criminal
prosecutions fall under its purview. The nature of
modem administrative proceedings and the signifi-
cant monetary sanctions imposed force the con-
clusion that these proceedings are indeed penal in
purpose and character and that consequently, the
sixth amendment should operate to guarantee a
jury consideration of guilt or innocence.
The restrictive limitations placed upon the sixth
amendment are "an unwarranted abrogation by
the federal government of a Constitutional
right," 10'2 and yet they continue. These limitations
implicitly disregard the absolute nature of the
wording of that amendment.1 13 However, vigorous
dissent has often chastised the Court for looking
past the precise wording of the amendment.1' 4 If
52 Kaye, .Petty Ofenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CHr.
L. REv. 245, 246 (1959).
103 The Court stated:
The great minds of the country have differed on
the correct interpretation to be given to various
provisions of the Federal Constitution ... but
until recently no one ever doubted that the right
of trial by jury was fortified in the power of attack.
It is now assailed; but if ideas can be expressed in
words, and language has any meaning, this rigt-
one of the most valuable in a free country-is pre-
served to every one accused of crime....
Cf. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); United States v.
English, 347 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1965).
104 For example, the first Mr. justice Harlan dis-
senting in Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 99
(1903) complained bitterly about the way in which the
absolute nature of the sixth amendment was ignored:
... [Under the principles now announced, an of-
fense punishable by a fine of five or ten thousand
dollars may be regarded-if the court so wills--as
a petty offense, triable without a jury. I cannot
understand where the judiciary derives its au-
thority to prescribe any rule on the subject, in the
face of the absolute Constitutional requirement that
all crimes ... shall be tried by a jury. (emphasis
added).
See also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970),
in which Mr. justice Black, in a separate concurring
opinion, stated that the sixth amendment applied to
the courts were to interpret the sixth amendment
and article III more broadly, as the wording of
these provisions would seem to require, an in-
dividual seeking a judicial determination of guilt
or innocence would only have to show that the
administrative prosecution intended was primarily
criminal in nature. Modem administrative pro-
ceedings, which offer the possibility of significant
monetary penalties, evidence such a criminal
nature. Applying recent precedent, the penal
character of many of these sanctions becomes clear;
punishment is indeed their goal.
A number of indications during the past fifteen
years point to a trend expanding the right to trial
by jury. The seventh amendment has shed some of
its previous technical limitations and has been
applied more broadly,"°5 while the narrow and
somewhat restrictive meaning given to the sixth
amendment in earlier times has broadened to a
degree. The limitations imposed by the petty/
serious distinction have also diminished in signifi-
cance' and a trend toward the recognition of the
primary criminal nature of contempt proceedings
is apparent.107 Similar advances were made with
regard to denaturalization proceedingsPlo These
movements indicate a pattern expanding the right
to trial by jury in a variety of situations and they
logically foreshadow the extension of this constitu-
tional protection into the administrative realm
where agencies in effect punish those who violate
their regulations. These decisions lay a solid foun-
dation for the extension of the right to trial by
jury into certain segments of administrative law.
Such an extension would definitely sacrifice some
efficiency. However, a loss of efficiency is preferable
to the continued abrogation of constitutional pro-
tective devices. By upholding the view that the
administrative process is purely civil in nature in
all situations, courts may be encouraging wholesale
evasions of constitutional protections by indirectly
indicating to the legislatures that they need simply
all crimes and not just those of a serious nature. This
sentiment was again echoed by Black, joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, in Frank v.
United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
105 See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1969);
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962);
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
See also the discussion of the seventh amendment p. 349
supra.
106See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) and discussion p. 358 supra.
1
07See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968),
discussion p. 354 supra.
103 See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) and
discussion p. 356 supra.
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to re-label the action as a part of the administra-
tive process." 9 Indeed, it has been suggested that
public pressure might one day demand such legisla-
tive action in certain fields." ° This is plainly un-
desirable, from both a legal and a policy standpoint.
It can be argued that such occurrences have
already presented themselves. As penalties increase
in severity, the proceedings in which the agency
imposes them become more and more criminal in
nature; yet, constitutional protections are not
available. Ignoring the principle that constitutional
provisions designed to protect personal rights and
property should be construed liberally,"' many
decisions restrict the scope of those constitutional
provisions dealing with the right to trial by jury.
Bearing in mind the increased penalty potential of
modern administrative statutes, a total re-evalua-
tion of this field of the law is necessary.
It is possible that the courts will decide the
questions posed in this area on policy grounds.
They may weigh the efficiency and convenience of
the administrative process against the more cum-
bersome procedure established in the Constitution.
Undoubtedly, it is more efficient to bring certain
offenders before an agency to determine guilt or
"'SIf a court believes that such a re-labeling is oc-
curring, it can be expected to react with hostility.
Ashley v. Wait, 228 Mass. 63, 70, 116 N.E. 961, 966
(1917), illustrates this:
Of course, the legislature cannot by a mere change
of name or form convert that which is in its nature
a prosecution for a crime into a civil proceeding
and thus deprive parties of their rights to a trial by
jury. The Constitution cannot thus be trifled with.
The problem has been that most courts have not de-
tected any of the more subtle shifts which have occurred,
particularly in the administrative realm. Cf. State ex
rel. Wilcox v. Gilbert, 126 Minn. 95, 147 N.W. 953
(1914).110 See Polelle, supra note 40 at 588.
"'See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,.635
(1885), in which the Court issued the following warning:
.. but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices
get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes
of procedure. This can only be obviated by adher-
ing to the rule that constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally
construed. A close and literal construction deprives
them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual
depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in
sound than in substance.
See also Morrison Hotel v. Kirsner, 245 Ill. 431, 92
N.E. 285 (1910).
innocence and to allow agency imposition of a
severe sanction; yet, the Constitution demands
consideration of these issues by a judge and jury
in some administrative contexts. Blackstone com-
mented on these competing interests several cen-
turies ago:
And, however convenient these [summary criminal
proceedings without a trial by jury] may appear at
first (as doubtless all arbitrary powers well exe-
cuted, are the most convenient) yet let it be again
remembered, that delays and little inconveniences
in the forms of justice are the price that all free
nations must pay for their liberty... that these
inroads upon this sacred bulwark... are funda-
mentally opposite to the spirit of our Constitution;
and that though begun in trifles, the precedent may
gradually increase and spread, to the utter disuse
of juries in questions of the momentous concernm
Although made hundreds of years ago in another
country, Blackstone's logic is equally relevant to
the administrative process today.
Should the courts void the administrative im-
position of severe sanctions, fundamental changes
would occur in the administrative process. To im-
pose large sanctions defined as criminal, the agency
would go into a court as an advocate and prosecute
the alleged violator, thereby preserving the right
to trial by jury. The agency would still impose
lesser criminal sanctions itself, perhaps utilizing
the precedent distinguishing petty from serious
sanctions as a guideline.
Cease and desist orders and other purely reme-
dial sanctions still would not demand the presence
of a jury and no interference with administrative
imposition of these sanctions is necessary. The
efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative
process will not decline as long as these non-crimi-
nal and petty criminal sanctions remain available
for agency imposition. Whatever small incon-
veniences result from requiring the agency to go
before a judge and a jury must be endured. The
framers of the Constitution chose this method and
it is time that the nation's courts respected their
selection.
UI Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 99 (1903)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
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PERJURY: THE FORGOTTEN OFFENSE
It is undenied that perjury is both a frequent and
substantial threat to the effective administration
of justice. In 1968, the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
noted that perjury has always been widespread
and that there must be more effective deterrents
against perjury in order to ensure the integrity of
trials.' A commentator stated that "Few crimes
except fornication are more prevalent or carried off
with greater impunity." 2 In United States v.
Norris,' the Supreme Court observed that 'Terjury
is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may
well affect the dearest concerns of the parties before
the tribunal." 4 More recently, the Second Circuit
noted that perjury is punished for the harm perpe-
trated upon the courts and the administration of
justice.5
Nevertheless, prosecutions for perjury are rare.
The total number of criminal cases commenced in
all United States district courts for perjury in the
fiscal years 1966 through 1970 was 335.6 This total
was two-tenths of one per cent of the 162,664 cases
commenced in the same courts during the same
time periodY Of the 21,478 sentenced prisoners in
federal institutions as of June 30, 1966, only eleven
were sentenced for perjury.8 In 1972, Pennsylvania
I REPORT OF TEE PRESIDENT'S COmADSSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADIANITRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CaE IN A FREE SoCIETY 347 (1968).2 Whitman, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of
Perjury in Our Courts, 59 DIcx. L. Rav. 127 (1955).
Another commentator estimated that perjury occurs
in fifty per cent of contested civil actions, seventy-five
per cent of criminal cases and ninety per cent of di-
vorces. Hibschman, "You Do Solemnly Swear!" or
That Perjury Problem, 24 J. Cnme. L.C. & P.S. 901
(1934). See also Note, Problems of Successful Perjury,
78 SoL. J. 423 (1934).
3 300 U.S. 564 (1937).4 
Id. at 574.
5 United States v. Manfredonia, 414 F.2d 760, 764
(2d Cir. 1969).
6 DmECroR o TuE ADmmisTEArW OFiE or THE
UNITED STATES COeRTS AN. REP., Table D 2 (1970).7 These figures vary only slightly from those pre-
viously recorded. In 1937, of 50,279 cases of major of-
fenses reported by 28 states and the District of Co-
lumbia, only 187 or 3.7 of one per cent were prosecu-
tions for perjury. UNITD STATES DEPARTMENT OF
ComMRCE, BUREAU OF TME CENSUS, JUDICIAL Camn-
xAL STATISTICS FOR 1937 cited in McClintock, What
Happens to Perjurers, 24 fmn. L. REv. 727, 729 (1940).
8 FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRrsoNs, A REPORT OP THE
WoRx or THE FEDERAL BUREAU OP PRIsoNs, Table
A 7 (1966).
reported only twenty-four cases of perjury from a
total of 72,138 defendants processed. 9 There were
only six reported convictions for perjury from a
total of 38,964 convicted defendants. 10 In California
during the same period, there were fifty-three
charges of perjury from a total of 88,291 felony de-
fendants prosecuted." There were only twenty-two
convictions for perjury from a total of 49,060 con-
victed defendants.
12
This comment will examine the elements and
evils of perjury and determine the reasons for the
failure to enforce perjury statutes. It will further
examine the problems which may arise because of
the failure to prosecute in cases where perjury
occurs.
Historical Development of Perjury as a.
Criminal Offense
Until the fifteenth century" the only form of
perjury punished by common law was perjury by
9 PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL COURT DIsPOsITIONs 4
(1972) and letter from the Pennsylvania Bureau of
Criminal justice Statistics to author (January 24,
1974). Letter on file in the editorial offices of the Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology.
10 PENNsYLvANIA CRInINAL COURT DIsposroNs 4
(1972) and letter from the Pennsylvania Bureau of
Criminal Justice Statistics to author (January 24,
1974). Letter on file in the editorial offices of the Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology.
n CRnm AND DELINQUENCY IN CALiroRwA: ADULT
PRosEcUTIONs 1-8 (1972) and letter from the Cah-
forna Department of justice to author (March 28,
1974). Letter on file in the editorial offices of the Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology.
2Twenty-two of the original fifty-three defendants
were convicted of offenses other than perjury. CRImE
AND DELNQUENCY IN CALIFOR-NA: ADULT PROsECU-
TIONS 1-8 (1972) and letter from the California Depart-
ment of Justice to author (March 28, 1974). Letter on
file in the editorial offices of the Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology. It is difficult to obtain statistics
on perjury from all states, since most states include
perjury in the categories of "miscellaneous crimes" or
"other categories." The results of inquiries addressed
to states which do not keep separate statistics on per-
jury are on file in the editorial offices of the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology. For the statistics from
Minnesota, see note 83 infra.
UThe concept of giving false testimony is not a
modern one. References to false testimony are found
in the Bible and in Cicero: "You shall not bear false
witness against your neighbor." Exod. 20:16; "[And
if the witness is a false witness and has accused his
brother falsely, then you shall purge the evil from the
midst of you." Deut. 20:19; "He who has once deviated
from the truth, usually commits perjury with as little
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a jury. After the Norman conquest jurors were
picked from men of the locality who were expected
to know the facts and circumstances of the case.
The jurors were not regarded solely as witnesses,
but rather as arbiters of the facts known to them
who were under a legal duty to render a proper
verdict.14 The writ of attaint punished jurors who
violated this duty and gave a demonstrably false
verdict. In the process of attaint a subsequent ver-
dict of twenty-four jurors could annul the first
verdict and punish the original jurors by imprison-
ment for a year, loss of chattel and by accounting
them infamous.'
5
The writ of attaint differed from later perjury
statutes in one important aspect. Attaint was in-
tended as a method to control the jury, while per-
jury statutes are intended as a method to control
the testimony of witnesses. Attaint was rarely used,
however, because subsequent jurors did not want
to slander their neighbors who sat as the original
jurors in the case. 6 The subsequent shift in the
function of jurors furthered this nonenforcement.
As courts shifted to the use of witnesses, the jurors'
function of examining their own knowledge changed
to an examination of the evidence placed before
them.17 Thus, attaint with its intent to control
jurors became an anachronism and a new method
had to be devised to control witnesses who might
present false testimony.
scruple as he would tell a lie." CIcERo, ORAIO P io
QuiTo Roscio ComAEDo, XX.
The word "perjury" is derived from the Latin word
perjurium. Perjurium, however, was regarded as a sin
and not a public wrong. It consisted of invoking a god
to bear witness to the truth of the statement although
the speaker knew the statement was false. It could be
committed anywhere and not just at a judicial pro-
ceeding. Nevertheless, Roman law did provide for an
offense similar to the modern concept of perjury. A
witness who had taken an oath (usjurandun) in a
judicial proceeding and then testified falsely or with-
held the truth was upon conviction deported if he were
a person of rank, or put to death if one of the common
people. 1 W. Buraie, LAW OF CRIM § 319 (1946).
14 T. PLUCKNETY, CONCISE HISTOPY OF THE COMMON
LAw 131 (5th ed. 1956).
15 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAws
337 (3d ed. 1922).
161n 1565, Sir Thomas Smith, Queen Elizabeth's
Secretary of State, wrote:
Attaints be very seldom put in use, partly because
the gentlemen will not meet to slander and deface
the honest yeoman, their neighbors; so that of long
time they had rather pay a mean fine than to ap-
pear and make the inquest.
Id. at 342.
17 PxUCxC£rr, supra note 14, at 132. Because the
function of American juries has always been to examine
the evidence placed before them, the writ of attaint
has never been used in the United States to punish
jurors and reverse verdicts.
In response to the increasing problem of perjured
oral evidence, the Star Chamber in 1487 assumed
jurisdiction to punish perjury. 8 Subsequently, in
1540 subornation of perjury 9 was included with a
number of other punishable offenses connected
with litigation.'0 Twenty-two years later one com-
prehensive statute punished both perjury and sub-
ornation of perjury. Finally, the Star Chamber
resolved in 1613 that perjury by a witness was
punishable at common law.n
Despite the confusion between the punishment
of perjury by common law and statute, in 1628 Sir
Edward Coke defined perjury in a manner similar
to most modern statutes:
Perjury is a crime committed, when a lawful oath
is administered by any that hath authority to any
person, in any judicial proceeding, who sweareth
absolutely and falsely in a matter material to the
issue or cause in question by their own act or by
the subordination of others.n
The modem elements of perjury, whether in a
federal or state court, are essentially the same: the
willful giving of false testimony, on a materialpoint
to the issue or inquiry, in a judicial proceeding, by
a person to whom a lawful oath has been adminis-
tered.u The only apparent difference between the
two definitions is Coke's requirement that the wit-
ness should have sworn "absolutely." Coke be-
lieved that perjury could not exist on matters of
opinion, belief or recollection.25 Modern courts, on
183 Hen. 7 c. 1 (1487).
9 For a definition and discussion of subornation of
perjury, see notes 92-94 infra and accompanying text.
20 32 Hen. 8 c. 9 (1540). The statute imposed a fine
of ten pounds for subornation of perjury in actions to
determine the title to lands. BuomicK, supra note 13,
at § 324.
215 Eliz. c. 9 (1562). Perjury was punished "with six
months imprisonment, perpetual infamy and a fine of
20 pounds or to have both ears nailed to the pillory."
Subornation of perjury was punished by the penalty
"of perpetual infamy and a fine of 20 pounds on the
suborner and in default of payment, imprisonment for
six months and to stand with both ears nailed to the
pillory." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIxS § 138.
213 CoxE, INsTITUTEs § 164.
2Id.
24See, e.g., United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570
(1958); United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138 (2d Cir.
1970); People v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P.2d
118 (1943); Hirsch v. State, 279 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1973);
State v. Deets, 195 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1972); Gate-
wood v. State, 15 Md. App. 314, 290 A.2d 551 (1972);
State v. Sullivan, 24 NJ. 18, 130 A.2d 610, cerl. denied,
355 U.S. 840 (1957); Walther v. O'Connell, 72 Misc. 2d
316, 339 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1972); State v. Heyes, 44 Wash.
2d 579, 269 P.2d 577 (1954); State v. Crowder, 146
W.Va. 810, 123 S.E.2d 42 (1961).
2-3 CoxE, supra note 22, at § 166.
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the other hand, punish perjury in such instances
if the witness intended to mislead the factfinder.
21
Perjury became an American crime in 1790 2 and
the American statutes and courts have sub-
stantially adopted common law perjury require-
ments. Besides defining the offense in a manner
similar to Coke's definition, American courts have
traditionally adhered to the common law rules of
evidence for perjury, including the two witness rule.
Although the common law generally permitted the
guilt of the accused to be proven by one witness
alone, in perjury cases the common law required
that guilt be established by the testimony of two
witnesses or of one witness plus corroborating cir-
cumstances.u This "quantitative" or two witness
rule was intended to prevent convictions where
there is an oath against an oath. An example of this
situation is the case where the only evidence of
perjury is the oath of a single witness balanced
against the oath of the accused. In this situation
the common law required more evidence of guilt-
either another witness or corroborating circum-
stances.2 9
Although the United States adopted most com-
mon law requirements for perjury, the American
courts did not adopt the common law requirements
for drafting a perjury indictment. At common law
the drafting of a perjury indictment was a maze of
technicalities. The indictment had to explicitly
allege every fact and circumstance necessary to
prove the offense, including the organization of the
court where the crime was committed and the en-
tire proceeding therein." The pleader also had to
allege the conclusions that the court had jurisdic-
tion, the officer had the authority to administer
the oath, and the testimony was material and will-
26 United States v. Rivera, 448 F.2d 757 (7th Cir.
1971). But see Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S.
352 (1973).
2 Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 18, 1 STAT. 116. The
present federal statutes are 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1966)
(Perjury), § 1622 (1966) (Subornation of Perjury) and
§ 1623 (1970) (False Declaration before a Grand Jury
or Court).
28WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 2040-41 (3d ed. 1940).
The two witness rule maintains its vitality in most
American juridictions. See, e.g., Wells v. State, 270
So. 2d 399 (Fla. 1972); Commonwealth v. Field, 223
Pa. Super. 258, 298 A.2d 908 (1972). See also note 77
infra and accompanying text.
29 The rule requiring two witnesses to prove a charge
of treason was statutory and not a common law rule.
England adopted this rule in the sixteenth century and
it was later incorporated into the United States Consti-
tution. "No person shall be convicted of Treason unless
on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the overt Act,
or on Confession in open Court." U.S. CONST. art. ii,
§ 3. WVIGUoE, supra note 28, at § 2036-39.
20 McClintock, supra note 7, at 733.
fully and corruptly given." Further, the pleader
had to allege the true facts with respect to the
alleged false testimony.n
Fortunately, American courts adopted a modi-
fied form of the common law charge provided for
in a later English statute. In Markham v. United
States,u the Supreme Court stated that a perjury
indictment was sufficient if it identified the officer
before whom the alleged false oath was taken;
averred he was competent to administer an oath;
set forth the statement alleged to have been will-
fully and corruptly given; and charged that the
statement was both false and material to an issue
or pending inquiry.3
Effects of Perjury
An important factor in the development of per-
jury as a criminal offense has been the recognition
of its effects. For centuries, perjury has been char-
acterized as an offense against the effective ad-
ministration of justice. 5 The offense rests on at
least two levels. On the first level, perjury interferes
with the particular judicial dispute between in-
dividuals and on the second level, it impedes the
effective administration of the judicial system as a
whole. A possible third level is the moral level, since
giving a false statement offends the moral code of
mankind.3 This was the original conception of per-
jury and modem courts have sometimes alluded
to it when dealing with the offense.u
Perjury interferes in the specific dispute between
two parties by injecting false testimony into the
case. Thus, it may unjustly enrich one party while
unfairly depriving the other. The obvious example
31 d.
32 Id.
160 U.S. 319 (1895).
3 Id. at 324. Without mentioning it, the Court sub-
stantially relied on 23 Geo. 2, c. 25 (1728). This statute
loosened the indictment requirements for perjury in
order to more effectively deter persons from committing
perjury. BuDIcK, supra note 13, at § 324.
31 See, e.g., United States v. Manfredonia, 414 F.2d
760 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Otto, 54 F.2d 277
(2d Cir. 1931); United States v. Hall, 44 F. 864 (S.D.
Ga. 1890); Rex v. Rowland ap Eliza, 12 Coke 101, 77
Eng. Rep. 1377 (1613); Onslowe's Case, 2 Dyer 242b,
73 Eng. Rep. 537 (1566).
26 See note 13 supra.
17 In United States v. Carolio, 30 F. Supp. 3 (W.D.
Mo. 1939), the court noted that for centuries perjury
had been an offense involving moral turpitude. Moral
turpitude is described as an act which offends the moral
code of mankind even in the absence of a prohibitive
statute. Id. at 6. Perjury has also been described as an
"[U]nnatural and heinous crime, because of its ten-
dency to jeopardize person and property and even




would be the tort case where the plaintiff introduces
false testimony about personal injuries and recov-
ers from the defendant.,n Perjury also tarnishes the
integrity of the judicial system as a whole by dimin-
ishing the respect necessary to maintain that sys-
tem. A judicial system requires respect or it cannot
fairly determine the rights of parties which may
appear before it. Courts require respect if they are
to reach the goal of ascertaining the truth in a par-
ticular case. If individuals believe that perjury is
the norm and not the exception in the courts, then
they will either introduce false testimony for their
own benefit or avoid the courts and settle disputes
in their own manner.
Perjury further interferes with the function of
the jury in a trial. If one of the goals of a trial is
to ascertain the truth by presenting the facts to a
jury, then perjury impedes reaching this goal by
presenting false evidence to the jury. In determin-
ing the truth of conflicting evidence at a trial, the
jury has no simple formula of weights and measures
upon which to rely. 0 The jury must rely on the
,credibility of the witnesses and the trustworthiness
of the testimony. Perjury destroys both credibility
and trustworthiness and thus upsets the means by
which a jury reaches a decision. It hinders the jury
in its determination of truth and, therefore, may
result in incorrect findings and decisions.
Closely related to perjury's detrimental effect
upon the judicial system in general is perjury's ef-
fect upon the value of the oath as a means to insure
trustworthy testimony.40 By definition perjury can
only occur in a judicial proceeding in which a proper
oath has been administered. Thus, unpunished per-
jury subverts respect for the solemn oath and under-
mines a safeguard intended to compel trustworthy
testimony.
4 '
38 It may be argued that perjury does little damage in
civil actions where the defeated party has insurance.
The insurance company absorbs the loss, not the de-
feated party. This argument overlooks possible dam-
age to the defeated litigant and the public in the form
of higher insurance rates and the inestimable damage
to the effective administration of justice.
39 Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 609 (1945).4 0 See United States v. Hall, 44 F. 864 (S.D. Ga.
1890).41 It may be argued, nonetheless, that the solemn
oath was only effective in societies which viewed per-
jury as a moral offense punishable by a Deity and that
it was never effective in societies which viewed perjury
as a public offense. In such societies, it was necessary
,to enact perjury statutes to ensure trustworthy oral
evidence in judicial proceedings. Hence, unpunished
perjury does not destroy respect for a solemn oath
since there was never any deep respect anyway. For a
.discussion of the related developments of oaths and
perjury, see Silving, TI. Oath: 1. 6R VATE L.J. 1329,
1381-89 (1959).
The concern with perjury as a potential disrupter
in the legal system can be seen not only in court
comments,4 but also in the number of proceedings
in which an oath is administered with the intention
of preventing perjury. The judicial proceedings are
varied and include: divorce actions,4 3 civil" or
criminal trials,4 congressional hearings46 and grand
jury,47 bankruptcy" or ex parte proceedings. 49 Yet,
perjury statutes are rarely enforced in any of these
situations. To prevent the spread of perjury to
other situations, there is also the separate offense
of giving a false statement.3 0 The distinction be-
tween the two offenses is that to be subject to
criminal conviction for perjury, the perjurious
statement must be given under oath and before a
competent tribunal. On the other hand, a false
statement which may be prosecuted under false
swearing statutes need not be given before a tri-
bunal nor under oath. 51
Reasons for the Failure to Enforce
Perjury Statutes
In the face of these recognized evils of perjury,
the question remains why there are so few indict-
ments and convictions for perjury. Most com-
mentators attribute the absence of indictments and
convictions for perjury to the highly technical
nature of the offense. They point to problems in
drafting indictments,52 in proving materiality of
the alleged false testimony- and in meeting the
stringent evidentiary rules.M Another theory is that
the present rules are sufflicently liberal to support
42 "We all know that this crime [perjury] is one of
the most serious and that its effects are far-reaching,
obstructive and destructive." United States v. Otto,
54 F.2d 277, 279 (2d Cir. 1931). See also notes 3, 5 and
37, supra.
43 People v. Teal, 196 N.Y. 372, 89 N.E. 1086 (1909).
44Walther v. O'Connell, 72 Misc. 2d 316, 339
N.Y.S.2d 386 (1972).
45 Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606 (1945).
46 United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953).
47 United States v. Harris, 311 U.S. 292 (1940).
48 Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
49 United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570 (1958).
50 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1966); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-2402 (1971); N.J. CODE ANN. § 2A: 131-4 (1969);
PA. STAT. ANN. ch. 18, § 4904 (1973).
51 United States v. Waters, 457 F.2d 805 (3d Cir.
1972) (Falsification of records directed to the Urban
League of Philadelphia, a contractor with the Depart-
ment of Labor, was within the federal false swearing
statute); Plummer v. State, 90 Ga. App. 773, 84 S.E.2d
202 (1954) (False statement before Deputy Director of
the State Board of Workmen's Compensation was false
swearing and not perjury).
52 See note 56 infra and accompanying text.
5See note 66 infra and accompanying text.
"See note 77 infra and accompanying text.
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most perjury charges and that the failure to enforce
perjury statutes is basically a policy decision.65
One theory to explain the dearth of perjury pros-
ecutions is the belief that the technical nature of
perjury indictments prevents simple prosecutions. 6
This theory compares perjury indictments with in-
dictments for other offenses and concludes that the
difference in the forms of the indictments explains
the difference in rates of prosecutions. One signifi-
cant difference in perjury indictments is the re-
quirement that a valid perjury indictment set
forth, either in substance or verbatim, the words
of the alleged false statement.57
In criticizing such a requirement, however, the
theory overlooks the differences in the manner in
which perjury and other crimes are committed. In
perjury the words are the means by which the
offense is committed, as distinguished from other
felonies not dependent on the particulir manner in
which the offense is committed., Hence, a perjury
indictment must fail if it just sets forth the words
of the criminal statute, since this does not inform
the accused of the elements of his alleged offense.
It is a fundamental constitutional right guaranteed
by the sixth amendment that the accused receive
sufficient and adequate notice of his alleged of-
fense.n
This theory further overlooks the test to deter-
mine the sufficiency of a perjury charge and the
trend of the courts toward liberal construction of
perjury indictments.65 Although a perjury charge
11 See note 89 infra and accompanying text.
5' See Black, A Report on Perjury, 49 hLx. B.J. 574
(1961); McClintock, supra note 7.
United States v. Markham, 160 U.S. 319, 324
(1895).
Es In People v. Aud, 52 Ill. 2d 368, 288 N.E.2d 453
(1972), the court distinguished perjury indictments from
indictments for other crimes like burglary on the theory
that the validity of a burglary indictment does not de-
pend on whether the unlawful entry was through a door
or a window. Thus, burglary can be adequately charged
by an indictment that simply uses the language of the
criminal statute. A perjury indictment, however, must
set forth the alleged false statement since the false
statement was the means by which the offense was
committed. Id. at 390-91, 288 N.E.2d at 454-55.
9 '"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. . . ." U.S. CossT. amend. VI.
Wo The most recent federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1623 (1970), is an example of the liberal trend in per-
jury indictments. In this statute Congress avoided the
common law requirement of alleging the truth with re-
spect to the false testimony. The statute provides that
a perjury indictment which alleges that the defendant
under oath knowlingly made two or more inconsistent
statements to the degree that one of them was neces-
sarily false, need not specify which declaration was
false if:
[(1)] each declaration was material to the point in
may seem more complicated than the usual crimi-
nal indictment, the test of the sufficiency of a
perjury charge is the basic sixth amendment test
of whether the indictment clearly informs the de-
fendant of his alleged offense to enable him to pre-
pare an adequate defense." The trend toward lib-
eral construction of perjury charges can be seen in
the upholding of charges which failed to allege the
name and authority of the person administering
the oath" and which failed to allege what the truth
was in regard to the false statements. 3 Courts have
also found indictments not defective when they did
not specifically charge that the false testimony was
given "feloniously" and "corruptly" 6 and did not
set forth every matter in order to allege the ma-
teriality of the false statement.6 5
Another theory for the absence of perjury indict-
ments is the difficulty in proving materiality of the
false statement.66 In order to constitute perjury, a
false statement must be material to an issue or
point of inquiry.Y Materiality of the false state-
question and (2) each declaration was made within
the period of the statute of limitations for the of-
fense charges under the section.
Id. at § 1623(c).
61United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953);
People v. McGreal, 4 Ill. App. 3d 312, 278 N.E.2d
504 (1971).
United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374 (1953);
United States v. Neff, 212 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1954).
Contra, State v. Burtchett, 475 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1972).
'3Stassi v. United States, 401 F.2d 259 (5th Cir.
1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969);
People v. Campbell, 48 Misc. 2d 144, 264 N.Y.S.2d
262 (1965).
"United States v. Johnson, 414 F.2d 22 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991, rehearing denied, 397
U.S. 1071 (1970); State v. Harris, 145 N.C. 456, 59
S.E. 115 (1907). Contra, People v. Taylor, 6 Ill. App.
3d 961, 286 N.E.2d 122 (1972).
65Markham v. United States, 160 U.S. 319 (1895);
United States v. Edmondson, 410 F.2d 670 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 966 (1970).6
6 See Hibschman, supra note 2, at 905. For a dis-
cussion of the theory that the ordinary meaning of
materiality is being expanded to the point where it may
be eliminated from perjury statutes, see Lillich, The
Element of Materiality in Federal Crimes of Perjury, 35
INm. L.J. 1 (1959).
'7The materiality requirement for perjury existed
in common law and has been adopted by modem
statutes and the courts. Coke believed that false
testimony must be material to the issue or cause in
question because if it does not concern a point in the
suit it is extrajudicial. CoxE, supra note 22, at § 164.
Blackstone noted that immaterial false statements
were no more penal than voluntary extrajudicial oaths.
BLAcxsroE, supra note 21, at § 137.
Materiality is a question of law for the court and not
a question of fact for the jury. The court determines
whether the alleged false statement was material to an
issue in the prior case and the jury determines whether
the defendant committed perjury. United States v.
Rivera, 448 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1971); Wolfe v. State,
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meat must be alleged in the indictment and must
be proven in order to convict.Y' The justification for
the materiality requirement is that an individual
should not be convicted for statements which were
incapable of influencing the court or jury on the
basic issue. The objection to this requirement is
that it injects another element of proof into the
already difficult task of prosecuting for perjury.
Critics of the requirement believe that any false
statement, whether material or immaterial, should
be punished as violations of both the moral code
and criminal statutesA.
9
This criticism disregards the sufficiently broad
tests of materiality and the expansive application
of these tests. The most common tests of ma-
teriality are whether the false testimony was capa-
ble of influencing the tribunal on the issue before
it" and whether it would have the natural effect or
tendency to impede, influence or dissuade the grand
jury from pursuing its investigation .7 It should be
271 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1972); State v. Deets, 195 N.W.2d
118 (Iowa 1972).
Examples of material statements in perjury prosecu-
tions include: United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (Defendant's
perjured testimony that he had not accepted bribes
was material to an investigation into corrupt practices
of Federal Housing Administration employees); Dolan
v. United States, 218 F.2d 454 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 923 (1955) (Officer's alleged false testimony as
to the handling of ransom money was material to grand
jury investigation of kidnapping-murder and disposi-
tion of the ransom money); People v. Giacomo, 193
Cal. App. 2d 688, 14 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1961) (Defend-
ant's testimony that he had not signed the name which
appeared as the endorsement on the check was ma-
terial in connection with the trial for grand theft and
forgery). But see United States v. Freedman, 445 F.2d
1220 (2d Cir. 1971) (Defendant's denial that he re-
ceived gifts from customers was not material to a Se-
curities Exchange Commission investigation of three
corporations and their directors in connection with
stock manipulations); Wolfe v. State, 271 So. 2d 132
(Fla. 1972) (Defendant's statement of what he did with
the checks was immaterial in the prosecution of the
defendant for larceny and conspiracy to commit lar-
ceny).
68 United States v. Gremillion, 464 F.2d 901 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972); United States
v. Freedman, 445 F.2d 1220 (2d Cir. 1971).
11 In emphasizing the moral aspects of false state-
ments, these critics apply the original conception of
perjury. See notes 13, 37 supra.
70 United States v. Rivera, 448 F.2d 757 (7th Cir.
1971) (Defendant's denial that he sold heroin was ma-
terial since if the jury believed his denial, he would be
found innocent in a trial for selling heroin).
7' LaRocca v. United States, 337 F.2d 39 (8th Cir.
1964) (False testimony as to the purchase of a revolver
found near a government witness was material since it
thwarted the grand jury's effort to determine the link
between ownership and possession of the weapon and
an assault on the government witness). Other tests of
materiality in perjury prosecutions include: whether
noted that although the tests differ in the language
describing them, they are essentially the same and
have been used interchangeably by the courts. In
United States v. Lococo,72 the Ninth Circuit cited
these tests and further observed that the false
testimony need not be directed to the primary sub-
ject of the investigation. The testimony is material
if it is relevant to any subsidiary issue under con-
sideration by the tribunalY.7 In Lococo, where the
grand jury was investigating interstate gambling
activities, the court found material the defendant's
denial of a telephone conversation with a named
person. Although the testimony was not directly
related to the primary purpose of the investigation,
it may have supplied a link between the named
person and an alleged gambler, thus bearing on the
interstate gambling activities that the grand jury
was investigating.
New York has created a three-degree structure
of perjury in which even immaterial false state-
ments may be punished as perjury. Perjury,
whether material or immaterial to an issue, is con-
sidered a pernicious offense so that materiality is
considered only a factor of aggravation of the of-
fense.7 4 Thus, perjury in the first and second degree
requires materiality while perjury in the third
degree does notY5 Nevertheless, there is no availa-
ble statistical evidence to prove that the statutes
punishing both material and immaterial false state-
ments have resulted in more convictions for perjury
in New York than in other jurisdictions which re-
tain the materiality requirement6
Most critics blame the absence of perjury indict-
the jury would have believed the accused's false state-
ment and would have acquitted, United States v.
Paris, 448 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1971), and whether the
false statement would have the tendency to prove or
disprove a relevant fact irrespective of the main issue,
State v. Deets, 195 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1972).
72450 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945
(1971).
3 Id. at 1199.
74People v. Dunleavy, 41 App. Div. 2d 717, 341
N.Y.S.2d 500 (1973); N.Y. PEiA LAW, PRACTICE
ColmENTAiY to § 210.05 (McKinney 1967).
75 First degree perjury covers testimonial perjury and
is a Class D felony (maximum of seven years imprison-
ment). N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.15 (McKinney 1967).
Second degree perjury deals with written instruments
and is a Class E felony (maximum of four years im-
prisonment). Id. at § 210.10. Finally, third degree
perjury covers both testimonial perjury and written
instruments and is a Class A misdemeanor (maximum
of one year imprisonment). Id. at § 210.05,
76 New York does not maintain separate statistics
on perjury indictments and convictions. Letter from
the New York Attorney General to author (February
25, 1974). Letter on file in the editorial offices of the
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology.
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ments and convictions on the stringent evidence
rules which must be met in order to convictY As
noted earlier, in most jurisdictions the falsity of
testimony can only be established by the testimony
of two witnesses or of one witness plus corraborat-
ing circumstances.78 One critic of this rule argued
that this evidentiary distinction between perjury
and other crimes is senseless and arbitrary since it
makes it more difficult to convict for perjury than
for murder.79 Another stated that the rule may
even be a stimulus to perjury in that it makes the
offense so difficult to prove80 On the other hand,
some believe the rule is necessary to protect honest
witnesses from hasty and spiteful retaliation in the
form of unfounded perjury prosecutions by de-
feated and disappointed litigants8 ' Also, there may
be less harm in the escape of guilty perjurers than
in the escape of other criminals.82
At the basis of this criticism is the belief that the
removal of the two witness rule will result in a
higher rate of perjury prosecutions. Nevertheless,
the critics of the quantitative rule have not shown
that there is a higher rate of indictments and con-
victions for perjury in Minnesota where the rule
was abandoned in 1922.P3 Also, there is insufficient
evidence at the present time to show a higher rate
77 See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 2; Note, Perjury-
Quantitative Evidence Rule Rejected, 28 G~o. WAsH.
L. R.v. 786 (1960); Comment, Proof of Perjury: The
Two-Witness Requirement, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 86
(1961).78 See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
79 Whitman, supra note 2.
80 Note, Kind and Degree of Evidence Necessary to
Convict of Perjury or Subornation, 10 U. FLA. L. REv.
77 15.
81 Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606 (1945). The
Court noted that the two witness rule protects wit-
nesses in the same manner as immunity from libel suits
protects witnesses who testify in open court.
8 WIGo oE, supra note 28, at § 2041.
8 In State v. Storey, 148 Minn. 398, 182 N.W. 613
(1921), the court held that perjury could be established
by circumstantial evidence and not just by two witnesses
if guilt could be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court believed that perjury was not more heinous
than murder so that one charged with perjury should
have greater immunity than one charged with murder.
Of the 19,512 defendants processed in district courts in
Minnesota from 1965 to 1971, only 17 were processed
for perjury. Jumicr CRn=AL STAnsrScs FoR Mix-
1NESOTA 1965-71 and letter from the Minnesota Bureau
of Criminal Apprehension to author (February 11,
1974). Letter on file in the editorial offices of the Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology. These figures are
even lower than those recorded in courts where the
two witness rule was in effect. See notes 6-12 supra
and accompanying text for the statistics from Penn-
sylvania, California and the federal district courts
where the two witness rule was used.
of prosecutions for perjury in federal courts since
Congress abolished the two witness rule in 1970.84
Another difficulty encountered in prosecutions
for perjury is that the testimony from the original
proceeding may be unclear and ambiguous. In
Bronston v. United States,8" the Court confronted
the question whether a witness may be convicted
of perjury for an answer, under oath, that is literally
true, but not responsive to the question asked
and arguably misleading by negative implications.86
The Court held that the federal perjury statutes do
not provide for a perjury conviction for either an
intent to mislead the examiner or for unresponsive
answers which are untrue only by negative impli-
cation.1 Juries should not be permitted to engage
in conjecture whether an unresponsive, but lit-
erally true, answer was intended to mislead the
jury. If the answer is unresponsive or unclear, the
questioner should either press another question or
reframe the initial question with greater precision.
It is the duty of the questioner in the original pro-
ceeding to make the questions and answers unam-
64Although the two witness rule was eliminated in
federal courts in 1970, it has still been used in recent
federal decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Weiner,
479 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973) (Perjury occurred in 1966
and the indictment was in 1969); United States v.
DeLeon, 474 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1973) (Accused was
indicted in September, 1971).
The most recent federal perjury statute provides
that:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section
is sufficient for conviction. It shall not be necessary
that such proof be made by any particular number
of witnesses or by documentary or other type of
evidence.
18 U.S.C. § 1623(e) (1970).
The constitutionality of this statute has been upheld
on the rationale that the two witness rule was never
constitutionally mandated. United States v. Ruggerio,
472 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Ceccerelli,
350 F. Supp. 475 (W.D. Pa. 1972). In Weler v. United
States, 323 U.S. 606 (1945), the Supreme Court earlier
had adhered to the quantitative rule since Congress had
not shown any legislative intent to abandon it. In
Ceccerelli, however, the court noted that recent legis-
lative history showed congressional intent to abolish
the rule. See also S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 33 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 91-1549 quoted in
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADn. NEws, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
4008 (1970).
85 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
81 In Bronston, the defendant was asked whether he
had a Swiss bank account. He replied that his company
had an account in Zurich. Thus, the defendant told the
literal truth, but not the whole truth. He gave the im-
pression that he never had a personal account in a
Swiss bank, although he had an account for five years.
The questioner failed to follow up his inquiry and the
Court held that the defendant could not be convicted of
perjury by negative implication. Id. at 354.
8 Id. at 359.
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biguously specificP Nevertheless, this requirement
should not present a barrier to subsequent prosecu-
tion for perjury where the original questioner has
competently examined a witness and has elicited
precise and specific answers.
If the technicalities of the offense do not provide
an answer to the question of the failure to enforce
perjury statutes, then perhaps the answer lies in a
policy decision of nonenforcement. In both civil
and criminal cases, prosecutors may consider the
individuals, interests and issues involved and choose
nonenforcement of perjury statutes. Essentially,
this involves a balancing test in which the benefits
of a strict enforcement policy are weighed against
the detriments of nonenforcement. Also included in
this balancing are considerations of the technicali-
ties of the offense and problems of proof.
The relative nonenforcement of perjury statutes
in civil cases may result from the attitude of some
prosecutors and judges that the judicial machinery
should not be expended on civil actions where only
a few individuals are involved. Although perjury is
recognized as both widespread and destructive of
the judicial system, if a relatively small number of
individuals are affected by the alleged perjurious
statement, then why should the state become in-
volved by prosecuting for perjury. Prosecutors
might have to devote a substantial amount of their
limited time and resources in investigating the civil
case and alleged false statement even before they
decide to indict one of the parties.
In civil cases, prosecutors may believe that
economies of both prosecutorial and judicial ad-
ministration outweigh the benefits of a possible
perjury conviction. Even if a prosecutor does re-
view the civil case, the fact that the case is de
minimis and the fact that there is only slight evi-
dence of perjury will most likely result in nonen-
forcement of the criminal statute.8 9 Yet, it may be
argued that the roots of the perjury problem lie
even in the de minimis civil case. If prosecutors and
judges truly believe that perjury injures parties in
all judicial proceedings and also impedes the effec-
tive administration of justice, then they should
strictly enforce perjury statutes in all cases. More-
over, if witnesses believe that perjury will be prose-
cuted, then a deterrent effect may reasonably be
expected.
88 Id. at 362.
81 Default divorces, small claims or auto accidents in
which both parties are insured are examples of civil
cases in which perjury will probably remain unprose-
cuted.
In criminal trials, there may be a sense of frus-
tration as a result of the frequency of perjury that
prevents prosecutors from filing charges in every
case in which perjury occurs.9" Most prosecutors
are faced with a multitude of different duties so that
it is impossible to examine every case for possible
perjury. Further, prosecutors may accept the the-
ory that defendants are expected to do anything
possible, even perjure themselves, to avoid convic-
tion.
As in civil cases, the decision to prosecute for
perjury following a criminal trial involves a bal-
ancing of the damage which the perjury caused
and the benefit of a conviction for false testimony.
Prosecutors may believe that in the particular case
the perjury resulted in only negligible damage
since the defendant was convicted of the major
offense alleged by the prosecution. A subsequent
prosecution for perjury may be only collateral to
the overall issue of the case. In addition, the burden
of another trial on the judicial system may out-
weigh the benefit of convicting the defendant of
another crime. Economies of judicial administra-
tion may outweigh the benefit of the additional
sentence which a perjury conviction may impose. 1
Yet, it may be argued that administrative incon-
venience should not prevent prosecution of perjury
in a particular civil or criminal case. The first and
most obvious reason is that perjurers should be
punished for their offense. Secondly, a strict en-
forcement policy and the perception of this policy
by the public may act as a deterrent to future
perjury.
The danger of a policy of nonenforcement is that
it encourages perjury in future cases, since the
defendant and other witnesses may realize that
their false testimony will remain unpunished. Par-
ties to a proceeding may also be encouraged to
commit the separate offense of subornation of per-
jury. Subornation of perjury consists of procuring
or instigating another to commit perjury. There
are two essential elements of the offense. First, the
testimony of the suborned witness must be false
and known to be false by the witness. Second, the
suborner must know or believe the testimony about
to be given will be false and must know or intend
that the witness will give the testimony corruptly
90 In defense of this nonenforcement, prosecutors
could argue that they lacked sufficient evidence and the
requisite knowledge with which to proceed against the
alleged offender. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448
(1962).




or with knowledge of its falsity.92 Both parties and
nonparties to a case may procure or induce false
testimony if they believe that perjury and suborna-
tion of perjury statutes will not be strictly enforced.
Although subornation of perjury is an obvious
breach of legal ethics,9' attorneys are especially
prone to indictment for violating subornation
statutes.94 A recogniton of the nonenforcement of
perjury statutes and an unwavering belief in his
client and his client's position may lead an attorney
to induce a witness to give false testimony.
In situations where perjury is alleged, it is often
the only criminal violation charged. Prosecutors
may feel that a perjury charge is warranted follow-
ing a criminal trial or grand jury proceeding 95 be-
cause of the substantial investment of time and
resources by the prosecution in investigation and
litigation. If the jury fails to convict the defendant
in the original criminal trial, a subsequent perjury
charge may be used to obtain a conviction. Perjury
charges may also be employed following a grand
jury proceeding if no other grounds for criminal
charges were discovered during the proceeding.
Perjury, along with obstruction of justice,98 is a
0 See, e.g., Petite v. United States, 262 F.2d 788
(4th Cir.), remanded on other grounds, 361 U.S. 529
(1959); Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1958);
State v. Potts, 154 Me. 114, 144 A.2d 261 (1958);
State v. Devers, 260 Md. 360, 272 A.2d 794 (1971);
State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162, 183 A.2d 77 (1962);
State v. McBride, 15 N.C. App. 742, 190 S.E.2d 658
(1972); Commonwealth v. Billingsley, 357 Pa. 378, 54
A.2d 705 (1947).
11 The Canons of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility provide that a lawyer should represent his client
zealously within the bounds of the law. ABA CODE Or
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY, CANON 7. The Ethical
Considerations prohibit the use of fraudulent, false
or perjured testimony and subject to discipline any
lawyer who knowingly participates in or introduces
such testimony. Id. at EC 7-26. The Disciplinary Rules
prohibit a lawyer from knowingly using perjured testi-
mony or false evidence. Id. at DR 7-102(A)(4).
1 See, e.g., United States v. Root, 366 F.2d 377 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1966) (Attorney in-
duced a witness to commit perjury); Burns v. Clayton,
273 S.C. 316, 117 S.E.2d 300 (1960) (Attorney paid a
witness to make a false statement); State ex. rel. Mil-
waukee Bar Ass'n. v. Aderman, 11 Wis. 2d 319, 105
N.W.2d 284 (1960) (Attorney encouraged a client to
give false testimony).
90 The Eighth Circuit noted that one reason for the
more liberal evidence rules in 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1970)
may be Congress' feeling that perjury before the grand
jury is especially damaging. United States v. Koonce,
485 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1973). Analogously, prosecu-
tors may believe that false testimony during a grand
jury proceeding is more destructive of the judicial sys-
tem than perjury in a civil case.
For a discussion of the relationship between per-
jury and obstruction of justice, see note 124 infra and
accompanying text.
means to obtain an indictment or conviction when
it is impossible to allege or prove a more serious
offense.97
The situations in which perjury charges have
been used in this manner include cases involving
political or official corruption, s organized crime, 9
and the Watergate incident. °9 This selective en-
forcement of perjury raises the the issue of prose-
cutorial discrimination' 0 If perjury occurs in most
judicial proceedings, may the state properly select
one individual for prosecution? In United States v.
Falk,102 the Seventh Circuit confronted the question
of prosecutorial discrimination and observed that
there is a presumption "that a prosecution for
violation of a criminal law is undertaken in good
faith and in nondiscriminatory fashion for the pur-
pose of fulfilling a duty to bring violators to jus-
tice." 103 Nevertheless, if the defendant alleges in-
tentional and purposeful discrimination and pre-
sents facts sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt
about the prosecutions' purpose, the burden of go-
9A perjury charge could also be used as an "1insur-
ance" charge following a grand jury proceeding. In
addition to alleging other offenses, a perjury count
could be added in order to obtain conviction on at least
one ground. For a discussion of the use of perjury
charges in police corruption cases, see Beigel, The In-
vestigation and Prosecution of Police Corruption, 65 J.
Cams. L. & C. 135, 141-43 (1974).91 United States v. Gill, 490 F.2d 233 (7th Cir.
1973). (Police officers charged with perjury before the
grand jury in a case dealing with extortion in violation
of the Hobbs Act).
19 United States v. Andrews, 370 F. Supp. 365
(D. Conn. 1974). (Perjury charges were the result of a
grand jury inquiry into defendant's alleged gambling
activities).
10 United States v. Krogh, 366 F. Supp. 1255
(D.D.C. 1973). (A federal official was charged with per-
jury in sworn deposition taken by Assistant Attorney
General in a proceeding ancillary to the Watergate
Grand Jury inquiry).
10 1 It also raises the issue of the use of charges of al-
leged perjury to harass those suspected of criminal of-
fenses. Although the evidence of perjury may be weak
following a trial or grand jury investigation, a perjury
count could be used as a harassment technique. The
Court has noted, however, that a defendant may be
charged with a petty crime, even if most others are not
prosecuted. Nevertheless, the defendant must be sus-
pected of committing other crimes and not unpopular
legal acts. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58
(1965). An example of the valid use of a smaller charge
is United States v. Sacco, 448 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1970).
In Sacco the defendant was suspected of being involved
in organized crime, but was convicted of the lesser
offense of violating alien registration laws.
102 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973). For a discussion of
the development of the theory of prosecutorial discrimi-
nation, -see--Comment, The Ramifications of United
States v. Falk on Equal Protection from Prosecutorial
Discrimination, 65 J. Cman L. & C. 62 (1974).
1G3 479 F.2d 616, 620.
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ing forward with proof of nondiscrimination will
then rest on the government.1°4 A defendant in a
perjury case could possibly cite the Falk rationale
and argue that the prosecution in the particular
case violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment since other perjurers were
not being prosecuted.105
In defense of their selective enforcement of per-
jury, prosecutors may argue that the means of se-
lectivity were reasonable because they lacked suffi-
cient evidence or knowledge of other crimes with
which to charge the defendant. 1 6 In addition, it
has been held that prosecutors may conserve law
enforcement resources by selecting individuals at
random.1 7 This reasoning may be utilized to argue
that it is not improper discrimination to prosecute
someone who is highly visible to the public and
whose conviction would have a strong deterrent
effect.l'1 Hence, a sound enforcement technique
might include the prosecution of a highly visible
offender for perjury in order to achieve general
compliance. 0 9 Nevertheless, this rationale assumes
that the public will be aware of the selective prose-
cution and that this will affect their future actions
as witnesses.
Remedies
Legislatures, courts and commentators have
presented various solutions to the problem of per-
jury in judicial proceedings. For example, Ken-
tucky and Pennsylvania have statutory sanctions
1o4Id. at 624. In support of an argument that the
selective enforcement of the perjury statute violated
the equal protection clause, the defendant may not
merely allege purposeful discrimination. He must also
show that the selective enforcement -was based upon
an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other
arbitrary classification. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,456
(1962).
105 Cases which have found prosecutorial discrimi-
nation include: United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616
(7th Cir. 1973) (25,000 others handed in their draft
cards, but were not prosecuted); United States v.
Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (Six others com-
mitted the same federal census violation, but were not
prosecuted); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d
1074 (4th Cir. 1972). (Similar disruptive acts were com-
mitted on sixteen other occasions, but no prosecutions
resulted in those instances). The defendant alleging
prosecutorial discrimination in a perjury case would
have to show a particular class (for example, divorces
or small claims) where perjury statutes were not en-
forced.
106 Oyler v. Boles, 368'U.S. 448 (1962).
107 People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d
12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962).
105 United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 634 (7th
Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
10 Id. This would essentially involve a balancing of
the issues and parties involved in the proceeding.
which disqualify convicted perjurers from being
witnesses in future litigation."1n This sanction is
limited, however, since the perjurer may testify on
his own behalf in criminal prosecutions and is only
estopped from testifying against others or on his
own behalf n cinvil cases."' The prospective per-
jurer is unlikely to think of these consequences
before he gives false testimony,"' and therefore,
the sanctions have little or no prospective deterrent
effect.
Maine grants a cause of action to a party de-
feated by the introduction of perjury by the ad-
verse party at a trial.113 The cause of action requires
a judgment obtained against a party, by perjury
of a witness introduced at trial by the adverse
party, resulting in damage to the party.114 The sta-
tute is an exception to the common law rule that
there is no civil remedy in favor of a defeated
litigant against a witness who committed perjury" 5
Public policy has denied civil remedies in perjury
cases in order to protect the proper functioning of
courts by enabling witnesses to make full and com-
plete disclosures without fear of subsequent tort
cases due to alleged false statements.1 6 Further,
subsequent tort cases for alleged perjury may
create endless litigation n7 Because of the dearth
of cases using this cause of action in Maine and the
fact that the remedy is only available after the
perjury occurs, it may be assumed that this remedy
also has little prospective deterrent effect.
A frequent recommendation is treating perjury
Uo0 Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.090 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN*
ch. 28, § 253 (1958).
" Howard v. Commonwealth, 395 S.W.2d 355,
(Ky.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 995 (1965). See also Com-
monwealth v. Bartel, 184 Pa. Super. 528, 136 A.2d 166
(1953).
12The New York statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW §
210.05 (McKinney 1967), which establishes penalties
for even immaterial statements suffers from the same
defect. Witnesses will not fear conviction for imma-
terial false statements unless they know that the
statute is being enforced.
"I MAINE REv. STAT. Tit. 14, § 870 (1964).
114 Cole v. Chellis, 122 Me. 262, 119 A. 623 (1923).
"5 Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d
118 (1959); Morgan v. Morgan, 129 Misc. 212, 221
N.Y.S. 117 (1927). But see Morgan v. Graham, 228
F.2d 625 (10th Cir. 1956) (A defeated litigant cannot
recover damages due to perjured testimony, but may
recover damages for false and fradulent acts and con-
duct); Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Transp. Co., 85 F.
Supp. 235 (W.D. Ark. 1949) (There is no cause of
action for subornation of perjury, but there is civil
redress if a party is damaged by the successful execution
of a conspiracy).
"16 Robinson v. Missouri Transp. Co., 85 F. Supp.
235 (W.D. Ark. 1949).




as contempt of court.18 The Supreme Court has
held, however, that the crime of perjury alone does
not permit summary contempt proceedings. 1 9
There must also be the additional element of the
obstruction of the court in the performance of its
duties. 10 Thus, this remedy would be limited to
cases where it was proved that the witness testified
falsely with the intent to obstruct the court.
A further proposal is to increase the penalties for
committing perjury.'2' This could be achieved by
increasing the statutory penalties for perjury and
through the application of the additional statutes
for the offense of obstruction of justice in perjury
cases. Obstruction of justice is defined as the spe-
cific intent to do an act which tends to impede,
influence or obstruct the administration of jus-
tice.14 The purposes of obstruction of justice
statutes are to protect participants in the specific
proceeding and to prevent the miscarriage of
justice.12' Because these are also the goals of per-
jury statutes, both perjury and subornation of
perjury have been construed as acts which obstruct
the administration of justice.'2' Hence, a perjurer
may be convicted not only for perjury, but also for
the separate offense of obstruction of justice if the
court finds that the false statement impeded the
court in its inquiry. 25 Increasing the penalties for
118 See, e.g., Black, supra note 56; Comment, Proof o
Perjury, supra note 77.
u9 In re Micheal, 326 U.S. 224 (1945).
120 Id.
" The older federal perjury statutes punish perjury
and subornation of perjury by fines of not more than
$2,000 or imprisonment of not more than five years
or both. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1622 (1966). The most
recent statute expands the maximum fine to S10,000
and imprisonment to five years. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1970).
New York determines the penalty according to the
degree of the offense. See note 75 supra. Minnesota
punishes false statements in felony trials by imprison-
ment of not more than five years or a fine of not more
than $5,000 or both. In all other cases the maximum
prison term is three years and the maximum fine is
$3,000. MmN. STAT. § 609.48 (1971). These penalties
are substantially lighter than those provided for in
early perjury statutes. See note 21 supra.
mSee, e.g., Knight v. Unites States, 310 F.2d 305
(5th Cir. 1962); Baker v. State, 122 Ga. App. 587, 178
S.E.2d 278 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1012 (1971);
People v. Coleman, 350 Mich. 268, 268 N.W.2d 281
(1957); People v. Longo, 16 App. Div. 2d 297, 227
N.Y.S.2d 815 (1962).
nUnited States v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.
1970).
24 United States v. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. 587 (D.
Conn. 1962); State v. Kowalczyk, 4 N.J. Super. 47,
66 A.2d 175 (1949).
"' United States v. Kahn, 366 F.2d 259 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 948, rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 984
(1966); Stein v. United States, 337 F.2d 14 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 927 (1965).
perjury, however, does not answer the fundamental
problem of the failure to enforce perjury statutes.
Stiffer penalties do not act as deterrents to perjury
unless perjurers are indicted and convicted.
Another proposal is the use of scientific means to
discover perjured testimony. 2' Polygraph tests
could be administered to witnesses to discover the
truth or falsity of their testimony in court. The-
oretically, the threat of a polygraph test would
compel witnesses to give truthful testimony. How-
ever, the results of polygraph tests have tradition-
ally been held inadmissible."7  Nevertheless,
prosecutors could possibly use polygraph tests in
investigations to determine whether to file perjury
charges. A frequent problem facing prosecutors is
whether there is sufficient evidence with which to
charge the defendant with perjury. Polygraph tests
which indicated that a witness gave false testimony
might give prosecutors the impetus to prosecute
for perjury. Although the polygraph evidence of
perjury would be inadmissible, it might give the
prosecutor the incentive to search for additional
evidence.
In sum, various remedies have been proposed for
the problem of perjury in the courts, but none have
provided an adequate answer. The fundamental de-
fect of these remedies is that they usually involve
sanctions which are imposed only after the perjury
occurs. In most cases the sanctions involve further
punishment of the defendant after he has already
been convicted of perjury. However, the funda-
mental problem of perjury is that perjury statutes
are rarely enforced. The additional sanctions can
only be effective as further deterrents of perjury if
perjury statutes are enforced and prospective per-
jurers know of this enforcement.
Conchusions
It is undenied by courts, prosecutors and com-
mentators that perjury is a frequent and sub-
stantial threat to the effective administration of
"2 See Walther v. O'Connell, 72 Misc. 2d 316, 339
N.Y.S.2d 386 (Civil Ct., 1972).
" United States v. Salazar-Gaeta, 447 F.2d 468 (9th
Cir. 1971); People v. Nicholls, 42 Ill. 2d 91, 245 N.E.2d
771 (1969). But see Reid v. State, 285 N.E.2d 279
(Ind. 1972); Walther v. O'Connell, 72 Misc. 2d 316,
339 N.Y.S.2d 386 (Civil Ct., 1972). In Reid, the court
admitted the results of the polygraph test since the
defendant expressly waived any objection to admission
of the test. In Walther, the court admitted the poly-
graph evidence in an action to recover an alleged oral
loan. The evidence was admitted on the grounds that
the test was administered by the court and was nec-
essary to determine which party of the action was lying
and which was telling the truth.
1974]
COMMENTS
justice. The offense prevents a fair and proper trial
in the particular proceeding and interferes in the
overall administration of the judicial system. It is
also undenied that a purpose of criminal statutes
for perjury is to act as deterrents to the offense.ms
Nevertheless, perjury statutes cannot properly act
as deterrents unless they are strictly enforced. Per-
jury cannot be deterred by court dicta noting its
evil effects. Neither can it be deterred by arguing
that the technicalities of the offense prevent simple
enforcement of perjury statutes. Perjury can only
be deterred by enforcing perjury statutes in in-
12 The Court has observed, however, that perjury
statutes are not the sole or even the primary deterrent
against perjury. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S.
352, 360 (1973). Nevertheless, the Court has provided
no other alternatives besides perjury statutes and pre-
cise questioning of witnesses as deterrents of perjury.
[Vol. 65
stances where perjury occurs. If witnesses, attor-
neys and other parties involved in judicial proceed-
ings believe that perjury and subornation of per-
jury will be prosecuted, then it may be assumed
they will be more hesitant to commit these offenses.
Moreover, the enforcement of perjury statutes will
have the obvious effect of punishing those who
commit perjury.
Thus, the remedy to the problem of perjury in
the courts may be the simple one of developing a
sterner sentiment in place of the apathy which
presently exists.129 If prosecutors and judges truly
believe that perjury is a threat to the judicial sys-
tem, then they should take positive steps to prevent
its occurrence.
'-" For an early advocate of this position, see Par-
rington, Frequency of Perjury, 8 CoLum. L. Rxv. 67
(1908). •
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TRENDS IN LEGAL COMMENTARY ON THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases
has been the subject of continual controversy since
the Supreme Court decision of Weeks v. United
States in 1914.1 Recent decisions by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Robinson2 and United
States v. Calandra2 will undoubtedly elicit further
debate. Since the Supreme Court may reconsider
the exclusionary rule in the near future,4 the clarity
1232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Robinson involved the arrest,
on a traffic charge for driving on a revoked license, of
Willie Robinson, Jr. of Washington, D.C. Pursuant to
certain regulations of the D.C. police force, the arrest-
ing officer was required to take Robinson into custody.
Thus, in this case, the officer made a full body search
after he stopped Robinson's auto. During the search,
the officer found several caps of heroin in a crumpled
cigarette package in Robinson's breast pocket. The
circuit court of appeals eventually held that the heroin
could not be introduced as evidence and that Robin-
son's conviction for its possession could not stand.
Their rationale was that, in making an arrest for a
traffic violation, a police officer was "substantially
safe" and, therefore, had no right to make more than a
cursory pat-down frisk for weapons. On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed. In a 6 to 3 decision, the
Court permitted an arresting officer to make a full
search of any person he has lawfully arrested, whether
he is searching for fruits of the crime for which he
made the arrest or simply for his own protection. In
writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist said, "a search incident to the arrest
requires no additional justification." Mr Justice Rehn-
quist then referred to the number of policemen killed
during traffic stops and the inherent danger to an
officer of taking a person into custody.
2414 U.S. 338 (1974). Calandra presented the ques-
tion whether a witness summoned to appear and testify
before a grand jury may refuse to answer questions on
the ground that they are based on evidence obtainedfrom an unlawful search and seizure. The Court in a
5-3 decision held that the exclusionary rule did not
exclude the use of illegally seized evidence in all pro-
ceedings or against all persons, and its application was
restricted to those areas where its remedial (deterrent)
objectives are thought most efficaciously served. The
Court emphasized that allowing a grand jury witness
to invoke the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere
with the effective and expeditious discharge of the
grand jury's duties and extending the rule to grand
jury proceedings would achieve only a speculative and
minimal advance in deterring police misconduct at the
expense of substantially impeding the grand jury's role.
'Certiorari was granted in the case of California v.
Xrivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), where the Court agreed to
reconsider the exclusionary rule. After arguments,
however, the Court did not decide the case but re-
manded it for a determination as to whether the state
court had based its decision on state or federal grounds.
This case may yet be heard if the California supreme
court decides that its decision was based on the federal
Constitution.
and persuasiveness of any additional commentary
for or against the rule will be critical.
The arguments for and against the rule have been
exhaustively presented. 5 Because the literature on
the question is extensive, no purpose would be
served by merely restating these arguments. In-
stead, the purpose of this comment is to evaluate
selected legal commentaries published at different
stages during the development of the exclusionary
rule and assess their impact to its development. In
other words, this comment will present a historiog-
raphy of the exclusionary rule. Case law references
will be made only to provide the judicial back-
ground necessary to detect its similarities or differ-
ences with legal commentary trends.
The Pre-Mapp Commentary
The first suggestion that evidence obtained by
an unreasonable search and seizure violated the
fourth amendment appeared, by way of dictum, in
Boyd v. United States.' This suggestion was severely
5 See, e.g., Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amend-
ment: A Requiemfor Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 1 (1961);
Allen, The Wolf Case Search and Seizure, Federalism,
and the Civil Liberties, 45 LIm. L. REv. 1 (1950); Burger,
Who Will Watch the Watchman? 14 Am. U.L. REv. 1
(1964); Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All American Mistake,
19 DEPAuL L. REv. 80 (1969); Driver, Confessions and
the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HAnv. L. REV. 42
(1968); Friendly, Thm Bill of Rights as a Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 53 CanN. L. REv. 929 (1965); Kamisar,
Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence
in State and Federal Courts, 43 Mnuw. L. REv. 1083
(1959); Katz, Supreme Court and the States: An In-
quiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina, 45 N.C.L.
REv. 119 (1966); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cur. L. REV. 665 (1970);
Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the
Police, 52 J. C~m. L.C. & P.S. 255 (1961); Traynor,
Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE
L.J. 319.
For some of the more recent commentary, see Cox,
The Decline of the Exclusionary Rule: An Alternative to
Injustice, 4 Sw. U.L. REv. 68 (1972); Gardner, The
Exclusionary Rule--Its Anticipated Demise-and A
Meaningful Alternative, J. CaL. LAW Eropc. 55
(1972); Horowitz, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule, 47
L.A. BAR Buit. 91 (1972); Milner, Supreme Court Ef-
fectiveness and the Police Organization, 36 L. & CON-
TEmP. PROB. 467 (1971); Wingo, Growing Disillusion-
ment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573 (1971).
See also F. INBAu, J. TraowsoN & C. SowiE,
CASES AWD CoMExNs ON CnmAL JUsTIcE: CaRar-
NAL LAW ADmINIsTRATION 1-84 (3d ed. 1968).
6116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd held that documents ob-
tained under an order of court pursuant to a statutory
provision which had authorized a court of the United
Vol. 65, No. 3
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criticized7 but it remained unchallenged for twenty
years.8 Adams v. New York 9 halted the development
of the exclusionary rule until 1914 when the Su-
preme Court in the celebrated case of Weeks v.
States in revenue cases on motion of the government
attorney to require the accused to produce in court his
private books and papers, were erroneously admitted
in evidence. The Court declared that both the fourth
and fifth amendments to the federal Constitution had
been violated. "We have already noticed the intimate
relation between the two amendments," wrote Mr.
Justice Bradley for the majority of the Court, "...
And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure
of a man's private books and papers to be used in evi-
dence against him is substantially different from com-
pelling him to be a witness against himself." Justice
Miller delivered a dissenting opinion in which Chief
Justice Waite concurred. The ground of the dissent was
that only the fifth amendment was violated, as there
was no search. Justice Miller in his opinion said:
I am of opinion that this is a criminal case within
the meaning of the clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States which de-
clares that no person 'shall be compelled in a crimi-
nal case to be witness against himself.' And I am
quite satisfied that the effect of the act of congress is
to compel the party on whom the order of the
court is served to be witness against himself. The
order of the court under the statute is in effect a
subpoena duces tecum and though the penalty for
the witness' failure to appear in court with the
criminating papers is not fine and imprisonment,
it is one which may be made more severe, namely,
to have charges against him of a criminal nature,
taken for confessed, and made the foundation of
the judgment of the court. That this is within the
protection which the Constitution intended against
compelling a person to be a witness against himself
is, I think, quite clear. But this being so, there is
no reason why this court should assume that the
action of the court below, in requiring a party to
produce certain papers as evidence on the trial,
authorizes an unreasonable search or seizure of the
house, papers, or effects of that party.
IDean Wigmore pointed out that logically there is
no search or seizure when a person is merely required
to testify, or, in the capacity of a witness, to bring a
document or chattel into court. WIoMoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 2264 (3d ed., 1940). In addition, he said, common
law doctrine that the admissibility of evidence is not
affected by the illegality of the means through which
the party has been enabled to obtain the evidence was
never doubted "until the appearance of the ill-starred
majority opinion of Boyd.. ." 8 A.B.A.J. 479-80
(1922); Wigmore noted in this article that Boyd was
thoroughly incorrect in its historical assertions and
dealt with matters outside the question at issue. Id.
Some of the case law at the time also considered the
dictum in Boyd illogical and improper, e.g., Van Hook
v. Helena, 170 Ark. 1083, 282 S.W. 673 (1926); Gore v.
State, 24 Okla. Crim. 394, 218 P. 545 (1923); Hoyer v.
State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923); State v.
George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 P. 683 (1924).
8 In 1904, the Supreme Court indicated that the
sef-incrimination provision had no application to
search and seizure, and that violations of the latter
guaranty would not be punished indirectly by excluding
the evidence. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
9Id.
United States 0 "reverted to the approach taken in
Boyd" 1 and for the first time adopted the rule of
exclusion in the federal search and seizure cases in
virtually its modem form. After a further extension
of the Rule in 1949,12 the Supreme Court in Mapp
v. Ohio" extended the exclusionary rule to its fullest
application by holding federal search and seizure
standards applicable to state courts.
Throughout the development of the exclusionary
rule, commentators have expressed various goals
which the rule was purportedly designed to
achieve. One of the leading articles of the early ex-
clusionary rule commentary published in 1925 was
written by Professor Thomas S. Atkinson 4 In
praising the rule, which at the time was applicable
only to the federal courts,15 he noted the ineffective-
ness of certain methods other than the exclusionary
rule to deter violations of the fourth amendment."
10 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Weeks the Court held that
documents and contraband lottery tickets illegally
seized were inadmissable because the taking was in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment. The Weeks doctrine
was reaffirmed in Gould v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921), where writings were seized illegally by federal
officers, and in Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313
(1921), where contraband liquor was found in a search
of defendant's home without a warrant.
1 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
12 In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Su-
preme Court held that unreasonable searches and
seizures by state law enforcement officials violated the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
states, however, were left to adopt whatever means
they desired to protect against such conduct.
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
1
4Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained
Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25
CoLuM. L. REv. 11 (1925).
16 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
16 Atkinson, supra note 14, at 24. Discussing the in-
effectiveness of both criminal and civil remedies, At-
kinson said:
Generally an innocent person whose rights have
been invaded will not seek civil relief unless there is
substantial physical or property injury. Courts and
juries are not in the habit of giving substantial
damages where there has been a mere violation of
privacy without visible loss. Few innocent persons
will lay out time and money in order to recover
nominal damages for the violation of a right, no
matter how fundamental and precious that right
may be. Yet the soul will be rankled and the people
dissatisfied. A guilty person is in even a worse posi-
tion. He could not even hope to recover more than
nominal damages unless the search was attended
by serious personal injury or destruction of lawful
property. Of course he could not recover the
amount of the fine or the value of his time during
imprisonment. The other alternative, a criminal
action against the offending officer, seems inade-
quate. If mere technical violations of the Fourth
Amendment are punished criminally, this would
discourage an officer from doing his duty whenever
there could be any doubt as to the legality of the
search. On the other hand, if punishment be con-
[Vol. 65
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Recognizing that the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence was a sanction less direct than criminal
and civil penalties, he pointed out that exclusion of
the evidence would nevertheless result in a real
means of enforcing the fourth amendment when all
other means practically failed.17 The deterrent ef-
fect would be real because "if the officers know that
the evidence which they obtain through violation
of the Amendment cannot be used, they will have
no incentive to indulge in even merely technical
violations." ' Despite the purported practical fail-
ure of "all other means" of enforcing the fourth
amendment, Atkinson recommended that "the
more violent and obvious infringement may be cur-
tailed through civil or criminal actions against the
guilty officers." 19
Atkinson's reply to the criticism that the remedy
of excluding evidence was too stringent because it
freed guilty defendants"0 was to note that the prose-
cution lost nothing to which it was lawfully en-
titled.n If officers regularly discovered guilty per-
sons by means of unreasonable searches, it was be-
cause the laws which they sought to enforce were
fatally unpopular or it was an argument in favor of
a judicial relaxation as to what was an unreasonable
search.22 "But so long as the Fourth Amendment
has a place in the fundamental law," he said,
"searches which are unreasonable must be discour-
aged by every feasible means." 2
The primary thrust of Atkinson's thesis, how-
ever, was that just as the evidence obtained in vio-
lation of the self-incrimination clause is excluded,"
fined to malicious violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment or cases in which substantial physical dam-
ages were done, the result would be that the force
of the Fourth Amendment would be gradually
whittled away. In addition, prosecutors are natu-
rally loathe to proceed against the officers who have
furnished them the convicting evidence. An example
of this is shown by recent experience. An amend-
ment to the National Prohibition Law provides
for criminal punishment of officers who make il-
legal searches. About three years have elapsed and
there is no reported case in which an officer has
been punished under its provisions. Cases are
numerous in which unreasonable searches were
made. The absence of cases punishing officers
criminally or giving compensation to persons whose
rights are violated shows that these means are not
adequate to preserve the Fourth Amendment as
part of our living law.
17 Atkinson, supra note 14, at 24.
1 Id.
19 Id.2




2 Atkinson stated that it was natural to make this
dichotomy between exclusion of evidence under the
the evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment should also be excluded as was sug-
gested in Boyd. Atkinson argued that every possible
legitimate reason of policy or social need for the
rule of self-incrimination could be urged for the in-
admissability of evidence procured by unreasona-
ble search. "Indeed, in some regards," he added,
"the latter presents the much stronger argument
for exclusion in evidence." 25
Approximately twenty-three years after Atkin-
son's article and about a year before the exclusion-
ary rule was expanded in Wol] v. Colorado,"6 Profes-
sor Fraenkel authored an article surveying the de-
velopments in the federal law of searches and seiz-
uresY His discussion of the exclusionary rule
re-inforced for the most part the acclamation of the
rule expressed by Atkinson. 'Most of the criminals
let go by reason of the application of the federal
rule might safely be in prison had the law enforce-
ment officers used more care in procuring the evi-
self-incrimination clause and inclusion of it under the
reasonable search and seizure clause in view of the
manner in which the clauses were separated in histori-
cal growth and constitutional statement. "Yet from
the standpoint of policy it would seem that the two
provisions have much in common," he said. Developing
this point further, he said:
They are both based upon the idea that the gov-
ernment's authority to infringe upon personal
privacy should be limited. The Fourth Amendment
is generally a limitation upon enforcement officers,
and the privilege against self-incrimination is a
limitation upon prosecutors and trial courts. The
former is ostensibly to protect physical privacy;
and the latter the privacy of one's knowledge.
Privacy is just as much and as unreasonably in-
fringed by the seizure of a document or a chattel
as by compelling a person to produce the same or
to testify concerning them in such manner as to in-
criminate himself; and the practical result is the
same. Indeed, if either infringement on privacy is
reasonable, it is the act done at the trial under the
supervising eye of the judge who can guard against
unreasonable abuses. The search cannot be so ef-
fectively restrained, for it is ordinarily conducted
by petty, free-lance officials, away from the eye of
the court. On this score the unreasonable search
presents a much stronger case for the exclusion of
the evidence obtained thereby than does the case
of self-incrimination. There is no inherent reason
for admitting evidence already found through an
unreasonable search and excluding it where the
evidence will not be learned until a witness is com-
pelled to testify or produce something.
Id. at 17. Some of the case law from Boyd until Wolf v.
Colorado followed an approach quite similar to the one
suggested by Atkinson. E.g., United States v. Lef-
kowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 466-67 (1932); Gould v. United
States, 255 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1921); Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1921).25 Atkinson, supra note 14, at 29.
26 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
27 Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Federal Law
of Searches and Seizures, 33 IowA L. REv. 472 (1948).
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dence against them," said Fraenkel.2 "It is un-
deniable, of course, that illegal searches continue
despite the risk that a conviction based on the
evidence seized may be reversed," he said, "but
that they would be much more numerous if there
were no such risk can hardly be doubted." 
29
Fraenkel maintained that in the last analysis, the
issue would be determined by what was considered
to be a greater good: to preserve the privacy of a
citizen or to catch a few criminals?30 He pointed out
that those who drafted the Bill of Rights made a
choice based on their reading of history; the wisdom
of the founding fathers still seemed best.31
The commentary of both Atkinson and Fraenkel
are fairly representative of the trend to expand the
exclusionary rule during the pre-Wolf years.32 These
proponents frequently asserted the deterrent effect
of the rule without referring to any empirical data
to corroborate such a conclusion. Neither Atkinson
nor Fraenkel considered the possibility that the ex-
clusionary rule could be an ineffective remedy. On
the contrary, both authors simply assumed that if
illegal searches were made futile, then the incidence
of illegally obtained evidence would be diminished;
or inversely, if lawless searches and seizures resulted
in convictions, lawlessness would flourish and
increase. This reasoning, said Professor John
Barker Waite, "is a logical enough theory, impreg-
nable in the library. But in light of eventualities it
appears to have been dim-visioned theory spec-
tacled in rose." 1 "Not a shred of evidence has been
2 Fraenkel, supra note 27, at 498.
21 Id. at 499.
30 Id. at 500.
31 Id. at 501.
2 For a detailed presentation of the pro and cons
during the pre-Wolf period see Plumb, Jr., Illegal En-
forcement of Ike Law, 24 CoRNamu L.Q. 337, 369-85
(1938-39).
1 Waite, Polie Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42
Micr. L. REv. 679, 685 (1944). While this criticism
was directed against the legal commentary, the ju-
diciary did not escape the wrath of Professor Waite's
criticism; he pointed out that the judicial decisions
were based not upon research, not even upon careful
evaluation of known data, but wholly upon the pre-
dilections of the particular judges who assume that
power to choose between competing nations. It was
not the choice of a scientist, not even of a social scien-
tist, he said. It was at best the empirical reaction of
individuals whose knowledge of realities varied greatly.
By no other less condemnatory theory, said Waite,
can the disparity of belief and divergence of judicial
opinion be explained. Waite stated that on the federal
bench itself, Holmes, Brandeis, Butler and Stone took
emphatic issue with Taft, Van Devanter, McReynolds,
Sutherland and Sanford. Yet not one of these judicial
statesman, choosing policies, making law for the
government of society, asked for information of the
discovered," added this critic, "to indicate that the
police of Ohio and New York, where use of evidence
is permitted, are worse behaved than the police of
Michigan and Illinois, where it is excluded." "
Professor Francis A. Allen, a supporter of the
rule, writing in 1950, noted that "one seeking to
discover the actual consequences of the Exclusion-
ary Rule in protecting individual rights of privacy
and its effects upon the process of law enforcement
cannot fail to be impressed by the paucity of em-
pirical evidence upon which anything more than
highly tentative conclusions may be based. Data to
supply adequate answers to even elementary ques-
tions is largely non-existent." 35 Fully aware of the
tentative nature of any conclusions on the subject,
Professor Allen nevertheless submitted that the
most powerful argument in support of the adoption
of the exclusionary rule came from a consideration
of the alternatives advanced to fulfill its func-
tion s
In meeting the traditional criticism of the exclu-
sionary rule, he conceded that the rule of exclusion
in a great many particular cases had resulted in the
release of defendants clearly guilty of serious
crimes.n This argument, he responded, seemed
predicated upon the assumption that effective law
enforcement required police misconduct in the form
of invasion of individual rights of privacy, for in all
such cases law enforcement was obstructed only to
extent that police officials themselves engaged in
unlawful conduct.P He suggested that if the in-
terest of individual privacy at some point seemed
to be outweighed by other important social inter-
ests the solution was not to abandon the exclu-
sionary rule but to reconsider the realities of law
enforcement in defining the scope of the right of
privacy.
89
Allen's recommendation to retain the rule was
based, in part, upon his difficulty in accepting the
proposition that the rule did not have any sub
stantial regulative effect. "Certainly, the rule sub-
jects the individual officers," he said, "to the pres-
realities upon which to predicate his choice. No one
would queston the intelligence of a Holmes. But what
knowledge of realities, asked Waite, does even a Holmes
possess---after four decades in the ivory towered
cloisters of an appellate bench? Id. at 684-85.
34Id. at 685.35 Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federal-
ism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. R.v. 1, 16-17
(1950).
36 Id. at 17.
3 Id. at 18.




sure of those charged with making an efficient
record of criminal convictions to avoid conduct
which imperils successful prosecution." 11
Much of the criticism directed against Atkinson
and Fraenkel is equally applicable to Professor
Allen. Although he was "fully conscious" of the
paucity of data surrounding the application of the
rule of exclusion, he proceeded to attribute a deter-
rent quality to the rule without offering any em-
pirical support for such conclusion. Only six years
earlier, Professor John Barker Waite had reiterated
in a Michigan Law Review articleA the findings of
a study originally published in 193342 in which he
said that "at least one-fourth of all the guilty gun-
toters discovered and arrested during that year es-
caped any penalty, not because they were innocent,
but solely because of the judge-made rule that
evidence of their guilt could not be used." 
4
The expectation that the exclusionary rule de-
terred police misbehavior was temporarily shat-
tered by a study" of the exclusionary rule in Illi-
nois.45 Despite the rigorous enforcement of the rule,
the study demonstrated that the right of privacy
was overwhelmingly disregarded by Illinois police
officers.48 However, in a series of public lectures
40 Id. at 20.
"Waite, supra note 33, at 687.
2 Waite, Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons, 31
MicH. L. REv. 749 (1933).
4 Waite, supra note 33, at 687-88. Professor Waite
stated that during one year 1,347 robberies were re-
ported, 237 persons were prosecuted for the felony of
carrying concealed weapons and only 134 were con-
victed. In nine of the failures to convict, the accused
had jumped bail. In other cases the weapon bad been
found on the floor of an automobile, without evidence
as to which of the occupants had possessed it; three
defendants were sent to insane asylums; and a razor
was held not to be a concealed weapon. But in at least
forty-one instances the prosecution had been dismissed
because the trial judge held the arrest unlawful be-
cause made on suspicion only. The consequent search
was held to be "unreasonable," and the evidence thereby
procured inadmissible. In a large number of other in-
stances arrests did not even reach the stage of accusa-
tion; the offenders were discharged by order of the
superintendent because it was obvious that the courts
would not permit use of the evidence. No one appears
to have investigated the number of liquor law violators
and other criminals released for similar reasons; nor
have similar releases in other cities been compiled. The
total number, however, must run into appallingly high
figures, concluded Waite. Id. at 688.
"Note, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement
of the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L.
Rzv. 493 (1952-53).
" People v. Castree, 311 Il. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924);
People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N. E. 728 (1923).
41 The data was gathered from a study of Branch 27
of the Chicago Municipal Court for the year 1950. The
study indicated that the rule clearly failed to deter any
delivered at the University of Chicago Law School
in July of 1952, Professor Jerome Hall asserted the
expectation again.47 Speaking on the subject of
police and law in a democratic society, Professor
Hall stated that daily discipline, thoughtful con-
duct and legal control of the police were decisive
factors in deterring illegal searches and seizures.18
He said the claim that admission of illegally ob-
tained evidence is necessary for efficient law-en-
forcement was "certainly not supported by the
record of federal prosecutions which show an
extremely high percentage of convictions." 4 He
suggested that perhaps this could be explained on
the ground of superior police service, but submitted
that it may also be true that such service was stimu-
lated by the federal exclusionary rule." Despite the
results of both Waite's police study" and the
Northwestern Law Review's survey of the Chicago
Municipal Court, 2 Professor Hall intimated that
the rule of exclusion could be an effective deterrent
device." In reviewing the various situations con-
fronting a police officer, Hall commented that
police ought to be able to combat crime without
substantial number of illegal searches. In 4,673 out of
6,649 cases, the legality of the method of obtaining
evidence was put in issue by the defendant. In 4,593 of
these cases, the court determined that the search had
in fact been illegal and granted the motion to suppress
the evidence. No cases were found in which conviction
was secure despite the suppression of the evidence.
Note, 47 Nw. U.L. Rav. 493, 497 (1952-53).
47 Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28
Inn. L.J. 133 (1953).
48Id. at 175.
4"Id. at 173-74. This analogy is not particularly
persuasive to the opponents of the rule because of the
differences between the FBI and state police forces.
These differences were succinctly summarized by Pro-
fessor Barrett as follows:
It should be noted that, in general, the federal in-
vestigating agencies, such as the F.B.I., Treasury
and Internal Revenue, operate with comparatively
large budgets and highly selected personnel and do
not face the same types of problems as do the local
police. The federal agencies are not charged with
maintaining law and order in large cities, nor are
they faced with the necessity of dealing constantly
with emergency situations and with the problem
of the criminal easily fleeing their jurisdiction to
avoid apprehension. A large portion of the federal
police work is of the type which permits long in-
vestigations and careful development of cases be-
fore arrest is made.
Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CAL. L.
Rxv. 565, 592 (1955).
" Hall, supra note 47, at 173-74.
51 Waite, supra note 33.
", Comment, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforce-
ment of the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 47 Nw.
U.L. Rnv. 493 (1952).
"Hall, supra note 47, at 173-74.
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triggering the adverse impact of the exclusionary
rule.54
The development of the exclusionary rule gained
much momentum during the years following Wolf
v. Colorado. In 1955 the influential Supreme Court
of California adopted the exclusionary rule in Peo-
ple v. Cahan.55 The majority opinion, written by
Chief Justice Traynor, examined in detail the argu-
ments for and against the exclusionary rule and
concluded that fifty years of California precedents
holding the evidence admissible should be over-
ruled.
We have been compelled to reach that conclusion
because other remedies have completely failed to
secure compliance with the constitutional pro-
visions on the part of police officers with the at-
tendant result that the courts under the old rules
have been constantly required to participate in,
and in effect condone, the lawless activities of
law enforcement officers.56
5 The police officers difficulties in law enforcement
were described by Professor Hall as follows:
The police officer's problem frequently require a
choice to be made between speedy solution of a
crime by methods which violate the Constitution
(even though in his jurisdiction the courts will
admit the evidence), and a delayed solution in order
to get the necessary evidence lawfully. These situ-
ations are distinguishable from those where search
warrants can be secured. If competent methods of
detection are patiently pursued, a suspect can often
be caught in the act of committing a crime or he
can be found in a room working with the instru-
mentalities and evidence of his criminal vocation,
e.g., in gambling, so that an arrest at that time does
not require ransacking an entire house to get the
evidence. More difficult problems are posed where
the police are dealing not with professional crimi-
nals but with a person who has committed a single
major offense. Here the temptation is great to seize
the hidden gun or the stolen property immediately.
Even in these situations, however, there is often
nothing to prevent one officer from keeping the
suspect under surveillance while another goes for
the search warrant. Besides, in dealing with a per-
son who has committed a single offense, the training
and resourcefulness of the police should more than
compensate for the delay in acquiring specific evi-
dence. In sum, if professional criminals, for exam-
ple, dealers in narcotics, are involved, it is usually
possible to secure a search warrant or, if there is
patience and skillful detection, to arrest them at a
strategic time and place; while in the cases of ama-
teurs, except for those attempting to flee the juris-
diction, the police can normally solve their crimes
without resorting to illegal searches and seizures.
That, at least, is a fair inference from the enforce-
ment records of states which follow the exclusion-
ary rule.
For a critic's view of the Exclusionary Rule and
police conduct see Peterson, note 75, infra.
1r 44 Cal. 461, 282 P.2d 905 (S. Ct. 1955).56Id. at 471, 282 P.2d at 911. The dissenting judges
concluded that the cost of adopting the exclusionary
Only thirteen years earlier, Justice Traynor
speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court of
California had vigorously reaffirmed the common
law rule of admissibility. 57 His personal view of the
reasoning behind his change of position was ex-
pressed in 1962 in an address at Duke University
School of Law. 8
My misgivings about its admissibility grew as I
observed that time after time it was being offered
and admitted as a routine procedure. It became
impossible to ignore the corollary that illegal
searches and seizures were also a routine procedure
subject to no effective deterrent; else how could
illegally obtained evidence come into court with
such regularity? It was one thing to condone ax
occasional constable's blunder, to accept his il-
legally obtained evidence so that the guilty would
not go free. It was quite another to condone a
steady course of illegal police procedures that de-
liberately and flagrantly violated the Constitution
of the United States as well as the state constituion.
It was the cumulative effect of such routine that led
us last in the case of People v. Caban to reject il-
legally obtained evidence. It had become all too
obvious that unconstitutional police methods of
obtaining evidence were not being deterred in any
other way.59
These observations by Chief justice Traynor had
been advanced in 1955 by Professor Edward L.
Barrett, Jr., in a comprehensive comment on Peo-
ple v. Cahan.1 Evaluating the existing law enforce-
ment situation in California prior to Cahan, Bar-
rett concluded that Cahan came when California
was badly in need of (1) a re-examination and def-
inition of the rules governing police searches and
seizures, and of (2) developing more effective reme-
dies for police violations of the rules~A
rule was too great. They urged, instead, the retention
of the exclusionary rule and a re-examination of the
state laws concerning the sanctions to be placed upon
illegal searches and seizures. Id. at 484, 282 P.2d at 919.
51 People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P.2d 44
(1942). In reaffirming the common law rule of ad-
missability, Justice Traynor, writing the majority
opinion, said:
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the
use of law of evidence thus obtained is so contrary
to fundamental principles of liberty and justice as
to constitute a denial of due process so long as it is
fair and impartial.... The fact that an officer
acted improperly in obtaining evidence presented
at the trial in no way precludes the court from ren-
dering a fair and impartial judgment.
Id. at 170-71, 124 P.2d at 47.
5 Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large In the Fifty
States, Dux L.J. 319 (1962).
59 Id. at 321-22.60 Barrett supra note 49.61Id. at 5 /8.
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The exclusionary rule continued its surge during
the forties and fifties as a means to deter police vio-
lations of search and seizure laws with substantially
no empirical support. In 1957, Professor Monrad
G. Paulsen joined the ranks of proponents of the
rule and reiterated the empirically undemonstrated
conclusion that the rule was the most effective
remedy against lawless law enforcement." Pro-
fessor Paulsen characterized the rule as a genuine
incentive devise for police departments to educate
their members in the constitutional rights of sus-
pected persons." He pointed to Wolf v. Colorado
where Mr. Justice Murphy in his dissenting opinion
presented an informal survey disclosing that states
using the rule emphasized this type of education
more than others." He cited California as an addi-
tional example of where the rule adopted in Cahan
stirred a great deal more police interest in the
search and seizure law than was the case before.A5
The rule's favorable commentary during the
fifties" reiterated most of the standard arguments
presented by previous generations,"7 but was not
supported by any empirical studies. Writing in
1965, Professor Wayne R. LaFave observed that
notwithstanding the existence of the exclusionary
rule on the federal level for nearly half a century
and in many states for almost as long, there was no
systematic attempt to measure the precise impact
of the rule or to determine its limitations."3 Instead,
the proponents merely acknowledged this paucity
of data and then proceeded to enunciate their
"tentative" conclusions. The issues were simply
phrased as a struggle between effective law enforce-
ment and the right to privacy.69 In resolving this
dilemma, the proponents rarely looked beyond the
law library although the issues were primarily
factual. Two important empirical studies7 indi-
6Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of Search and




"See, e.g., Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic
Society, IN. L.J. 133 (1953); Paulsen, Safeguards in
the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L, REv. 65
(1957).
"See, e.g., Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Ob-
tained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25
CoLum. L. REv. 11 (1925); Fraenkel, Recent Develop-
ments in the Federal Law of Searches and Seizures, 33
IOWA L. REv. 472 (1948).
13LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through
the Exclusionary Rule-Part I: Current Police and Local
Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 394 (1965).
19 E.g., Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Federal
Law of Searches and Seizures, 33 IowA. L. REv. 472,
501 (1948).70Waite, supra note 33; Comment, Search and
cating the ineffectiveness of the rule were either
ignored or explained awayY' More conveniently,
the proponents postulated that the protection to
individual privacy afforded by the exclusionary
rule would be greater than the loss of protection to
society.
Another characteristic of the literature during
the fifties and also common in the earlier com-
mentary was the near unanimous agreement that
all remedies except the exclusionary rule were
inadequate to deter police misbehavior.72 It was
logically explained that criminal sanctions-judi-
cial or statutory, were "inherently" weak and the
civil sanctions were an illusory relief. These con-
tentions were usually empirically unsubstantiated.
Not all the pre-Mapp commentary praised the
rule or expected it to function effectively. In 1957,
Virgil W. Peterson unleashed a rigorous critique of
the ruleY "As amazing or incredulous as it may
seem," he said, "we are rapidly approaching the
position where the right of privacy of the criminal
is to be considered paramount to any right society
may have to be protected from crime planned or
committed in secrecy." 7 4 Peterson acknowledged
that it was of the utmost importance that individ-
uals rights receive adequate protection. But he
urged that it did not follow that the judicially
created exclusionary rule was the proper method of
achieving this objectiveY5 He noted that the rule,
Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of the Constitutional
Right of Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 493 (1952).71 In evaluating the statistical study of the operation
of the rule in a branch of the Municipal Court of Chi-
cago made by the student editors of the Northwestern
University Law Review, Professor Paulsen observed
that the data was partial and inconclusive. It suggested,
said Paulsen, "that the Chicago police engaged in a
great deal of harrasment of gamblers by bringing cases
which they knew they could not win." He also com-
mented that little attention was paid to the rules of
law in these cases. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and
Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRan. L.C. & P.S. 255,
262 (1961). The data above was given another interpre-
tation by an opponent of the rule. He observed that it
was obvious, from an analysis of the court records that
the exclusionary rule was a failure in its objective of
deterring police misconduct. Peterson, Law and Police
Practice: Restrictions in the Law of Search and Seizure,
52 Nw. U.L. Rev. 46, 56 (1957-58).
2 This characteristic was particularly noted in At-
kinson, Admissibility of Evidence obtained through un-
reasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 CoLrm. L. Rzv. 11
(1925).
73 Peterson, supra note 71.74 Id. at 48-59.75 Id. at 60. Peterson referred to two general weak-
nesses of the rule. One was the side effect of its appli-
cation-freeing a dangerous or potentially dangerous
criminal; the other weakness was the confusing and
often contradicting judicial definitions of *reasonable
search and seizure. Id. at 46 et seq. For a chilling ex-
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while failing to prevent one type of abuse, was
creating others that were advancing a general dis-
respect for the law, its agencies of enforcement, the
courts, and the Constitution itselfY6
Another dissenter from the generally favorable
commentary of the fifties was Professor John
Barker Waite7r who had expressed his dislike for
the rule several years earlier.7 8 Professor Waite
castigated the judiciary for its role in adopting
and perpetuating the exclusionary rule. His thirty
page indictment commenced as follows:
One does not happily charge the judiciary with re-
sponsibility for the country's burden of crime,
but the responsibility does in fact exist. Judges,
though they may not encourage crime, interfere
with its prevention in various ways. They deliber-
ately restrict police efficiency in the discovery of
criminals They exempt from punishment many
criminals who are discovered and whose guilt is
evident. More seriously still, they so warp and alter
the public's attitude toward crime and criminals
as gravely to weaken the country's most effective
crime preventive.79
Waite's serious charge and Peterson's harsh
critique apparently did not serve to dampen the
enthusiasm of those who lauded the rule. In a sym-
posium on the exclusionary rule regarding illegally
seized evidence conducted by Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law in 1960,80 the enthusiasm for
the rule prompted Frank J. McGarr, a panel par-
ticipant, to recognize that in arguing against the
rule he was taking "a somewhat lonely position." 81
It was indeed a lonely position for a year later the
Supreme Court of the United States imposed the
federal exclusionary rule upon all the states32 The
rule had run its full course. Initially conceived by
way of dictum in 1886, the rule had become the
supreme law of the land three quarters of a century
later.
ample of the first weakness see Peterson, supra note 71,
at 54-55.
7 Id. at 60. Chief Justice Burger has also expressed
this view. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman? 14
Am. U.L. REv. 1, 12 (1964).
7 Waite Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 Mica. L.
REv. 169 (1955).
7 Waite, supra note 33 and 41.
79 Waite, supra note 71.
80 This symposium was probably the last pre-Mapp
debate. McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule Regarding Il-
legally Seized Evidence--An International Symposium,
52 J. Cnmr. L.C. & P.S. 245 (1961).
81 McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule: An Ill Conceived
and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J. CRw. L.C. & P.S. 266
(1961).
8 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
81 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
Post-Mapp Commentary
Much of the pre-Mapp debate addressed to the
question of whether the police were in fact deterred
became, to some extent, largely academic." Writing
four years after Mapp, Professor LaFave suggested
that the concern should now be "whether the Ex-
clusionary Rule is doing as good a job of improving
police performance as one might hope, and if it is
not, whether the factors which contribute to this
result can be identified." 5 In an article devoted
to this inquiry, he outlined three requirements to
harmonize the exclusionary rule with effective law
enforcement: (a) that the law on arrest, search, and
seizure be developed in some detail and in a manner
sufficiently responsive to both the practical needs of
law enforcement and the individual right of
privacy, (b) that these laws be fashioned in a man-
ner understandable by the front-line lower-echelon
police officer and that they be effectively communi-
cated to him, and (c) that the police desire to ob-
tain convictions be sufficiently great to induce
them to comply with these requirements. 8' He
noted that it was fair to say that, currently (1965),
deficiencies in all three respects existed. In an-
other study co-authored with Remington in 1964-
65, the authors analyzed the judge's role in making
and reviewing law enforcement decisions and con-
cluded that the exclusionary rule's limited impact
was attributable in large measure to inadequate
communication between the police and the
courts s
Both of these articles typified the earnest at-
tempts after Mapp to accommodate the seemingly
inconsistent interests of effective law enforcement
and right of individual privacy. The authors em-
phasized not whether police enforcement was
hampered by the rule but the necessity that the
courts gain a better understanding of the factual
bases of police action, the underlying policies being
furthered by such action, and the necessity of the
police to be more effectively informed as to what
must be done to avoid exclusion. 9
8' LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through
the Exclusionary Rule-Part I: Current Police and
Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 395 (1965).
85 Id.86Id. at 395-96. These three requirements reflect,
for the most part, the criticism of the rule expressed
by Peterson, supra note 71, and Barrett, supra note 49,
among others.
87 LaFave, supra note 68, at 396.
8 LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The
Judges' Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforce-
ment Decisions, 63 Mrcn. L. RPv. 987, 1012 (1964--65).89Id.
[Vol. 65
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Another effort to foster a favorable environment
for the orderly development of the exclusionary
rule after Mapp v. Ohio was made by Chief Justice
Traynor in 1962. 90 He expressed hope that his own
experience with exclusionary rule problems (reject-
ing the rule in 1942"1 and accepting it in 195512)
would serve as a useful introduction to the responsi-
bilities awaiting the states after Mapp."1 However,
Chief Justice Traynor stressed that the initiative in
giving meaning to Mapp rested with the state
courts.14
This spirit of adjusting to Mapp evidenced by
Traynor, LaFave and Remington, however, did not
prevail. In an address to the National District At-
torneys' Association on July 26, 1961, Professor
Fred E. Inbau berated the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Mapp v. Ohio for "taking it upon itself,
without constitutional authorization, to police the
police" and for its function "at times as a super-
legislative body." "1 Professor Inbau's disgust with
Mapp was succinctly expressed in the following:
Individual rights and liberties cannot exist in a
vacuum. Alongside of them we must have a stable
society, a safe society; otherwise there will be no
medium in which to exercise such rights and lib-
erties. To have "rights" without safety of life,
limb, and property is a meaningless thing. Indi-
vidual civil liberties, considered apart from their
relationship to public safety and security, are like
labels on empty bottles. 6
This criticism evoked a reply from Professor
Yale Kamisar.17 Unlike many previous supporters
of the exclusionary rule, Kamisar confronted Inbau
with substantial data to support the purported
merits of the rule." The ensuing debate" between
,0 Traynor, supra note 53.
91 People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P.2d 44
(1942).
2People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905
(1955).
" Traynor, supra note 58, at 321.
94 Id. at 328.
95 Inbau, Public Safely v. Individual Civil Liberties:
The Prosecutor's Stand, 53 J. Czitn. L.C. & P.S. 85, 86
(1962).
96 Id. at 95.
97Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties:
Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. Cns L.C. & P.S.
171 (1962).
98Kamisar's observations about the exclusionary
rule's impact upon law enforcement were documented
with letters from the Attorney Generals of California
and Minnesota and the United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia. Id. at 179-81. Numerous em-
pirical references were also cited along with various
federal and state crime statistics. Id. at 184-90.
99Inbau, More About Public Safely v. Individual
Civil Liberties, 53 J. Cans. L.C. & P.S. 329 (1962);
Kamisar, Some Reflections on Criticizing the Courts, and
Professors Inbau and Kamisar demonstrated that
the merits of the rule were far from settled after
Mapp. Despite Kamisar's persuasive and atypical
defense of the exclusionary rule, it is fair to state
that the post-Mapp commentary trend began to
slowly move toward the anti-exclusionary rule
position.
This new trend was strengthened in 1964 by the
disenchantment with the exclusionary rule ex-
pressed by Warren E. Burger, then a Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia 0 ° Judge Burger traced the evolution of
the rule and noted that although the Supreme
Court had steered a waivering course--confusing
and even contradictory at times-the Court now
appeared to have settled upon the need for deter-
rence of police violations as the principal reason for
exclusion. 0' He then challenged the capability of
the rule to accomplish this stated purpose of deter-
rence. "As I see it," said Judge Burger, "a fair con-
clusion is that the record does not support a claim
that police conduct has been substantially affected
by the suppression of the prosecution's evi-
dence." 102 He offered four reasons why this may be
so: (1) the rule did not deter policemen because it
imposed no undesirable consequences upon them,'
(2) the basic training of a policeman was rarely ade-
quate to make him understand what he could and
could not do in all situations,"e4 (3) no effective
"Policing the Police," 53 J. Cane. L.C. & P.S. 453
(1962). For some of the commentary provoked by this
debate see Note, 53 J. Cram L.C. & P.S. 231-32, 501-
02 (1962).
10' Burger, supra note 76.
101 Id. at 10.
10id. at 11.
103 How then are police deterred in the future be-
cause a court today rejects evidence seized illegally
a year ago? I am informed by experts that a police-
man is rarely disciplined for action declared illegal
by a court as a basis for suppression. Curiously,
those in the legal world who contend most ardently
that deterrence of crime by punishment is an out-
moded concept are among the most vocal in claim-
ing a deterrent effect for the suppression of evi-
dence. If prisons do not deter forbidden conduct,
how can we think that a policeman will be deterred
by a judicial ruling on suppression of evidence
which never affects him personally, and of which
he learns, if at all, long after he has forgotten the
details of the particular episode which occasioned
suppression? This is an important issue which pro-
ponents of deterrence-by-suppression must meet;
it cannot be swept under the rug.
Id.
1041 doubt that policemen have the time or inclina-
tion to read the opinions of appellate courts, and
even if they did so it is hardly likely they would
grasp their fullimport without sustained expert guid-
ance... It is unlikely that without some special
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mechanisms of communication to inform and edu-
cate police existed in any real sense in metropolitan
police departments,1 5 and (4) the operation of the
"Suppression Doctrine" unhappily brought before
the public eye a spectacle repugnant to all decent
people-the frustration of justice. °6 In recom-
mending the abolishment of the rule, Judge Burger
concluded his article with the following suggestion:
We can well ponder whether any community is en-
titled to call itself an "organized society" if it can
find no way to solve this problem except by sup-
pression of truth in the search for truth. 07
Approximately a year after Judge Burger's com-
mentary, another prominent jurist called for the
modification of the exclusionary rule. 00 Judge
Henry J. Friendly submitted that it was inconsist-
ent with the objective of deterrence that the maxi-
mum penalty of exclusion should be enforced for
an error of judgment by a policeman, "necessarily
formed on the spot and without a set of the United
States Reports in his hands." 109 He proposed that
the rule be applicable only to "intentional or
effort and outside help he will ever understand what
he did wrong in a given case. Moreover we cannot
blame him too much for not accepting what he
does not understand.
Id.
101 In most cases a policeman does not hear or learn
about the ultimate disposition of the case that fails
because of his acts, or if he does, it may be years
later. If he reads a newspaper account of the dis-
position of the case, the chances are it will be a
garbled version which indulges in the overworked
oversimplification that the prosecution was 'thrown
out' because of 'technicalities.' If the officer in the
particular case gains an understanding of what
error led to suppression, and the reason for suppres-
sion, he will be less likely to repeat that error. If
this missing element of understanding is supplied
to the particular officer, it is likely that his fellow
officers would become aware of the problems in de-
tail and that others would learn from his experi-
ence.
Id. at 12. Professor LaFave said this criticism did not
counsel for the abandonment of the rule but for more
effective police-judge relationship to maximize the in-
tended purpose of the rule. LaFave and Remington,
supra note 88.
100The impact of the doctrine is dramatic and
easily understood, while the important reasons
underlying it are almost beyond comprehension to
most laymen, including most police officers. This is
one of the major causes of popular discontent with
the administration of the criminal law. Addition-
ally, it has operated and will-until explained-op-
erate as a demoralizing element in law enforcement
agencies.
Id. 07 Id. at 23.
100 Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REv. 929 (1965).
109 Id. at 952.
flagrantly illegal" police activity. It was no objec-
tion that such modification would require courts to
make still another determination, said Judge
Friendly. "The recognition of a penumbral zone
where mistake will call for the drastic remedy of
exclusion would relieve [the court] of exceedingly
difficult decisions [focusing on] whether an officer
overstepped the sometimes almost imperceptible
line between a valid arrest or search and an invalid
one." 110
These two judges typified the two general early
sixties post-Mapp attack upon the exclusionary
rule: one urged its abolishment and the other its
modification. However, both judges resorted to
factual documentation of their arguments as infre-
quently'm as most proponents of the pre-Mapp
exclusionary rule. just as the latter had repeat-
edly advanced factless arguments that the rule
would deter police misconduct, the opponents of
the rule now were similarly asserting that the rule
was not deterring such police misconduct.
The enthusiasm for the rule began to dwindle in
the late sixties. Although the rule had been in op-
eration since 1961 it did not appear to accomplish
its stated purpose of deterrence. Yet no empirical
studies were conducted to certify this appearance.
However, in 1970 the first detailed empirical study
of the rule's effectiveness was conducted by Dallin
H. Oaks, then a professor at the University of
Chicago."' He scrutinized all the available data and
concluded that the data did not provide any "em-
pirical substantiation or refutation of the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule." " His own judg-
ment was that the exclusionary rule was "a failure"
as a deterrent.n 4
Professor Oaks' findings became the most potent
weapon available in the early seventies to the
0 Id. at 953.
m Quite reminiscent of the way pre-Mapp proponents
of the rule had prefaced their conclusions, Judge
Burger prefaced his conclusions about the ineffective-
ness of the exclusionary rule as follows: "No empirical
evidence is available to support a claim that significant
deterrence has been the result of the [Exclusionary]
doctrine." Burger, supra note 76, at 10. Chief Justice
Burger observed that in recent years Supreme Court
opinions have begun to indicate some hint of doubt and
skepticism that suppression of evidence operates to de-
ter future illegalities. Id. The validity of this proposition
is dubious in view of the authority cited--a 1954 Su-
preme Court opinion, Irving v. California, 347 U.S.
128, 136 (1954)-which had been clearly repudiated by
the time Judge Burger made this statement. See Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
n2 Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rode in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. Car. L. REv. 665 (1970).
un Id. at 709.
- Id. at 755.
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steadily rising number of critics of the exclusionary
rule. 1 The factless arguments previously advanced
against the rule by Burger and Friendly were reas-
serted by other critics "1 and buttressed by the find-
ings made by Oaks. The appeals for adjustment
sounded by Traynor in 1962 and LaFave and
Remington in 1964 and 1965 were ignored.
Aside from its influence upon the trend against
the rule, the Oaks study also stimulated needed
empirical research. Thus, three years after Pro-
fessor Oaks' study, another major and exhaustive
study was conducted by James E. Spiotto." 7 The
latter's study corroborated the findings of the
earlier study that police misbehavior was not de-
terred by the exclusionary rule.
This new systematic and detailed research-ori-
ented literature began to dispel the deeply rooted
notion that the exclusionary rule deterred search
and seizure irregularities. Aware of the success of
this approach, other critics pursued similar studies
to substantiate the purported futility of the exclu-
sionary rule. An excellent opportunity for this
factual trend to reach the Supreme Court was
presented in Slate of California v. Krivda."2 One of
the questions considered was whether the exclu-
sionary rule should be modified in state trials. In an
amicus brief in support of modification of the rule,
the Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, and
the International Association of Chiefs of Police
presented the Court with an empirical study indi-
cating that during the twenty-seven month period
of January, 1970 through March, 1972, the ap-
pellate courts nationwide found police conduct in
cases of warrantless search and seizure to be proper
in six out of every seven cases 9 A.E.L.E. con-
"' See the recent articles cited in note 5, supra.
116 Id.
U7 Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study
of the Exclusiomary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J.
LEGAL Strums 243 (1973).
m 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
n9 Brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforce-
ment, Inc., and the International Association of Chiefs
of Police, as Amci Curiae in Support of the Petitioners
at 4 [hereinafter cited as A.E.L.E. Amicus Brief]. Cali-
fornia v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
The cases studied were characterized as those
in which the policeman, on the street, must make
his own decision as to whether to proceed with a
given search or not, [and] as cases in which the
officer is acting on his own with no assistance
from a magistrate or prosecuting attorney, cases
in which his activity must stand or fall based on
his own judgment, knowledge of search and seizure
restrictions, and his desire to abide by such re-
strictions.
Id. at 16.
The results of the study were explained as follows:
tended that these findings demonstrated the dedi-
cation to lawful and proper conduct of law enforce-
ment officials. These figures further indicated, ac-
cording to A.E.L.E., that police professionalism in
the search and seizure area was such that the abso-
lute sanctions of the exclusionary rule were no
longer constitutionally mandated.2 0 In meeting the
reasonable inference that this study evidenced the
beneficial exclusionary rule influence upon law e.
forcement, A.E.L.E. argued that the threat of the
exclusionary rule was not an effective sanction to
police misconduct as indicated by the Oaks study.m
The reasons for the high incidence of proper police
conduct were attributed, instead, to "police pro-
fessionalism: an attempt by the majority of police-
men to know, at least in a general way the restric-
tions on their search and seizure activities and a
good faith desire to comport themselves properly
within such restrictions." 122
In an attempt to demonstrate the deleterious ef-
fect of the exclusionary rule upon society and upon
law enforcement, A.E.L.E. in Krivda again pursued
the factual oriented attack. It collected brief sum-
maries of sixteen sample cases in which the exclu-
sionary rule was applied in recent years. 12l These
cases purportedly demonstrated instances in which
convictions were reversed or highly probative
evidence was suppressed in cases involving serious
crimes committed by the offender and relatively in-
substantial "violations" by police officers. 24 The
impact of these factual presentations remains un-
known because the Supreme Court, after hearing
arguments, did not decide Krivda; the Court re-
manded it for a determination of whether the state
court had based its decision on federal or state
grounds.
1'2
Although Krivda was remanded, the possibility
that the exclusionary rule may soon be reconsid-
ered is likely. The two most recent Supreme Court
Of 1,371 cases involving warrantless searches and
seizures by the police which were decided by ap-
pellate courts during the 27 month period covered
by the study, the police conduct of the search and
seizure was upheld as lawful in 1,157 cases and held
to be unlawful in 214 cases. Thus six of every seven
searches and seizures studied were upheld by re-
viewing courts; 84% of police search and seizure
procedures were found to be proper upon appellate
review.
Id. at 16-17.
'20 A.E.L.E. Amicus Brief, at 17.
n' Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
m Id. at 10. For the case summaries see Appendix to
brief.
124 Id.
1'2 California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
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cases 28 dealing with the rule may be construed as
indicative of the Court's disposition to proceed in
that direction. As of this writing, the Supreme
Court of California had not determined whether
Krivda was decided on the basis of the state consti-
tution or the federal Constitution. Should that court
resolve this ambiguity in favor of the federal Con-
stitution, an appeal to the Supreme Court would
follow and Krivda could well provide the awaited
vehicle for the narrowing or even abolishing the
exclusionary rule.
A decision by the Supreme Court narrowing or
abolishing the exclusionary rule would not be sur-
prising in view of the recent legal commentary
trend. The factual justification expounded in Mapp
is under such attack that continued judicial ad-
herence to the rule might be empirically unsound.
Some commentary has suggested however that the
Supreme Court will hesitate to reconsider the ex-
clusionary rule until a suitable remedy can be
found 2 7 Others have urged the Court that "con-
cern over viable alternatives should not prevent the
Court from reconsidering the Rule." m "If the
Exclusionary Rule were effective and meaningful
as a deterrent," it was argued, "it might be proper
to ponder the necessity for replacing it with some-
thing else.... If the Exclusionary Rule has no de-
terrent effects, its absence will not leave a void to
be filled." 12
12 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
w See, e.g., Gardner, The Ezclusionary Rule-Its
Anticipated Demise-And A Meaningful Alternative,
J. CAL. LAW EDOM 55, 56 (1972). This view has also
been expressed by Chief Justice Burger quoted in
Gardner, Id.
m Brief of the State of Illinois as Amincus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 10. United States v. Robinson,





Most recently, the commentary trend has de-
parted, to a great extent, from the generally
polemic and intuitive arguments of the past. Un-
like previous commentary, the recent commenta-
tors are both evaluating the factual justification of
the exclusionary rule with detailed empirical stud-
ies and proposing alternatives to it."' Although the
accuracy of these empirical studies remains to be
scrutinized, their influence has been significant.
However, this influence has not yet moved the
Supreme Court to change the exclusionary rule.
Nevertheless, a general observation about this
recent literary trend is proper: The methodical and
detailed empirical approach to the exclusionary
rule will probably influence the Court the same way
that the enthusiastic and generally factless com-
mentary influenced the Court in Mapp v. Ohio.
I'l Katz, Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry
into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina, 45 N.C.L. REv.
119 (1966); Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Il-
legally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 283. The
two leading and most recent empirical studies are Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. Cma. L. Rlv. 665 (1970) and Spiotto, Search and
Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule
and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STEnixs 243 (1973).
For additional references see note 5, supra.
For literature commenting on alternatives to the
exclusionary rule see Davidow, Criminal Procedure
Ombudsman as a Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule:
A Proposal, 4 TEx. TEcH. L. Rxv. 317 (1973); Kates &
Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131 (1972);
Roche, A Viable Substitute for the Exclusionary Rude:
A Civil Rights Appeals Board, 30 WAsH. & LEE L. REV.
223 (1973); Comment, Use of § 1983 to Remedy Un-
constitutional Police Conduct: Guarding the Guards, 5
HAv. Civ. RiGirrs-Clv. LiB. L. REv. 104 (1970);
Comment, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for
Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YArE L. J. 143
(1968); Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under
42 U.S.C. §1983, 55 MmNN. L. REv. 1201 (1971); Note,
Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Congressional Assault
on Mapp v. Ohio, 61 GEo. L. J. 1453 (1973).
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